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**FRAMING SECURITY:  
A TRI-CULTURAL DISCOURSE ANALYSIS OF NEWSPAPER REPORTS  
ABOUT THE UNITED STATES MILITARY IN OKINAWA**

**A DISSERTATION SUBMITTED TO THE GRADUATE DIVISION OF THE  
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



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We certify that we have read this dissertation and that, in our opinion, it is  
satisfactory in scope and quality as a dissertation for the degree of Doctor  
of Philosophy in Political Science

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## ABSTRACT

In this dissertation, I use "discourse analysis" to examine the ways in which American, mainland Japanese, and Okinawan newspapers covered the issue of American military bases in Okinawa during a period of intense media attention on the United States-Japan military alliance. This period began with the rape of an Okinawan schoolgirl by three American servicemen in September 1995 and continued until April 1996, when a joint declaration by President Bill Clinton and Prime Minister Ryutaro Hashimoto reaffirmed the necessity of the American military bases in Japan. My central thesis is that during this period, newspaper reporters in all three areas "framed" their stories in ways that supported the ideological hegemony of cultural elites within their particular societies.

I begin by defining the relevant terms such as "hegemony," "ideology," "discourse," and "framing." I then identify four competing ideological models regarding the American military bases in Japan. I define the "Security Model" as a pro-base way of understanding the issue that focuses on external threats to Japan and to American interests in the Pacific. The "Cooperation Model" focuses on domestic benefits of the American military bases to all the three areas. The "Imperialism Model" focuses on the danger that American bases will involve Okinawa in external conflicts. The "Occupation Model" focuses on the

ways in which the bases are a threat to the domestic peace and well being of Okinawans.

A discourse analysis of six newspapers—two American, two mainland Japanese, and two Okinawan—confirms my theses. Both Okinawa newspapers mirrored the local government's Occupation Model ideology. Both American newspapers showed a preference for the same Security Model propositions and themes that were favored by the Clinton Administration. The ideological direction of the two Japanese newspapers was less clear. I conclude that this is because the Japan central government—while exerting strong influence on the press—maintained a contradictory and poorly articulated ideological position regarding the base issue.

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# CHAPTER 1

## INTRODUCTION

### Overview

In the mid-1990s, the southern Japanese island of Okinawa garnered headlines worldwide as the site of one of the first major post-Cold War challenges to the American military's presence in Asia. The media attention began with reports of the rape of a 12-year-old Okinawan girl by three United States Marines. This crime ignited smoldering anger at the overwhelming presence of the United States military in the tiny island prefecture, and fueled an already active campaign by Okinawan Governor Masahide Ota to rid the island of American bases.

In this dissertation, I use "discourse analysis" to examine the way in which two American, two mainland Japanese, and two Okinawan newspapers covered events in Okinawa during the peak of this anti-base activity from September 1995 until April 1996. My central thesis is that newspaper reporters in the United States, mainland Japan and Okinawa "framed" their stories in ways that supported the ideological hegemony of cultural elites within their particular societies.

This thesis is strongly influenced by Antonio Gramsci's understanding of the relationship between hegemony and ideology. I define cultural elites as

those individuals and groups (both public and private) within a society that work to perpetuate a dominant mental model of reality—an ideology. In this way, cultural elites are analogous to Gramsci's concept of a diffuse "State" comprised of both governmental and private entities that share an interest in maintaining the status quo power relationships. Gramsci defined "hegemony" as the State's use of ideology to obtain the consent of the working classes for their continued domination by the ruling classes.

I understand hegemony as the use of discourse to naturalize the position of subordinate groups (to make them appear to be common sense). I understand discourse to be both the social act of communication and the language and social practice that take their shape from specific ideological models of reality. Discourse naturalizes power relationships by creating identities, or subjectivities, for both dominant and subordinate groups, which can only be understood from within its engendering ideology. This understanding of ideology and hegemony is in closest agreement with the way in which a variety of scholars in the fields of political science, sociology, linguistics, and media studies have expanded Gramsci's idea beyond its Marxist origin (see Chapter 2). Discourse analysis allows the researcher to see the way in which identities are constructed in texts and thus whose mental models, or ideologies, are dominant.

My research shows that during this eight-month study period, American newspaper discourse on the United States military base-issue was grounded

in an ideological model favored by American elites that views military security as necessary and proper. Okinawan newspaper reports favored a discourse on the dangers and inequalities created by the American bases that expresses the ideological models of Okinawan elites. On the mainland of Japan, central government and other cultural elites did not articulate a strong position regarding the American base issue. As a result, national newspaper discourse focused on the confusion and debate within the Japanese central government rather than the events in Okinawa, or their implications for United States-Japan relations.

### **Background: The Okinawa Base Issue and the Press**

Since the end of World War II, Okinawa has served as the United States' "Keystone of the Pacific," the county's primary fortress in Asia. The United States maintains approximately 47,000 American troops in Japan. About 60 percent of this force—28,000 soldiers—are stationed in Okinawa Prefecture. What is more, while this island represents just 0.6 percent of Japanese territory, it houses 75 percent of all American military installations in Japan. American Military bases occupy one-fifth of the prefecture. During the Cold War, the American government viewed these bases as essential for containing communism. In turn, the threat of communism helped contain the discontent of

a large number of the 1.2 million Okinawans who felt unfairly burdened by the huge military presence.

At first, the thousands of demonstrators who took to the streets to protest in the wake of the "schoolgirl rape" were demanding changes in the United States-Japan Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) that many believed gives unfair extra-territorial rights to the American military personnel. However, events soon took the debate beyond this issue and toward demands for a withdrawal—or at least major reduction—of the American bases.

The rape occurred just months after the United States Department of Defense had published its *United States Security Strategy for East Asia-Pacific Region* (Department of Defense). This report outlined the Clinton Administration's post-Cold War justification for maintaining 100,000 troops in Asia. The principal post-Cold War threat identified by the report was uncertainty—uncertainty about the intentions of North Korea and the future of United States-China and China-Taiwan relations; uncertainty about what an American withdrawal from the region would mean to international trade or the balance of power in the region.

At about the same time, Governor Masahide Ota began using the approaching 50th anniversary of the end of World War II to call attention to his own ideology—that in the absence of a clear external enemy, the American military itself had become the clearest threat to the well-being and economic

development of his island. This claim appeared to be validated by the schoolgirl rape.

For a time, Okinawan, American, and mainland Japanese media attention was sustained by the realistic possibility that this clash of ideology could significantly alter the United States-Japan security relationship. This changed in April 1996, when President Clinton and Japanese Prime Minister Ryutaro Hashimoto signed the "Joint Declaration of Security for the 21st Century," which reaffirmed the United States-Japan Treaty of Mutual Defense and Security.

At the same time, the leaders made some concessions to the demands of Okinawans by giving their approval to the recommendations of the Special Action Committee on Okinawa (SACO). Among the suggestions of this committee, established in the wake of Okinawan unrest, was that the problematic Futenma Marine Corps base be relocated from the congested central part of the island to a less intrusive location within the prefecture.

In Okinawa, the base issue was far from solved by this declaration, and local media attention on the problem remained strong despite the actions of the two national leaders. American and mainland Japanese news organizations tended to accept the joint statement as a resolution of the problem. As New York Times Tokyo Bureau Chief Nicholas Kristof said, "For me [the agreement] was the end of the story, because it was clear from that point on that the

problems in Okinawa were not going to significantly change the U.S.-Japan relationship" (N. Kristof, personal communication, November 24, 1997).

### **A land of Competing Identities**

Okinawa provides a particularly useful test case for the study of ideological discourses in the news media. For centuries, this island has existed as a land of competing identities. Okinawa is the largest of the Ryukyu Islands, an archipelago that stretches from Japan's southernmost main island, Kyushu, to within 70 miles of Taiwan. The island's capital city, Naha, lies at the very crossroads of Asia. Within a 550-mile radius are Taipei, Shanghai, and Pusan. Within 900 miles lie Seoul, Manila, Hong Kong and Tokyo. The island's history has been marked by the struggle to maintain an indigenous sense of self even as more powerful nations have attempted to impose their own identities on it.

Early in the 14th century, Okinawa was the principal island in the independent Ryukyu Kingdom, which sought to expand its ability to trade with neighboring China-controlled countries by means of itself becoming a Chinese tributary. Because of its distance from the seat of Chinese power, this relationship afforded the Ryukyu Kingdom virtual political autonomy while allowing it to reap the benefits of far-flung trade and intercultural exchange (Kerr).

Although its language is related to Japanese, Okinawa has a distinct culture that owes much to its interaction with other parts of Asia during this period. To this day, allusions to this "Great Era of the Ryukyus" are common in the Okinawan mass media. Anti-base activists, politicians, and those who write about them often reflect upon this historical period—when peace was maintained by trade, not force—as a model for a military-free future. Media outside of Okinawa occasionally make mention of the islands' independent past without fully understanding the ideological significance of this period.

This "Great Era" came to an end in the early 17th century when Okinawa was invaded by Japan's Satsuma clan. This Kyushu fiefdom annexed the Ryukyu Islands closest to its home territory and reserved to itself ultimate political control over the rest. The Ryukyu Kingdom otherwise remained intact and able to continue its trade relationship with China. This strange period of limited self rule and dual suzerainty ended in the late 19th century when Japan's new Meiji government deposed the Ryukyu king and formally annexed the remaining islands. Many Okinawans see the arrival of Satsuma as the beginning of a long period of discrimination by mainland Japanese that continues to this day (Kerr).

## **Postwar United States-Japan-Okinawa Relations**

The United States took control of Okinawa through the final and bloodiest battle of World War II. After months of island-hopping campaigns, the American military planned to use Okinawa as a launching pad for its final offensive against the Japanese mainland, a strategy made unnecessary by the atomic bomb. For the United States, the 11,000 GIs who perished in the fight bought the island with their blood and made American military leaders reluctant to give up control of the island (Fisch, p. 70). To Okinawans, the more than 100,000 civilian dead symbolize Japan's willingness to sacrifice their lives to protect more important mainland Japanese.

In the immediate post-war years the Ryukyu islands under United States control were largely neglected (Fisch, p. 181). When the Cold War began, America quickly realized the strategic value of the island. In 1952, Japan was able to negotiate an early peace treaty with the United States, which ended American occupation of the mainland, partly because of its willingness to again sacrifice Okinawa. This time it ceded indefinite control of the island to the United States as part of the agreement. A Cold War mentality that places a high value on military security has guided much of the American news about Okinawa ever since. The Okinawan media are informed by a different ideology that looks to the battle for Okinawa as an example of the horrors of militarism,



and the sacrifice of Okinawan civilians as evidence of Japanese discrimination ("Governor Ota at the Supreme Court," p. 4).

The American military on Okinawa prefers to discuss the period of direct United States control of the island as the United States "administration" not "occupation." They emphasize that during this time, Americans and Okinawans worked together to rebuild cities and industries, and that Okinawa's postwar recovery was propelled by the availability of hundreds of good-paying, on-base jobs and high rents paid to Okinawans who own land used by the United States military (Fisch, 178). Many Okinawans do, in fact, accept that the presence of the American bases has been beneficial to their island. However, more forcefully articulated is the elite perspective that this period was not simply an American "occupation" but a "colonization." A time when the United States military used "bayonet and bulldozer" to appropriate one fifth of the island's land for military bases that exploited the island and its population to serve American interests (Ota, 1997, p.2).

During this period of direct American control, the United States exerted a strong influence over the content of local newspapers (Sakuda). Today, many Americans complain that Okinawan newspapers have swung to the other extreme, ignoring anything positive regarding United States military and focusing instead on problems such as base-caused noise, crime, accidents and pollution, which are represented as part of a pattern of abuse and disregard for Okinawan human rights.

Throughout the 1960s, many Okinawans demonstrated against the bases and in favor of the United States returning their island to Japan. It was widely believed that under the United States-Japan Security Treaty, revision would bring a more equitable redistribution of the American military presence throughout all of Japan. This was not to be. A condition of the 1972 reversion agreement between Japan and the United States was that America would keep all its bases on Okinawa. Once again, Okinawans felt betrayed by both Japan and America.

### **Post-Reversion Relations and the Press**

Today, while American and mainland Japanese news media focus on efforts to ease or compensate for the inequitable distribution of American bases in Okinawa, Okinawan news media use terms such as "continued occupation" to bemoan how little things have changed.

American military representatives claim that since reversion, The United States has made remarkable gains in decreasing American-caused crime, accidents and pollution on the island. Approximately 8,500 Okinawans are still employed by the bases, which account for about 5 percent of the prefecture's economy. What is more, each year the Japanese central government compensates the island for the burden of the bases by providing millions of yen

more in aid and economic incentives to Okinawa than it gives to any other prefecture (Barrett, p. 143).

The Okinawan press tends to focus on protests and demands for a speedy withdrawal of American forces from Okinawa with little discussion of how to sustain the economy or utilize the returned land once the bases are gone. Even more rare is discussion of whether the bases are still necessary for the defense of Japan given the end of the Cold War. One possible reason is the belief, prevalent in many areas of Okinawan society, that the bases were never necessary for defense, but rather have existed only to serve other American interests. Many Okinawans feel the real incentive for America to keep its bases on their island is the willingness of the Japanese central government to pay much of their operating costs, not regional security.

Mainland Japanese news media tend to focus on how the base issue affects internal politics and United States-Japan relations rather than either the economic issues or the security issue. This likely stems from the influence of a different kind of elite pacifist ideology. Throughout the postwar era, Japanese politicians and other societal leaders obeyed an unspoken taboo on actively debating the security issue. Politicians feared such debate could undermine the United States-Japan security treaty, a pact that enables Japan to maintain Article 9 of its "peace constitution," which outlaws war and the creation of Japanese offensive military capabilities.

Despite more than half a century of United States-Japan post-war history, most Americans are largely unaware of challenges to the United States-Japan mutual-security paradigm such as those described above. Likewise, many Okinawans have only a vague understanding of the United States' security rationale that supports the presence of American troops on their main island. Mainland Japanese tend to be even less informed. This study considers ideological bias in the news media as a possible explanation for this lack of mutual understanding.

### **Chapter Overview**

In this dissertation I attempt to answer four sets of research questions: 1) What is ideology and how is it related to culture and discourse? Can the journalistic practice of framing be understood in terms of discourse? 2) What are the ideologies of the cultural elite in the United States, mainland Japan, and Okinawa with regard to American military bases in Japan? Can these ideologies and their relationships to each other be represented in a systematic way? 3) Are there cultural or structural conditions within the print media of the three areas that would predispose reporters to favor one discourse or ideology over another? And, 4) Can a journalistic preference for elite ideologies be demonstrated through an examination of newspaper texts?

Chapter 2 deals with the first of these questions. In it I present my definitions of several key terms including "ideology," "discourse," and "framing." I discuss how other scholars in the fields of sociology, linguistics, and communication studies has applied the concepts of hegemony and ideology as put forth by political theorist such as Antonio Gramsci and Louis Althusser. I show that discourse can be thought of as both the social act of communication and the language associated with particular ideological models. I argue that the journalistic practice of "framing" is best defined as the process of creating a primary news discourse through the recontextualization of various other discourses. For example, a reporter covering the Okinawa base issue frames his or her story by incorporating (or recontextualizing) the various voices (discourses) of Okinawans, United States military officials, Japanese politicians, etc., into a new news discourse on the subject. I argue that this news discourse, or "frame," can be considered ideological if it assumes a common-sense attitude toward elements of an elite world view that defines a group identity in terms of relationships of power and domination.

In Chapter 3, I consider the question of systematically representing the various ideologies regarding the American bases on Okinawa. I explain how the many propositions and attitudes contending on this subject can be organized into four principal ideological models. Two of these models are pro-base and two are anti-base. Two take as their primary concern problems

arising outside the United States-Japan security alliance. Two focus on problems originating within the alliance.

In Chapter 4, I address the question of whether socio-cultural practices of reporters and the structure of the news organizations for which they work incline them to favor the elite ideology of their particular area. I compare the post-war histories of Okinawan and Japanese newspapers and the evolving relationship between reporters and American and Japanese government authorities. I discuss the Japanese news values and news-gathering systems. I then look at the problems American reporters face when covering Japan including their lack of resources and general unfamiliarity with Japanese language and customs. I discuss how the expectations of their news organizations often lead American reporters to focus on Japanese "Otherness" and how stereotyping is often used as tools for engaging readers and providing them with a mirror of themselves.

I then turn to the question of whether a preference for elite ideologies can be demonstrated through an examination of newspaper text. To answer this question, I conduct a discourse analysis of news stories about the base issue that ran during the period from September 1995 (when the three United States servicemen were accused of the schoolgirl rape) until April 1996 (when President Clinton and Prime Minister Hashimoto signed their joint declaration).

I selected six newspapers for study; two American papers, the *New York Times* and the *Washington Post*, two Okinawan newspapers, the *Okinawa*

*Times* and the *Ryukyu Shimpo*, and two national mainland-based Japanese newspapers, the *Asahi Shimbun* and the *Yomiuri Shimbun*.

I divided the stories from the study period into two separate case studies. Chapter 5 deals with the coverage of the September 1995 schoolgirl rape and the months of protests and demands for changes in to the SOFA that the crime engendered.

Chapter 6 examines how reporters in the three areas covered Governor Ota's refusal to act as the proxy signatory on private land leased to the United States military, and the campaign to reduce and consolidate the bases that led to the SACO recommendations.

Finally, in Chapter 7, I attempt to draw some conclusions regarding all of the study questions, discuss the significance and limitations of this study, and offer some suggestions for further research.

## **CHAPTER 2**

### **IDEOLOGY, DISCOURSE, AND FRAMING**

This dissertation uses a "discourse analysis" of American, Okinawan and mainland Japanese newspapers to demonstrate how news reporters tend to frame their stories in ways that support the ideological hegemony of cultural elites within their particular societies. To understand what this means, one must first know how I define the concepts of, "ideology," "hegemony," "cultural elite," "discourse," and "frame." Each of these terms is used widely by researchers in a variety of academic disciplines. Consequently, definitions and uses vary and often overlap. Adding to the confusion, a number of scholars use various other terms to express concepts that are similar to, but not exactly the same as, those associated with these key words.

In this chapter, I first explain how I understand ideology and its relationship to the "hegemony" of "cultural elites." I then discuss my definition of "discourse" and explain how it is related to the journalistic practice of framing. Finally, I will discuss my approach to discourse analysis and show how this technique can be used to uncover the ideology inherent in news frames about American military bases in Okinawa.



## Ideology and Hegemony

### **Gramsci's Concept**

In traditional Marxist theory, ideology is understood as the "false consciousness" of the working class. Because the ruling class controlled the means of production and distribution of ideas, Marx believed workers had no alternative but to view their domination by the economic elites as inevitable and right. "Herein lies the falseness" (Fiske, p. 165). Marx argued that eventually the disparity between the material realities of working class and ruling class lives would cause workers to realize this the error of their thinking. A newly enlightened working class would then overthrow the economic system that produced the ideology that kept them oppressed.

Gramsci became dissatisfied with this traditional concept of ideology as he witnessed Italian workers rejecting Marxism and continuing to participate in their own domination by the ruling classes. Rather than a false consciousness imposed upon the unwitting working classes, Gramsci theorized that ideology was the means by which the ruling classes *convince* workers to accept their own domination. Stuart Allan explains that Gramsci's contribution was in determining that control through coercion was "the exception rather than the rule," and that most elites maintain their power through persuasion and consent (Allan, p. 108).

For Gramsci, ideology was not static. He accepted that, as Marx predicted, the working class would be regularly confronted with disparities between their lives and those of the ruling classes. Therefore, the dominant classes needed to constantly adapt their ideology in order to continually win and rewin working class acceptance of the political system that oppressed them. Gramsci identifies this process of manufacturing consent as "hegemony." What is more, Gramsci saw hegemony taking place through a system of public and private organizations that had an interest in maintaining status quo power relationships and could be collectively thought of as the "State."

The school as a positive educative function, and the courts as a repressive and negative education function, are the most important State activities in this sense; but, in reality, a multitude of other so-called private initiatives and activities tend to the same end—initiatives and activities which form the apparatus of the political and cultural hegemony of the ruling classes (Gramsci, p. 258).

Allan explains that Gramsci's concept of ideology meant that:

A ruling group is hegemonic only to the degree that it acquires the consent of the other groups within its preferred definition of reality. More specifically, these subordinate groups are directed to negotiate reality within what are ostensibly the limits of 'common sense' when, in actuality, this common sense is consistent with dominant norms, values and beliefs (Allan, p. 108).

## **Althusser and Ideology as Elite Culture**

Like Gramsci, the French philosopher Althusser became dissatisfied with the traditional Marxist theory of ideology and created a new definition that involved commonsense (rather than class sense) assumptions about reality. Althusser went so far as to reject the fundamental Marxist concept that the ideology was a product of economic s and a tool for the material elites. Instead, he saw ideology as a force unto itself with the independent power to shape consciousness. Rather than the ruling class imposing its ideas on subordinate class, he saw ideology as "an ongoing all-pervasive set of practices in which all classes participate" (Fiske, p. 174).

In this way Althusser saw ideology as a kind of dominant culture. In fact, his understanding of ideology is similar to Clyde Kluckhohn and William Kelly's definition of culture as "a historically derived system of explicit and implicit designs for living, which tend to be shared by all or specially designated members of the group" (Kluckhohn and Kelly, p. 98).

The fact that Althusser believes that all classes participate in the ideological practices of a culture "does not mean that the practices themselves no longer serve the interest of the dominant, for they most certainly do," says Fiske. "What it means is that ideology is much more effective than Marx gave it

credit for because it works from within rather than without—it is deeply inscribed in the ways of thinking and ways of living of all classes (Fiske p. 174).

For Althusser, the power of these explicit and implicit designs for living lay in the ability of ideology/culture to "engage the subordinate groups in its practices and thus to lead them to construct social identities or subjectivities for themselves that were complicit with it, and against their own socio-political interests" (Fiske, p. 177).

Althusser is often criticized for implying that since it is the foundation for the construction of individual identity, the control of ideology/culture is irresistible. "The logical conclusion of his theory is that there is no way of escaping ideology, for although our material social experience may contradict it, the only means we have of making sense of that experience are always ideologically loaded; so the only sense we can make of our selves, our social relations, and our social experience is one that is a practice of the dominant ideology" (Fiske, p. 177).

### **Hegemony as a Cultural Struggle**

Raymond Williams approached ideology in much the same way as did Althusser—as a model of reality that is experienced. However, Williams differs from Althusser by combining this idea with Gramsci's concept of hegemony. This he sees as a continual struggle by the elite cultural group to reaffirm its position of dominance through constant rearticulation of its model of reality and

the continual renegotiation (and compromise when necessary) with those other cultural forces that oppose it (Allan, p. 110). In other words, Williams's theory, while embracing the idea of ideology as a kind of culture, provides for resistance to ideological domination that is absent from Althusser's theory.

I accept this concept of ideology as a particular culture's "lived system of meaning" or model of the world. I also accept the idea of a dynamic hegemony that requires the dominant ideological group—the cultural elite—to continually reaffirm its model of reality. The question then arises as to the medium through which this hegemonic struggle takes place. The answer is provided by a group of scholars who believe ideology is embedded in discourse. However, like the term ideology, "discourse" is a contested concept with various definitions.

### **Defining Discourse**

I understand discourse to be both the social act of communication and the language and social practice that take their shape from specific ideological models of reality. This definition is strongly influenced by Norman Fairclough's efforts to synthesize two ways of thinking about discourse that are generally considered independently, each being associated with a different area of academic study.

As Fairclough (1995) points out, researchers in the fields of language study tend to use discourse in the first sense, that is as "social action and

interaction, people interacting together in social situations" (p. 18). On the other hand, post-structuralist social theorists in the tradition of Michel Foucault tend to use discourse to indicate "a social construction of reality, a form of knowledge" (p.18). Fairclough's attempts to fuse both meanings into a single definition stem from his work on the language of news. He sees news as both a conversation—discourse—between writer and reader and a system of structuring competing linguistic constructions of reality—the discourses of the story subjects.

Fairclough's contribution is in articulating an understanding of discourse that is less clearly presented in much of the discourse analysis literature. For example, Linguist Teun van Dijk (1988) defines discourse in the former sense that is as "a communicative event." However, he acknowledges that each communicative event is itself "a complex unit of linguistic form, meaning, and action" (p.8).

[A communicative event] is not limited to the actual verbal utterance, that is, to the text or dialogue itself. Especially for the analysis of talk, it is obvious that the speaker and the hearer, their personal and social properties, and other aspects of the social situation belong to the event" (van Dijk, 1988, p. 8).

In other words discourse is not just what is said, but also the voice of shared understandings, or models, of how the world works that underlie and guide the language of the conversation. Van Dijk (1988) believes news stories and other kinds of written or printed communication fall into the "communicative

event" category of discourse. "The writer of the text and the readers are less closely participating in one spatiotemporally identifiable situation" (p.9), he says. Yet both writer and reader do share a conversation-like social relationship. Writers expect that their readers will understand their meanings. They write with the belief that they share with their readers certain knowledge of the world and language. In other words, "writer and reader are engaged in a form of sociocultural practice" (van Dijk, 1988, p. 9).

Fairclough accepts this idea of news as a social practice or communicative event. However, he sees news not simply as one communicative event (a discourse), but as an "extended chain of communicative events (Fairclough, 1995, p. 41). He uses discourses as a counter noun with each discourse being "a type of language associated with a particular representation, from a specific point of view of some social practice" (Fairclough, 1995, p. 41). In other words, discourses are the ways in which people talk about their mental models of the world.

Communicative events (discourses) differ in the fields of social activity that they represent, and in how they represent them. A communicative event is itself a form of social practice, and what it represents are other social practices, and more often than not other communicative events. The question is, then, which social practices and which communicative events are represented in particular types of communicative events (Fairclough 1995, p. 41).

News, then, is a series of discourses, each being subsumed into, or in Fairclough's terminology "recontextualized" into, a primary news discourse. For

example, in Okinawa, Governor Masahide Ota had a particular mental model of the problem of American bases on his island that was manifest in a particular discursive representation of that model. Japanese central government officials had their own models of the problems, and their own ways of representing those models in language, as did the Clinton administration.

We can ask how one type of communicative event [news discourse] 'recontextualizes' the others—what particular representations and transformations it produces, and how these differ from other recontextualizations of the same event. The general point is that communicative events and social practices are recontextualized differently depending upon the goals, values and priorities of the communication in which they are recontextualized (Fairclough 1998, p. 41).

This dissertation does just that. It asks how one type of communicative event recontextualizes the others—how the various discourses regarding the American military bases in Okinawa are recontextualized into the primary news discourse of American, Japanese and Okinawan newspaper reports. I identify this recontextualized news discourse as a news story's "frame."

### **Discourse and Framing**

This usage of the term "frame" differs somewhat from how others in the field of discourse analysis use the word. For example, Fairclough uses the term "framing" to describe just one way that a variety of discourses are



recontextualized into the primary news discourse. He defines a frame as the linguistic features that surround and give interpretive direction to a discourse. For example, a statement by a Libyan official may be framed in a neutral way, "Libyan officials said that," or the writer may position the reader to doubt the statement with framing clues such as "Libyan officials claimed that" or even "made out that" (Fairclough 1995, pp. 80-83).

Journalists themselves sometimes use "framing" to refer to their efforts to find a vantage point or "angle" from which to view the events or data they are reporting. As Gaye Tuchman says, framing involves turning occurrences into events and events into stories (p. 193). In this sense, a "frame" is similar to a literal window frame that allows a person indoors a limited and tightly selected view of the outside world. Tuchman notes that what one sees through a frame depends on "whether the window is large or small, has many panes or few, whether the glass is opaque or clear, whether the window faces a street or a backyard" (p. 1).

I have chosen to use the term "framing" to refer to not just the selection of words surrounding discursive features, but to denote the entire process of "recontextualization." I use the term "frame" to refer to the primary news discourse—that view of the outside world—that results from recontextualization of other discourses. I have chosen these broadened definitions for two reasons. The first is for clarity. It is less confusing to discuss the way reporters "frame"

competing discourses than it is to discuss the way reporters create news discourse by using framing to recontextualize other discourses.

The second reason is to draw upon the work of other media analysts, primarily in the social sciences, who use the term "news frame" in much the same way that linguists—and other discourse analysts—use the term "news discourse." The difference between those who speak of frames and those who use news discourse is largely in the focus of their studies rather than in conceptualization. Discourse analysts primarily study text to understand the act of conversation that takes place between writer and reader. Those who study news framing tend to focus on the social practice of newsgathering that results in that conversation.

Sociologist Erving Goffman originated the term framing to explain how people make sense of the vast amount of raw data they must process each day. Speaking not of news per se, but of all avenues of human experience, Goffman says that frames work not simply as interpretations, but as "*schemata of interpretations...that render what would otherwise be a meaningless aspect of [a] scene into something that is meaningful*" (p. 21, my emphasis).

Primary frameworks vary in degree of organization. Some are neatly presentable as a system of entities, postulates and rules; others—indeed, most others—appear to have no apparent articulated shape, providing only a lore of understanding, an approach, a perspective (Goffman, p. 21).

Todd Gitlin applied Goffman to his own study of the mass media. He suggests that news framing involves:

Principles of selection, emphasis and presentation composed of little tacit theories about what exists, what happens, and what matters. In everyday life... Media frames are persistent patterns of cognition, by which symbol-handlers routinely organize discourse, whether verbal or visual (pp. 6-7).

Both these concepts are quite similar to Fairclough's idea of reporters recontextualize competing discourses into an overarching news discourse that is shared by writer and reader.

### **Models: Scripts, Propositions, and Attitudes**

Van Dijk, defines the ideological models that give shape to discourse as large organizations of "scripts" and "attitudes." He says scripts:

may be thought of as abstract, schematic hierarchically organized sets of proposition, of which the final nodes are empty (default values) so that they can be applied to different situations by filling in such terminal nodes with specific information (1988, p. 21).

I find this terminology useful because the single word, "script," can express a variety of ideas such as Goffman's "system of entities, postulates and rules" (p. 21), or Gitlin's "little tacit theories about what exists" (pp. 6-7).

Van Dijk explains scripts with an analogy from everyday life. He says when people go grocery shopping they automatically engage a "supermarket script" that helps them execute their actions there. The script includes general understandings such as, "In a supermarket one can buy food or household articles, there are shopping carts, one can select and take the articles oneself and at the end one pays the cashier" (1988, p. 21).

Van Dijk also defines an "attitude" as a hierarchy of shared beliefs or "schematic representations of general opinions, that is, evaluative beliefs about social events, structures, or issues (such as public education, nuclear energy, or abortion)" (1988, p.21).

van Dijk does not have a term for the bits of information that he says are incorporated into the "terminal nodes" of a script. However, the idea of such information coincides well with what Goffman identifies as "strips," which he says refer to:

any arbitrary slice or cut from the stream of ongoing activity, including here sequences of happenings, real or fictive, as seen from the perspective of those subjectively involved in sustaining an interest in them. A strip is. . . any raw batch of occurrences. (p. 10)

One may have an *anti*-military mental model of the situation in Okinawa, which consists of a hierarchy of scripts on the dangers and injustices created by the American bases there. One particular script on the bases and their relationship to crime may consist of an organization of propositions about the

actions of soldiers: soldiers are trained to be violent; violent training decreases sensitivity to human rights; soldiers often commit crimes because they have low sensitivity to human rights. An anti-military mental model of the base situation may include attitudes such as: The American government is uncaring; its soldiers are arrogant and cruel.

The script on crime in the *pro*-military mental model of the situation in Okinawa may be comprised of propositions such as: military training creates high levels of discipline and cognition of civil duty; disciplined soldiers are less likely to commit crimes than other people; soldiers who commit crimes are unrepresentative of the whole, they have failed in their training. A *pro*-base mental model may include such attitudes as: The American government is generous; its soldiers are brave, selfless, and gallant.

Strips of occurrences are then incorporated into these models by being absorbed into the "terminal nodes" of these scripts and attitudes. For example, the strip of occurrence that was the "schoolgirl rape" may be absorbed into the *anti*-military model through its scripts and attitudes in this way: Military training creates insensitivity to human rights, soldiers are cruel—that is why three American soldiers raped this schoolgirl. Or, the strip of occurrence may be absorbed through the terminal nodes of the *pro*-military model's scripts and attitudes: Military training creates a high cognition of civil duty and discipline, soldiers are gallant—that is why American soldiers on Okinawa are so disgusted by the actions of these "bad apples."

Framing often involves the use of special language or codes to activate various scripts and attitudes. For example, a reporter who refers to Yugoslavian "President" Slobodan Milosevic invokes a particular attitude regarding public trust and a script on elected stewardship of government. The phrase Yugoslavian "Dictator" Slobodan Milosevic activates an attitude of distrust and a script on oppression.

Syntax can also favor one discourse over another by invoking different scripts and attitudes. The sentence, "When the atomic bomb was dropped on Japan" presents a passive lament to the act that evokes an attitude on near historical inevitability. The active, "When the United States dropped the atomic bomb on Japan," evokes a sense of culpability and invites reflection on the actions of Americans. Various news genres also activate different discourses. For example, an interview, while often shaped by editing and commentary, gives the news subject a voice. On the other hand, journalistic narratives of events often subsume many voices into the voice of the reporter (Fairclough, 1995).

Framing can be thought of as both the expressing and updating of models. van Dijk explains:

If we process media reports about the attack of the United States Air Force on Libya in April 1986, we build a mental model of that event with the help of the information from these reports. Part of that particular model however, is also instantiated fragments of general information we already have about military operations, Libya, the Mediterranean, the Middle East, or terrorism—information that might have been derived from

previous media reports. Later texts may be used to update the model with new details. And this is precisely one of the central cognitive functions of news discourse. (1988, p.21).

Reporters frame stories by drawing upon their own models—primary frames—of the world—internalized scripts and hierarchies of attitudes about such things as terrorism and the role and value of the American military—when they recontextualize the discourses of Libyans and Americans or American soldiers and Okinawans into a new news discourse. The readers create their own models of the world or update existing models by interacting with the news discourse. In this communicative event, it is assumed that the mental models of the reader and writer have many scripts and attitudes in common.

Combining all these ideas into a comprehensive theory of framing, one could say that: Reporters write news stories based on their models—primary frames—which consist of systems of beliefs and opinions—scripts and attitudes—about events. Many of the people about whom reporters write have different mental models of the particular situation, and are incorporating the "news item"—or strip of occurrence—in different ways. Reporters must negotiate the different mental models of their sources, as represented by their discourses. They do this by framing—or recontextualizing—those discourses into their news discourse—the frame of a story. Reporters assume that this frame will be accepted and understood by their readers, who share the reporters' world view, or model, or at least many of the same scripts and

attitudes that constitute that model. The reader can use this news discourse to build a new model of the events described or to update an existing model.

## **News Framing as Intentionally Ideological**

Michael Parenti believes this process of framing news is intentionally ideological. He says:

The most effective propaganda is that which relies on framing rather than on falsehoods. By bending the truth rather than breaking it, using emphasis, nuance, innuendo, and peripheral embellishments, communicators can create a desired impression without resorting to explicit advocacy and without departing too far from the appearance of objectivity (p. 220).

Parenti contends that "while iconoclastic views may on rare occasions make their way into the news, the general thrust is never out-of-step for too long with the pro-capitalist, anti-socialist, cold war containment perspective propagated by the government" (p. 206).

Noam Chomsky and Edward Herman also believe the American press favors anti-socialist, pro-capitalist, cold war ideologies. They demonstrate this claim using a content analysis of several major foreign news stories from the 1980s. For example, they found that American newspapers' coverage of the 1984 elections in the U.S. client state Guatemala was significantly different from coverage of elections in socialist Nicaragua. The authors claim that state terror,



forced voting, and the exclusion of the main rebel opposition were features of the Guatemalan election, yet when covering Guatemala, the American news media paid little attention to such problems and focused instead on how the elections marked the emergence of "fledgling democracies." On the other hand, "despite its superiority on every substantive count, the Nicaraguan election was found by the media to have been a sham and to have failed to legitimize" (p. 141).

### **News Framing as Non-Ideological**

Many other media experts disagree with the assumption that the news media are intentionally ideological. Michael Schudson criticizes Chomsky and Herman for what he characterizes as their "sophomoric assumption" that "each cover of *Time*, each *60 Minutes* investigation and every *New York Times* front page [is] designed with unflinching prescience to shore up a capitalistic system, every apparent sign of debate or controversy merely a cover for a deeper uniformity of views" (p. 4). Chomsky and Herman have gone so far as to liken *Time* magazine to *Pravda* (Chomsky and Herman, p. 112) for the way it marginalized dissenting views on American policy toward Guatemala, a comparison to which Schudson takes strong exception.

For Noam Chomsky and Edward Herman the whole matter is just that simple: the *New York Times* is *Pravda* (and the state apparently little

more than a front for the ruling class). Everything else is eyewash. This is misleading and mischievous. . .The *New York Times* journalists, although they may indeed be American patriots, see their day-to-day task as reporting the news, not elucidating a party line. They believe in fair and objective reporting (p.4).

In fact, American reporters generally view themselves as the watchdogs of democracy guarding against the misuse and abuse of power. Suggesting that their reports are in the service of elite ideology, or even anti-elite, is often dismissed as counter-intuitive and even offensive. *Washington Post* Tokyo Bureau Co-chief Mary Jordan became defensive when I asked why she decided to write a story detailing the advantages base-life affords American military personnel that Okinawans envy. "I don't have an agenda," she said.

The [Washington] Post is a lot of different people. Maybe if someone else had been [in Okinawa] they would have written something different. I went down there and talked to as many people as I could and just did the stories as they happened. There was no anti-government agenda, no pro-government agenda. The Post does not want to make sure the [American] troops are in or out [of Okinawa]. As you know, there is nothing like this. Some people like to think that. It's very frustrating (personal communication, November 25, 1997).

### **Ideology as Common-Sense Assumptions in News Discourse**

My work intends to show that it is not necessary to believe that all reporters have political agendas—or that they are even conscious of the ideology they produce—to believe that framing practices are inherently

ideological. I accept Gitlin's assessment that "simply by doing their jobs," looking for "news-worthy" stories and following journalistic routines, "journalists tend to serve the political and economic elite definitions of reality" (p.12). He says:

[Journalistic] routines are structured in the ways journalists are socialized from childhood, and then trained, recruited, assigned, edited, rewarded, and promoted on the job; they decisively shape the ways in which news is defined, events are considered newsworthy and objectivity is served. News is managed routinely, automatically, as reporters import definitions of newsworthiness from editors and institutional beats as they accept analytical frameworks from officials even while taking up adversary positions (pp. 11-12).

In his study of the press and student protests in the 1960s, Gitlin saw the ruling class culture dominating news reports even as the media worked to present both sides of a story. He says the journalists' routine of searching for "objectivity" and "balance" led them to juxtapose the views of scruffy Viet Cong flag-waving student protesters against more sober and reasonable-sounding authorities. "Hotheads carry on, the message connotes while wiser heads, officials and reporters both, with superb self control, watch the unenlightened ones make trouble" (Gitlin. p.4.).

"That kind of criticism really annoys me," says Jordan, "because it assumes that the readers are dumb."

[Such critics] assume that if people see pictures of radicals on the street they'll assume that everyone is a radical. They used to say that a lot

about coverage of Korea, why does CNN only show the tear gassing and firebomb-throwing radicals? but you know people are smart. They know that this is just one segment of society. And there are lots of stories getting written and lots of media sources, there are lots of networks and many papers and now computers (personal communication, November 25, 1997).

Roger Fowler agrees that "conspiracy theories," which suggest that reporters create biased stories that readers absorb, "ideology and all, give the newspaper too much, and the reader too little power" (p. 41). He says:

There is every reason to propose that being a reader is an active, creative practice. In general terms, it is now believed that perception and understanding involve the active development (not necessarily conscious, of course) of mental schemes and processing strategies which the subject knows in advance of his or her encounter with the object being processed: These are projected onto the data in a trial at 'making sense'; their relevance, their success, is confirmed by structural or contextual clues (p. 43).

This idea is similar to the above mentioned explanation of how models function in the creation and reception of news discourse as offered by van Dijk. News discourse functions ideologically when it serves to reproduce models of understanding about power relationships that are already shared by the writer and reader. Models limit discourse in such a way that Fowler says the writer is "constituted by the discourse." The same could be said for the reader. In other words, given that both reader and writer share a particular model of the world or an event, the discourse (language originating in that model) available to them is limited and already coded ideologically.

The practices of news selection and presentation are habitual and conventional as much as they are deliberate and controlled. And as for value-laden language, the crucial point is that the values are in the language already, independent of the journalist and of the reader. Ideology is already imprinted in the available discourse (all the discourse) (Fowler, p. 42).

Herbert Gans argues that the news media are not ideological if one thinks of ideology in the traditional sense of the "deliberately thought-out, consistent, integrated, and inflexible sets of explicit political values which is a determinant of political decisions" (p. 30). In his study of hiring practices in American print and television journalism he found that news organizations hired new reporters based on skills and education, not political viewpoints (the exception being the one or two "house radicals" or "house conservatives" deliberately hired by a news organization to provide perspectives on certain issues) (p. 192).

What is more, he argues that reporters themselves are rarely conscious of their own ideology. Gans prefers to refer to "the enduring values, conscious and unconscious opinion, and reality judgments" that he admits are imbedded in the language of news as what he calls "paraideology" rather than ideology. However, "when all is said and done," he admits, "a paraideology is an ideology" (p. 203).

That it is an ideology can be illustrated if not demonstrated, by the fact that those who adhere to it do not conceive of it as ideology. Like other

empiricists working within a dominant paradigm, journalists believe themselves to be (Gans, p. 203).

Schudson too, is reluctant to admit that ideology may be present in news even as he agrees that journalists are guided by internalized values, that they work "often unwittingly within a reservoir of stored cultural meanings and patterns of discourse." He prefers to think of news as a "cultural product." News as culture is "related to, but is not the same as, ideology," he contends (p. 3). In fact, his definition of news as culture is remarkably similar to van Dijk's definition of ideology. Schudson says:

News as a form of culture incorporates assumptions about what matters, what makes sense, what time and place we live in, what range of considerations we should take seriously. A news story is supposed to answer the questions "who," "what," "when," "where," and "why" about its subjects, but understanding news as culture requires asking of news writing, what categories of people count as "who," what kinds of things pass as facts or "whats," what geography and sense of time are inscribed as "where" and "when," and what counts as an explanation of "why" (p. 14).

Schudson argues that understanding news as a cultural product means news acts as a context within which ideas are discussed and debated, but its actual power is limited (p. 18).

[The news media] are not more important influences on the fabric of society than, say the family, the schools, the criminal justice system, or—to choose two institutions that are not cultural objects in the popular culture, or media culture at all—state governments or federal regulatory agencies (Schudson, p. 17).

It is for this reason that reporters working within the paradigm of an accepted elite model of reality may not perceive the ideology inherent in the discourse they create. What cultural outsiders see as ideology, the reporter takes as self-evident assumptions about the way that the world works.

As Fairclough notes, "Ideology is most effective when its workings are least visible." The minute it is recognized as ideology, "it ceases to be common sense, and may cease to have the capacity to sustain power inequalities, i.e. to function ideologically" (1989, 84).

Invisibility is achieved when ideologies are brought to discourse not as explicit elements of the text, but as the background assumptions which on the one hand lead the text producer to textualize the work in a particular way, and on the hand lead the interpreter to interpret the text in a particular way. Texts do not spout ideology. They so position the interpreter through their cues that she brings ideologies to the interpretations of texts—and reproduces them in the process! (Fairclough 1989, 84).

### **Uncovering Ideology with Discourse Analysis**

I set as my task the uncovering of the ideologies that are inherent in the frames selected by American, Okinawan and mainland Japanese when covering the issue of United States military bases in Okinawa. I first organized into models the various scripts—propositions and attitudes—and other linguistic

tropes used by regional elites, and non-elites, to discuss the issue. I then undertook a pilot study of the newspapers I had selected to analyze, looking for patterns of language, and themes that might indicate frames that favor one or another of the models I had identified. Next, I analyzed representative articles following the suggestions for conducting news discourse analysis presented by Allan Bell, van Dijk, and Fairclough. Each of these steps is explained below.

### **Identification of Ideological Models**

To understand the models at work behind discourse on the Okinawa base issue, I interviewed politicians, labor leaders, journalists and military representatives. I analyzed both publications designed to persuade outsiders of the validity of a group's position and documents meant to reassure group members of the legitimacy of their own world view. Special emphasis was placed on uncovering scripts and attitudes that inform these discourses and that form the common sense assumptions that these people held about the base issue, and its relationship to their personal and group identity.

Following van Dijk's suggestions for discourse analysis, I looked for propositions and attitudes that demonstrate ideology by expressing "positive ingroup description and negative outgroup description" (van Dijk 1998, p. 33). This polarization can be represented in what he calls the "ideological square":



1. Emphasize our good properties/actions
  2. Emphasize their bad properties/actions
  3. Mitigate our bad properties/actions
  4. Mitigate their good properties/actions
- (1998, p. 33).

As a strategy for understanding this polarization within the various discourses, I also followed van Dijk's suggestion of paying strict attention to the various levels of generality or specificity with which various propositions were offered (1998, p.43). I asked myself, which good/bad actions are made explicit as opposed to implicit? As van Dijk notes:

We may expect that Our good actions and Their bad ones will, in general, tend to be described at a lower, more specific level with many (detailed) propositions. The opposite will be true for Our bad actions and Their good ones, which, if described at all, will both be described in rather general, abstract and hence 'distanced' terms without much detail (1998, 35).

I also looked for the suppositions that gave coherence to various propositions in the language of interviewees and documents I analyzed. I asked myself, what facts, opinions, attitudes or beliefs must be assumed in order for the sequencing of propositions presented in a text or interview to make sense? I asked myself, how do these assumptions define in-groups and out-groups?

I considered attribution in the documents I analyzed. That is, which actions or practices were selected for discussion and to whom those actions were attributed—who received the praise or blame, who was shown to be

responsible—and which actions were presented without attribution. van Dijk says:

Good acts will usually be self-attributed to Ourselves (or our allies) and bad acts other-attributed to the Others (or their allies), and in both cases these groups are assigned full control and responsibility for their acts. The converse is true for Our bad acts and Their good acts: Our bad acts will be de-emphasized and attributed to circumstances beyond our control, and the same is true for their good acts ("they were just lucky"). (1998, 43).

Using this method, I found that American and mainland Japanese elites did indeed favor the pro-base propositions. What is more, Okinawan elites tended toward anti-base propositions. However, I also found that both the pro- and anti-base positions could be divided again into domestic, or "inside," concerns and international, or "outside," concerns.

I found that Okinawan elites tend to emphasize those propositions that support an inside, anti-base model of the problem of American bases on Okinawa. These propositions see the bases as a threat to Okinawan domestic peace and security and a symbol of continuing oppression and American occupation. I chose to call this the "Occupation Model." American elites' discourse tended to favor propositions from a pro-base, outside model that focused on Pacific region security, what I call the "Security Model."

An inside, pro-base "Cooperation Model" that emphasized propositions regarding the mutual benefits of the United States-Japan alliance was favored by mainland Japanese leaders, American military representatives in Japan, and conservative Okinawans. Members of the Japan Communist Party and some more radical anti-base activists favored a proposition which I have organized into an "Imperialism Model," which views the American bases in Japan as unnecessary to security and existing only to serve American hegemonic interests. These four models are discussed in detail in Chapter 3.

### **Newspaper Selection**

I decided to examine five newspapers, two mainland Japanese newspapers, the *Asahi Shimbun* and the *Yomiuri Shimbun*, two American newspapers, the *Washington Post* and the *New York Times*, and two Okinawan newspapers the *Okinawa Times* and the *Ryukyu Shimpo*.

The *Asahi Shimbun* and *Yomiuri Shimbun* were selected because they are the two largest and most influential of Japan's five major national dailies. The other three are the *Mainichi Shimbun*, the *Nihon Keizai Shimbun* and the *Sankei Shimbun*. The *Yomiuri* has the largest circulation, approximately 14.5 million (*The Japan Press 1998*, p.93). The *Asahi* is close behind with approximately 12.5 million (*The Japan Press 1998*, p.88). The *Yomiuri* has the largest share of national readership at 36.2 percent countrywide and 41.9

percent in the Tokyo area, while the *Asahi's* share is 30.4 and 30.5 (Feldman p. 11). The other three papers lag considerably farther behind.

The *Asahi* and *Yomiuri's* differing editorial policies also make for an interesting comparison. The *Asahi* is generally considered to be the most liberal of the big five. The *Yomiuri* is widely viewed as a conservative, pro-government newspaper (Feldman, p. 11). The *Yomiuri* is widely considered more conservative than the *Mainichi*, but not as conservative as the right-wing *Sankei* (T. Shibayama, Personal Communication, July 10, 1999).

The two papers also have somewhat different spheres of influence. Nearly 44 percent of Japan Diet members say the *Asahi* is their first preference for news (Feldman, p. 157). Tetsuya Shibayama, a former *Asahi* *Shimbun* reporter turned news analyst, says that the generally-conservative Japanese lawmakers and bureaucrats tend to dislike the *Asahi's* editorial position yet many read only the *Asahi*. "My belief is that they read it because they hate it" (personal communication, July 10, 1999). He says:

The newspaper that best reflects their own ideology is the *Yomiuri* or *Mainichi* or *Sankei*. The *Asahi* is the paper that least reflects their ideology. They read the *Asahi* to understand the other side. They worry a great deal about what the *Asahi* is writing. In some cases, if the *Asahi* writes something negative about them, they're in trouble. That's how it used to be. For example, if they are going to submit a bill, and find out that the *Asahi* is against it, they might just give up on it (personal communication, July 10, 1999).

The *Washington Post* and the *New York Times* are quasi-national papers. Like the *Asahi* and *Yomiuri*, these two American publications are widely considered the principal newspapers of record in the United States. The *New York Times* has the largest readership, 1 million (*World Almanac 2000*, p.184). It also has the strongest influence on other American media. As Gans notes, the newspaper is the media standard-setter:

When editors and producers [of other news organizations] are uncertain about a selection decision, they will check whether, where and how the *Times* has covered the story; and story selectors see to it that many of the *Times's* front-page stories find their way into television programs and magazines (p. 180).

The *Washington Post*, has a smaller circulation, about 750,000 (*World Almanac 2000*, p.184), but like the *Asahi Shimbun* in Japan, the *Washington Post* is the newspaper most read by politicians and bureaucrats in the United States.

Okinawa Prefecture is unusual in having two major local daily newspapers, the *Okinawa Times* and the *Ryukyu Shimpo*. These two newspapers have nearly identical editorial policies running virtually the same stories on their front pages each day with similar headlines. The *Okinawa Times* has a slightly larger circulation of 400,000 compared to the *Ryukyu Shimpo's* 395,000 (*The Japanese Press*1999, p. 103).

Japanese newspapers (including the *Okinawa Times*) tend to contain far fewer pages than American newspapers and to publish more often. The *New*

*York Times* and *Washington Post* are single edition newspapers that each average about 80 pages each day. The three Japanese newspapers studied here each average about 28 pages in their morning editions and 6-10 pages in their evening editions. Both morning and evening editions were included in this study.

I considered and rejected several other newspapers for study. *The Wall Street Journal* seemed a natural newspaper to compare with Japan's financial daily the *Nihon Keizai Shimbun*. However, I found that the *Nihon Keizai Shimbun* is much closer to a general news newspaper than is *the Wall Street Journal*, which focuses more exclusively on business news. While the *Nihon Keizai Shimbun* ran many stories about the Okinawa base issue, *The Wall Street Journal* largely confined its coverage of the base issue to the "World-Wide" portion of its front-page "What's News" news-in-brief section.

I also considered including the Japan Communist Party's daily *Akahata* as an example of far-left reporting on the issue. However, I decided that since the goal of this research was to assess the influence of elite culture on mainstream news discourse, it was not useful to include this outside-the-mainstream newspaper, which is overtly dedicated to a non-elite ideology.

Copies of the American newspaper articles regarding the bases were identified using the *Washington Post* and *New York Times* published indexes. The articles were then copied from microfilm. I researched the mainland Japanese newspapers and Okinawan newspaper using their monthly

compendiums of condensed and bound newspapers (*shukusatsuban*). Each of these monthly volumes contains a detailed story index that was used to identify base-related stories.

## **Analysis of Individual Reports**

In analyzing individual newspaper articles, I employed many of the same techniques used to identify ideological models in various documents and personal interviews that were described above. However, I also followed Bell's guidelines for news story discourse analysis. Bell notes, "Journalists to not write articles, they write stories—with structure, order, viewpoint and values" (p. 65). Since the discourse analyst is dealing with "stories," it is not important "at least initially" to worry about whether the report relates "what 'really' happened" (p. 65). Instead the analyst should accept the story's factuality on its own terms and look instead at "what we are *told* happened" or "what does the story actually say" (p. 65). Bell suggests the news discourse analyst begin by retracing the journalistic convention of asking "What," "Who," "Where" and "When."

When looking at "What" the story says about an event or issue, Bell suggests looking first at the headline and lead and asking oneself such things as, "What events are included/excluded in the headline? What news values lie behind these inclusions or exclusions?" "Is there any information that is given in

the lead but not returned to in the rest of the story?" "How does the lead begin telling the story as well as acting as an abstract for it?" (p. 76-77).

With regard to the "Who" in a news story, Bell suggests looking at both "source attribution" and "news actors" (p. 77). The researcher should ask such questions as, "What claims do the attributed sources have to authority?" "Who is quoted directly? Indirectly?" "Why have particular speech verbs been used?" "What parts of the story are not attributed?" "Where is attribution unclear or ambiguous? Does this have any repercussions?" (p. 77).

With regard to news actors, the researcher should ask, "What kinds of people or entities are mentioned in the story?" "Why are they in the news?" "Are the news actors elite?" "Are there patterns in the way the story refers to them or labels them?" (p.77).

"Where" and "When" analysis should include such questions as "What location does the story take place in?" "Why?" "Is there a pattern to where events take place?" "What order of events is the story written in? Why? What news values lie behind this order?" (Bell, 78).

In addition Bell suggests asking such things as: What kind of background is presented in the story and is there any ideological frame behind it? Is there any commentary or evaluation that indicates an ideological direction? Is the story cohesive? "What do the linkages (or their absence) between sentences or events mean for understanding the story?" And, "Is a cause and effect relationship between events implied by the way they are ordered?" (p. 80).



## **News Discourse Analysis and Okinawa Base Issue**

An example of stories about the American base problem in Okinawa taken from two different newspapers demonstrates how the method outlined above can detect the ideological models behind newspaper discourse. Both stories deal with the same four strips of information: 1) three United States servicemen have been accused of raping a 12-year-old Okinawan girl; 2) Okinawans have expressed their outrage; 3) Okinawan protests include calls for the revision of the Status of Forces Agreement; 4) the American government has apologized for this crime and promised to take measures to see that such crimes do not happen in the future.

The first excerpt is from the *New York Times's* initial story on the rape that ran September 20, 1995. The second is from an *Okinawa Times* story that ran September 12, four days after the newspaper's first report on the crime. In framing their stories the reporters for both papers create a news discourse of events by incorporating the strips of information, and the various other discourses of Okinawans and Americans into two distinct models for understanding the world. The news discourse created by the American reporter is grounded in a United States–Japan Cooperation Model. The news discourse of the Okinawan writer is grounded in the Occupation Model emphasizing propositions regarding the unfairness and dangers created by the bases.

## **Rape Case in Japan Turns Harsh Light on U.S. Military by Andrew Pollack**

The reported rape this month of a Japanese elementary school girl by three American servicemen in Okinawa has provoked an uproar in Japan. It has brought calls both to revise the rules that critics say make it easy for American soldiers to get away with crimes and to remove American military bases.

Seeking to quell the outcry, American Ambassador Walter F. Mondale and Lieut. General Richard B. Myers, the commander of the United States military forces in Japan, apologized to the Okinawan Governor, Masahide Ota, at a meeting today in the American Embassy here.

"This terrible tragedy was an outrageous act toward humanity and makes all of us wearing the U.S. military uniform deeply ashamed," General Myers said at a news conference later in the day.

He spoke in an American military hotel in Tokyo where top military officers from the United States and Japan and their wives gathered for a previously scheduled "friendship dinner," celebrating 50 years of military cooperation since the end of World War II.

The controversy comes as the United States and Japan are trying to reaffirm their security relationship when critics say the end of the cold war makes it unnecessary to station 45,000 American Troops in Japan.

It is not likely that the Okinawa episode will cause a re-evaluation of the entire security treaty. But it is leading to calls here for a change in the so-called status-of-forces agreement which stipulates that members of the American armed forces suspected of crimes will not be turned over to the Japanese authorities until after they are formally indicted. (Pollack, September 20, 1995).

Goffman argues that often those events that are deemed newsworthy are the ones that seem to defy interpretation under existing primary frames (models). The journalist's job is to find a way to make these events fit within the existing schemata of meaning (p. 27). This story is about neutralizing an image

of the American soldiers as criminals, which image defies the cooperation discourse script on United States soldiers as friends and protectors of the Japanese, this script being part of the model of United States-Japan cooperation. The headline tells the reader "Rape Case Turns Harsh Light on U.S. Military." In other words, the military is being seen in a different than usual light—a negative light. Yet, by the end of the story the reporter will have framed his report in such a way as to restore faith in the original pro-military script.

In the story lead, reporter Andrew Pollack gives the reader several examples of strips of occurrences that fall outside the familiar script on the United States military as protector. The reader is told that a "reported rape" of a "Japanese girl" by three United States servicemen is causing an "uproar in Japan." Even as these strips of information are introduced they are muted with syntax and code. The use of the term "reported" is a journalistic ethical convention intended to preserve the rights of the accused. However, here the accused soldiers are granted an extra element of detachment from the crime and its fallout by the reporters nominalization of the crime which serves to reduce the sense of action, and by his use of the passive voice.

Consider how much stronger it would sound if the soldiers, rather than the rape, were the subject of the sentence: "Three United States soldiers have caused an uproar in Japan by reportedly raping a Japanese elementary school girl." Consider also the description of the victim as "a Japanese girl," and of the "uproar in Japan." These uses, while technically correct, code the story in a way

that evokes an American script about Japan as a monolithic country. At the same time, it erases the discourse of Okinawans as an oppressed group within Japan. Imagine a lead that would have preserved the Okinawan discourse: "When three United States servicemen reportedly raped an elementary school girl on the Japanese island of Okinawa this month they sparked an uproar among Okinawans, many of whom regard the crime as proof that they are being unfairly burdened with dangerous American bases."

Although he doesn't tell us exactly who is angry, Pollack does give some indication of what they are angry about. He quickly introduces three scripts from an Okinawan discourse on the inequality of the base situation without telling us they are Okinawan. These are: 1) Americans soldiers commit crimes; 2) the status of forces agreement may help them get away with these crimes; 3) the bases should be removed. However, Pollack blunts the force of these scripts by attributing them to nameless, statusless, "critics." Their complaints are then quickly countered with statements from clearly identified American authority figures, Ambassador Walter F. Mondale and Lieut. General Richard B. Myers.

The story then follows the action of these Americans. Mondale apologizes to a passive Okinawa Governor Masahide Ota, whose role as a counter-authority is not mentioned until much later in the story (not in this excerpt). Description of the apology is immediately followed by a reassuring quote from Myers that this "tragedy," (again a passive term for the soldier's crime), "makes all of us wearing the United States military uniform deeply

ashamed." In other words, this is an aberration, it does not represent the conduct of American servicemen. In the next paragraph, the reader is further reassured that both United States and Japanese officials are "celebrating" 50 years of cooperation. Finally we are told that although still other unnamed "critics" question the need for the United States-Japan security agreement in the absence of the Cold War, the rape is likely to affect only specific areas of implementation. Pollack does not tell us how he knows this. It is presented *prima facie*. Compare the above story excerpt with the excerpt from the *Okinawa Times Story*.

**United States Soldiers' Young-Girl Attack Case  
Protest calls for Revision of Status of Forces Agreement  
Prefecture Severely Criticizes United States Military**

Regarding the case of the United States soldiers' attack on a young girl that occurred in the northern part of the main island, the 11th saw the beginning of protests to various agencies by political parties and women's groups within the prefecture. Furthermore, city councils in the central part of the island and others are adopting protest resolutions and expressing their anger with the United States military. Among these is Governor Ota who, at a press conference on the afternoon of the same day, strongly protested the barbarism [*banko*] of the American military that remains the same as before reversion by saying, "because we have these bases, this thing that should not have happened did happen."

Other prefectural authorities took the position that this was "an unforgivable deed and a very serious incident" and that they would make strong protests to both the American and Japanese [*nihonseifu*] governments that will include a call for revising the Status of Forces Agreement.

*[This is followed by another long paragraph outlining various protest activities].*

On the afternoon of the 11th Consul General O'Neil of the American Consulate visited Governor Ota in order to apologize for the incident saying, "We cannot put into words the shock we received from this incident." Regarding the handling of the suspects he said, "We will completely cooperate with the Japanese investigative authorities so they can make a full investigation." He made clear the offenders would be turned over to Japan after indictment.

Governor Ota criticized [the Consul General], saying, "Each time there is an incident, the United States military apologizes and promises that it will not happen again. But what is the United States military thinking? How can they explain this to the people of the prefecture?" He indicated that he will soon make a formal protest (*"Chiikyotei Minaoshi Fukume Kogi."*).

The three accused soldiers get no sympathetic treatment in the headline "United States Soldiers' Young-Girl Attack Case" (*Beihei no Shojo Boko Jiken*). Nor are they granted a "reported" or "alleged" with regard to the crime of which they are accused (later the soldiers are referred to as "suspects"). The headline tells the reader that this is a story about the prefectural government criticizing the United States military. This certainly does take place in the story. However, the story is really about listing up official validation for the inclusion of a particular strip of occurrence—the rape of a child—into a particular script—American soldiers pose a threat to our society.

Here, the nameless, faceless "critics" of the *New York Times* story are identified as both government officials and members of the general public, "political parties and women's groups. . . city councils . . . Governor Ota." It is these voices that are active, and directly expressed. The Americans and Japanese central government are depicted as passive recipients of protest. Women's groups, while a major force in the protests, were not the only citizen

organizations protesting the bases. By singling them out the reporter activates another script from the occupation discourse, that American soldiers pose the greatest danger to women.

An example of how the narrative genre can be used to recontextualize a discourse into the news frame comes in the lead paragraph. The narrative voice tells the reader that Governor Ota "strongly protested the barbarism of the American military that remains the same as before reversion." Yet the actual quote attributed to Ota lacks any of this force and is, in fact, rather self evident, "Because we have these bases, this thing that should not have happened did happen." It is not clear whether Ota actually used the term "barbarism" (if he did why was this not the direct quote?) or that he made the reference to what is a major script in the occupation discourse—that despite reversion to Japan, the presence of United States bases keeps Okinawa under American control. This script has been incorporated into the news frame and Ota's comments are simply offered as support. This frame is clearly contrary to that of the *New York Times* that favored an understanding of the rape as an aberrant event. Here the crime is framed as part of a pattern of abuse. The discourse that gets erased is that of the 50 years of United States-Japan cooperation.

In the second paragraph the reader is told that protest will be made to "both the Japanese and American governments." In most situations, the local news media in Okinawa and other Japanese prefectures refer to the Japanese government as the *chioseifu* (central government), a term that carries with it a

sense of inclusion and subordination. In this story, the word *nihonseifu* (Japanese government) is used instead. The term acts as a code for a script on Okinawan uniqueness or separateness from the rest of Japan. It creates a sense of distance between Okinawa and mainland Japan and evokes scripts on the unequal treatment and historical discrimination of Okinawans by mainland Japanese.

It is not until the fourth paragraph that any of the discourse on United States-Japanese friendship is introduced. It comes in the form of a statement of apology from Consul General O'Neil, who is allowed to speak for himself. However, the reporter quickly subsumes this script from the cooperation discourse back into the occupation discourse by juxtaposing the apology against the governor's comment that "each time there is an incident, the United States military apologizes and promises that it will not happen again." Whereas the *New York Times* story uses an apology statement to show American authorities bringing calm and reassurance to the unrest, the *Okinawa Times* uses a similar apology and promise of cooperation as a strawman to be knocked down by Ota.

In the next chapter I will explain in detail the four ideological models into which I have organized the various propositions and attitudes that make up the debate on the issue of American military bases on Okinawa.



### CHAPTER 3

#### FOUR MODELS OF IDEOLOGICAL DISCOURSE

As proposed in the previous chapter, ideology can be understood as any group's common-sense assumptions about its place in a system of power relationships such as dominance and oppression. These assumptions can be represented as mental models—internalized systems of scripts (systems of propositions) and attitudes (hierarchies of opinions)—which are made visible through discourse. As Dijk (1998) observed, models provide the "interface between social representations, including ideologies, on the one hand, and social practice and discourse on the other" (p. 27).

I have determined that ideologies regarding the American military bases on Okinawa can be represented in four models. Two of these models—the Security Model and Cooperation Model—are pro-base. Two models, the Occupation model and Imperialism Model, are anti-base. The Security Model and the Imperialism Model define their group identities in relationship to threats and Others *outside* the United States-Japan alliance. The Occupation Model and the Cooperation Model define group identity in terms of power relationships *inside* the alliance. The main scripts and suppositions of each model are shown in Figure 1. The principal attitudes of each model are represented in Figure 2.

**Figure 1. Primary Propositions of the Four Ideological Models**

		<b>Pro-Base</b>	<b>Anti-Base</b>
<b>Outside</b>	<b>Security Model</b>	<p><b>Principal Script:</b>                      •Military Force Provides Security/Deters Threats</p> <p><b>Propositions:</b>                      •Okinawa's location is strategically important                      •U.S. bases contained communism, won the Cold War                      •Post-Cold-War uncertainty warrants presence                      •U.S. is Asia's historical leader, stabilizer                      •U.S.'s Pacific states/territories make it part of Asia                      •"Rogue nations," North Korea, China remain threats                      •U.S. withdrawal would cause power vacuum, remilitarized Japan, arms race                      •U.S.'s Asian forces protect world economy</p>	<p><b>Principal Script:</b>                      Militaries=Militarism/War</p> <p><b>Propositions:</b>                      •History proves peace possible without weapons                      •Okinawans are pacifist by nature                      •Militarism has guided both Japanese and American policy toward Okinawa                      •U.S. Bases do not defend Japan                      •No outside threats remain                      •Real purpose of bases is to serve American hegemonic interests                      •Bases involve Okinawa in wars not of itsmaking</p>
<b>Inside</b>	<b>Cooperation Model</b>	<p><b>Principal Script:</b>                      •Bases provide domestic benefits to U.S., Japan, Okinawa</p> <p><b>Propositions:</b>                      •Bases economically beneficial to all three areas                      •Bases essential to Okinawan economy                      •U.S. use of base land is legal and fair                      •Returned land would be difficult to develop                      •U.S.-cause crime, accidents, pollution rates lower than Okinawan rates                      •SOFA protects Americans, is not unfair                      •U.S. military has reduced intrusions into Okinawan life</p>	<p><b>Principal Script:</b>                      •Presence of U.S. bases=continued military occupation</p> <p><b>Propositions:</b>                      •Base land stolen from Okinawans                      •Amount of land used by U.S. military unfair                      •Bases hamper city planning/economic development                      •Dangers stem from lack of local control over land, air space, and sea lanes                      •Dangers abound from U.S.-caused crime, accidents, pollution                      •SOFA gives American unfair extra-territorial rights</p>

**Figure 2. Primary Attitudes of the Four Ideological Models**

		Pro-Base	Anti-Base
<b>Outside</b>	<b>Security Model</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>•<b>U.S./Americans:</b> Leader, Peacemaker, Stabilizer, What's good for the U.S. is good for the world</li> <li>•<b>Okinawa/Okinawans:</b> Strategically located, Essential for deterrence, Lack understanding of U.S. Mission</li> <li>•<b>Japan/Japanese:</b> Contained, Potentially dangerous, A worry to neighbor countries</li> <li>•<b>Other Asian Countries:</b> Dangerous, Unstable, Conflicted, Potential enemies, Grateful for U.S. Leadership</li> <li>•<b>U.S. Military/Soldiers:</b> Strong, Brave, Righteous, Enforcers of justice, Defenders of Democracy, Settlers of disputes</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>•<b>U.S./Americans:</b> Arrogant, Selfish, Self Righteous, International bully, Power hungry, Mindless of true meaning of peace</li> <li>•<b>Okinawa/Okinawans:</b> Pacifist, Courteous, Diplomatic, U.S.'s unwilling accomplice, Targets of retaliation against U.S.</li> <li>•<b>Japan/Japanese:</b> U.S.'s Coconspirator, Toady, Dupe</li> <li>•<b>Other Asian Countries:</b> Target of American Hegemony, Partners in peaceful trade</li> <li>•<b>US Military/Soldiers:</b> Aggressive, brutal, Tools of hegemony</li> </ul>
<b>Inside</b>	<b>Cooperation Model</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>•<b>U.S./Americans:</b> Invited guests, Employer, Concerned resident, Problem solver.</li> <li>•<b>Okinawa/Okinawans:</b> Neighbors, Friends, Coworkers, Business partners, Unfairly critical of U.S. military</li> <li>•<b>Japan/Japanese:</b> Friend, Partner, Provider of financial aid and rents, Concerned about easing the burden of bases for Okinawans.</li> <li>•<b>Other Asian Countries:</b> Examples of places where U.S. is also a welcome neighbor, guest.</li> <li>•<b>US Military/Soldiers:</b> Good neighbors, Cooperative, Misunderstood, Decent, Generous, Kind</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>•<b>U.S./Americans:</b> Occupiers, Colonialists, Indifferent, Selfish, Superiority complex</li> <li>•<b>Okinawa/Okinawans:</b> Abused, Discriminated against, Angry, Fed Up</li> <li>•<b>Japan/Japanese:</b> Biased, Collaborators, Unsympathetic, Incompetent, Selfish</li> <li>•<b>Other Asian Countries:</b> Unfairly receive better treatment from U.S. than Okinawa, Potential investors in post-base Okinawa.</li> <li>•<b>US Military/Soldiers:</b> Arrogant, Lascivious, Reckless, Dirty, Dangerous, Criminal</li> </ul>

American and Japanese elite discourse is firmly grounded in the pro-base models. However, while Americans emphasize the outwardly-looking Security Model, Japanese elites tend to be focused on domestic issues, thus favoring the Cooperation model. However, this ideology is not forcefully articulated. Okinawan elite discourse draws from both anti-base models. However, it tends to favor the Occupation Model over the Imperialism Model. The Imperialism Model is favored by more radical and less socially powerful groups such as the Japan Communist Party and more radical anti-base citizen groups.

The central thesis of this study is that reporters produce news discourse that is informed by the same kinds of models as those held by elites within their area. For this reason, American newspaper reports about the base issue should be grounded primarily in the Security Model worldview, while also favoring some Cooperation Model concepts. Okinawan newspaper reports should be written from an Occupation Model perspective, while accepting some ideas from the Imperialism Model. Japanese newspapers' discourse should be closest to the Cooperation Model.

It should be noted that I am not saying that every reporter or all American or Japanese elites think in exactly the same way. The actual ideas of reporters and individuals within elite groups may be less systematic and precise or even include ideological elements not presented here. It is not improbable that one or two elements of an anti-base ideology might be present in the understanding

of a generally pro-base person. In other words, these models are presented not as absolutes but simply as ideal-types. I will now consider each of these models separately.

### **The Security Model**

The central script of this *pro-base* model is that military force is necessary to protect borders, promote peace, and enhance prosperity. Those who see the world in terms of this model view the United States as Asia's leader, teacher, and stabilizer. In this role, American military forces in Okinawa are the "Keystone of the Pacific," that deter threats and protect the stability of East Asia from dangerous Others *outside* the United States-Japan alliance. This model is primarily the mental domain of American political and military elites, and conservative American and Japanese scholars.

America maintains approximately 107,000 troops in Asia. Slightly less than half of these—approximately 47,000 soldiers—are stationed in Japan. About 28,000 soldiers—60 percent of all the United States' Japan forces—are stationed on Okinawa. Of the remaining American soldiers in Asia, about 37,000 are in the Republic of Korea, roughly 15,000 are afloat in the Pacific aboard United States Navy vessels and about 7,000 are stationed on the United States territory of Guam (O'Hanlon, pp. 153-154).

This "forward presence," as the United States military characterizes it, and the Security Model that justifies it, are products of the Cold War. For 50 years, the necessity of this large force was such a common-sense assumption among American elite, that not even the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 could weaken American resolve to maintain its forces in Asia. In 1995, Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs Joseph Nye declared that despite the lack of a clear enemy, the United States remained "steadfastly committed" to stationing no less than 100,000 soldiers in the region (p. 90). Today, the number of troops in Japan is only ten percent less than at its Cold War peak in the 1980s (O'Hanlon, p. 153).

The new Other that has replaced international communism as the foe against which the Security Model defines American identity and mission is "uncertainty." That is, uncertainty about the political and military directions of China and North Korea and other unpredictable "rogue" nations and groups; uncertainty about the effects of an American withdrawal on the economics of the region; uncertainty about whether a "normalized" and rearmed Japan would create tensions among its neighbors.

A principal proposition is that because the United States military has been present in Asia, the region has been stable and these uncertainties manageable. Therefore, without the United States the region could become unstable, even chaotic. The Security Model contains attitudes about Asia as an unstable, conflicted, dangerous region. These are reflected against counter-

attitudes about the United States as the leader, stabilizer, and peacemaker. American soldiers themselves are seen as noble defenders of democracy and human rights.

### **Cold War Foundations**

The need to maintain a large a force on Okinawa was not always a common-sense assumption, even within the United States government. This is evident in the debate over the strategic value of Okinawa that took place in the first few years after World War II. Army historian Arnold Fisch explains that America took the Ryukyu Islands in order to use then as a base for the planned attack on the Japanese mainland. With the surrender of Japan, the "the rationale for extensive Okinawan bases evaporated like the island's morning mist" (Fisch, p. 181).

For three years, Okinawa and the other Ryukyu Islands suffered from American neglect. "Facilities construction ground to a virtual standstill, as the great majority of engineer troops withdrew to new assignments elsewhere. Washington drastically curtailed funding for most projects on the island, thereby drying up Okinawan economic recovery" (Fisch, p. 181). In 1946, Secretary of State James F. Byrnes suggested that the Ryukyu islands should be quickly demilitarized and returned to Japan. However, his low assessment of the

Ryukyus' strategic worth was opposed by the chairman of the United States Joint Chiefs of Staff, Fleet Admiral William D. Leahy (Fisch, p. 70).

Leahy was the first to introduce "dangerous uncertainty" as an adversary with which the United States must deal. He argued that despite the absence of a clear foe, if through some unforeseen chain of events the undefended Ryukyus were to fall into hostile hands, retaking them would exact a price in blood and material equal to that paid to capture the islands during the war (Fisch, p. 70).

This debate continued until 1948, when the emerging Cold War introduced international communism as a more convincing Other against whom the United States' Japan policy should be directed. Kiyoshi Nakachi notes that in February of that year, the chief policy planner for the State Department, George Kennan, was advising a new Secretary of State, George Marshall, that Japan would be vulnerable to communist attack from Korea or the Soviet Union if America did not retain a military presence in Okinawa (Nakachi, pp. 46-47).

By the early 1950s Okinawa's role as the cornerstone of this new anti-communist policy became more certain when island bases proved to be invaluable staging grounds for the Korean War (Nakachi, p. 47). An early peace treaty between the United States and Japan included the condition that the United States would administer the islands indefinitely.

In 1960, the United States and Japan renewed their Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Defense (the United States-Japan Security Treaty). This



revised treaty obligated both sides to consider a military attack on the other as an attack on itself. With this indefinite obligation to defend Japan, Okinawa's role as an American fortress was cemented in place. When the reversion of the islands to Japan was negotiated in 1972, it was conditioned upon the United States maintaining its bases on Okinawa which, at the time, were a major staging area for the Vietnam War.

### **Uncertainty Revisited**

With the end of the Cold War, the United States once again saw its reason for being in Okinawa "evaporate like the island's morning mist." In 1995, then Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs Joseph Nye reintroduced "dangerous uncertainty" as suggesting that the victory over Soviet Union had created a new kind of threat, unpredictable change. He says, "History shows us that periods of the rise and fall of great powers are often times of great instability in international state systems" (p. 91).

As Thucydides wrote nearly 2,500 years ago, the real cause of the Peloponnesian War was the rise in power of Athens and the fear that created in Sparta. Similarly, an emergent France was the cause of turmoil in early nineteenth-century Europe. . .Asia today is marked by the rise and fall of great powers. Within the last decade, the Soviet Union declined and collapsed. Russia is currently preoccupied with internal change, but it remains an important regional power. Also during this period, Japan's growth has continued and China has begun to transform its economy (Nye, p. 91).

Nye notes that some skeptics believe that uncertainty is a foe with which the United States cannot deal. "How many divisions does uncertainty have?" one skeptic asked," Nye says. Such critics are "too clever by half," he says. The real question is "not the divisions that uncertainty has but the divisions that uncertainty can create" (p. 95). In a phrase that has come to represent the role of uncertainty as the Security Model's Other, Nye says, "Security is like oxygen—you don't notice it until you start to lose it" (p. 91).

The United States Marine Corps displays an even darker attitude toward the post-Cold-War world. In an article in the United States Marine Corps 1997 Almanac, "A Forward Presence in a Violent World", General Charles C. Krulak and Admiral Jay L. Johnson sound almost wistful for the Cold War as they justify America's military activism around the globe. "Never again," they say, "will we live in a bipolar world whose nuclear shadow suppressed nationalism and ethnic tensions" (p.4). They continue:

We have, in some respects, reverted back to the world our ancestors knew—a world of disorder. Somalia, Bosnia, Liberia, Haiti, Rwanda, Iraq, and the Taiwan Straits are merely examples of the types of continuing crises we now face. Some might call this period an age of chaos. (p. 4)

In 1995 Nye directed the creation of the Department of Defense (DOD) policy statement titled, *United States Security Strategy for East Asia-Pacific Region*. This report suggests the Asian region is particularly dangerous and chaotic:

Asia is characterized by diversity—ethnic, religious, cultural, linguistic, and geographic. Historical animosities remain strong; a sense of cohesion has been lacking. From the first Sino-Japanese war through the conflicts in Korea, Vietnam, and Cambodia, there has been a pattern of recurrent confrontation and conflict among the major powers in Asia (Department of Defense, p.9).

In the discourse of these American political and military elites, the dangerous, conflicted countries of Asia are the Other, or mirror, against whom a stable, rational American identity can be imagined.

### **United States as Asia's Leader**

These attitudes about a tumultuous Asia in need of an American stabilizer, leader and peacemaker are clear in the DOD report's explanation of the United States' historic role in Asia. It argues that America has been a positive force in the region as far back as 1784 when the American trading ship *Empress of China* inaugurated commercial ties with China. What is more, the United States went on to "negotiate" the opening of Japan to international trade in the 1850s and "mediated the end of the Russo-Japanese war." "From these beginnings through the Second World War and the Cold War the United States has served as a key stabilizing factor in the region" (Department of Defense, p. 1).

Ignored or mitigated in this discourse are counter-attitudes and propositions that see the United States as the aggressor and destabilizer. The

fact that America "negotiated" Japan's entry into international trade by pointing the cannons of Commodore Matthew Perry's warships at its capital is ignored. The destabilizing role that the United States and other non-Asian nations such as France and the Soviet Union played in the Vietnam and Korean wars is also unacknowledged. In the discourse of the DOD report, both conflicts were "wars against aggression" that proved that "Asian tensions have the potential to erupt in conflict with dire consequences for global security" (p.1).

Nye says the DOD report's assertions about the need for American leadership have been accepted by Asia itself. He writes:

Singapore's government "welcomed the report" and its Chinese language newspaper wrote, "This is not only the role Asia-Pacific countries want the United States to play, but also the best means by which the United States can safeguard its interests in the region." Hong Kong's *South China Morning Post* said, "Washington deserves praise, and gratitude, for maintaining its commitments in Asia" (p. 94).

It is interesting that the opinions of newspaper editorials in Hong Kong and Singapore, a British colony (Hong Kong was still under British control at this time) and a former British colony, respectively, are allowed to speak for all Asia. Neither Nye nor the DOD report mention Okinawan opposition to the American bases, warnings from Beijing about the continuation of the United States Japan Security treaty, or the fact that the Philippines had asked the United States to withdraw from its territory.

## **United States as a Pacific-Asian Country**

In the discourse of the DOD report the United States' obligation to act as Asia's leader is not just a historic imperative nor simply part of America's duties as the world's remaining superpower. The United States has a right and responsibility to guide the future of the region because the United States is itself a "Pacific-Asian" country.

History, geography, and demography make the United States an integral part of the [Asia-Pacific] region. The states of Alaska, California, Oregon, and Washington border on the Pacific Ocean, and Hawaii is surrounded by it. American citizens on three Pacific island territories—Guam, American Samoa, and the Commonwealth of the Northern Marianas—live closer to Asian capitals than to Washington. The increasing number of Americans who trace their ancestry to Asia-Pacific—numbering over seven million—is yet another indication of America's connection to the nations of the Pacific Rim (Department of Defense, 1).

Throughout this government report the words "Asia" and "East Asia" are rarely used without the modifying suffix, "Pacific." This discourse attempts to stake out a territorial right to station American troops in Asia regardless of the presence or absence of an enemy. It does so by rhetorically expanding the boundaries of the Pacific—where America has a clearer interest—to include all of East Asia.

The DOD presents this argument as common sense, without consideration of what it means for United States involvement elsewhere in the

world. Does the fact that seven million Americans trace their heritage to Asia-Pacific really help make the United States an "integral part" of Asia? What does this say about America's military rights with regard to Africa, Europe, Latin America and other areas of the world with even larger ethnic representation in the American population? If having coasts on the same ocean gives the United States a military interest in Asia, does it, in fact, give the United States military rights in any region bordering either the Pacific or Atlantic Oceans?

### **Brush Fires, Rogues, and Power Vacuums**

In the discourse of the Marine Corps, having uncertainty as your enemy means having to be prepared to respond to any number of conflicts, or "brushfires," at any time. General Krulak and Admiral Johnson argue that:

The United States and the world cannot afford to allow any crisis to escalate into threats to the United States and the world's vital interests. And while the skies are not dark with smoke from these brushfires, today's world demands a new approach. The concepts of choice must be selective and committed engagement, unencumbered global operations, and prompt crisis resolution (p. 4).

Implicit in the language of this declaration is the proposition that if a conflict anywhere in the world is a threat to American interests, then it is a threat to the world. It is this supposition that allows the United States to use forces stationed on Okinawa—ostensibly for the protection of Japan—to fight aggression

anywhere in the world, since a stable world order will benefit the safety of Japan.

The use of the term "brushfire" is also telling. A fire is something that must be responded to quickly with force. There is no diplomatic way to extinguish a blaze. The suggestion that military action should be "unencumbered" further suggests an underlying, common-sense assumption that military force is what maintains world order. In fact, Krulak and Johnson so directly state:

Friends and potential enemies recognize naval expeditionary forces as capable of defending or destroying them. This visible fist, free from diplomatic or territorial constraints, forms the bedrock of regional deterrence (p. 5).

The United States bases on Okinawa are an important part of this visible fist, says Air Force spokesman Ames. "If we [the United States] pulled out of Okinawa there would definitely be a power vacuum, especially if Kadena [Air Force Base on Okinawa] goes. There are fifty-four F-15 [jet fighters] here and they're backed up by a huge amount of munitions. That's a strong deterrence. Like it or not, it's a very strong deterrence" (C. Ames, personal communication, January 28, 1998).

The term "power vacuum" is popular with Security Model proponents to describe the state of chaos that would result from a United States withdrawal. The fear of this vacuum makes the lack of a clear enemy unimportant. "Security is not a steady state, problems come and go," Ames says. "It is a fantasy to

suggest that we don't need this [the Okinawa bases] at all. There is a pretty good argument that the reason Okinawa was taken over by Satsuma was that they could not defend themselves," he says (C. Ames, personal communication, January 28, 1998).

The importance of Okinawa is its location within 1000 miles of Taipei, Shanghai, Pusan, Seoul, Manila, Hong Kong and Tokyo. As Krulak and Johnson argue, even with a large deterrence, "some rogues are going to be tempted to strike" (p. 5). Quick response means being close to the action. They say:

The example of fighting forest fires is precisely applicable. The philosophy is simple: Prevention through living in the environment; deterrence through vigilance; and resolution through quick and selective engagement. Ninety-five percent of all forest fires are contained—the direct response of watchful local initial attack crews who attack flashpoints (p. 6).

To those who argue that the United States cannot afford to be the world's policeman, Krulak and Johnson respond that "we can't afford not to" (p. 4).

### **A Possible Korean Enemy**

Of all the potential dangers that define America's role in Asia, the most obvious and strongly stated within the Security Model is North Korea. Nye calls the country "a clear and present danger" (p. 95).



Not only is it on the brink of nuclear weapons capability, but it also has 1.1 million men under arms, with two-thirds of them deployed along the Korean demilitarized zone. Moreover, it is developing a new generation of ballistic missiles (Nye, p. 95).

The DOD report downplays the idea that a famine-stricken, isolated and bankrupt North Korea could not possibly wage war against South Korea or anyone else. It says:

Even with its badly deteriorating economy and years of poor harvests, North Korea has given priority to its military structure. North Korea continues to: mechanize its huge, offensively postured ground forces; expand its already massive artillery formations; enhance the world's largest special operations force; and improve its large ballistic missile arsenal (p. 18).

Even if the country was too weak economically and physically to launch an attack, Tokyo University expert on Northeast Asian regional security, Takashi Inoguchi, claims the country still poses a security risk in the possibility of its collapse.

If North Korea fell apart, for example, the negative impact on Asia and the Pacific would be incalculable. If South Korea had to absorb the 20 million North Koreans, the huge income gap between North and South would throw the South Korean economy into a tailspin for years to come. . .In the worst case scenario there would be great social upheaval (Inoguchi, p. 36).

Such a situation would require massive United States intervention and aid, Inoguchi says. In this way the Security Model is able find a threat in either a strong or weak North Korea and a justification for a stabilizing and peacekeeping role for the American military.

### **An Uncertain China**

More difficult to discuss is the possible threat posed by China. The Clinton Administration has pursued a policy of "constructive engagement" with China, hoping to guide the country into the family of "responsible" modern nations. This creates a problem in locating China within American strategic planning. Some American and Japanese elites are willing to call China a threat. For example, Krulak and Johnson claim that one of the brushfires that Marine Corps vigilance prevented was "Chinese attempts to derail democratic processes in Taiwan" (p. 5), a reference to China's war gaming in the Straits of Taiwan during the March 1996 Taiwanese presidential election.

American policymakers generally take a softer approach, focusing once again on the dangers of uncertainty, rather than China itself as the threat. Nye explains the China problem this way:

Some regional experts believe China will be aggressive outside the Chinese cultural area; others do not. In the face of this uncertainty among the experts, suppose that we simply pointed to a 50 percent chance of an aggressive China and a 50 percent chance of China

becoming a responsible great power in the region. On this hypothesis, to treat China as an enemy now would in effect discount 50 percent of the future. Moreover, a containment strategy would be difficult to reverse. Enmity would become a self-fulfilling prophecy. (p. 94).

The remaining option, says Nye, is American leadership. In other words, dealing with uncertainty by maintaining United States forces in Asia at status quo levels, avoiding the dangers of change.

### **The Threat of a Remilitarized Japan**

Even more delicate is the question of a "Japan Threat." United States Forces Japan spokesman Lieutenant Colonel Billy Birdwell, the Deputy Director of Public Affairs for all branches of the services in Japan explains:

If indeed the Americans did leave, there would be a significant power vacuum throughout the region. And frankly, there would be a strong sense of abandonment from the Japanese people and a strong fear among many of Japan's neighbors that America was turning Japan loose to remilitarize. A great many of Japan's neighbors are very nervous about a remilitarized Japan (B. Birdwell, personal communication, November 24, 1997).

Nye and the DOD strategy report prepared under his direction step more gingerly around the question of whether part of the mission of the United States in Asia is to contain Japan. Nye refers instead to the unattractive option of letting the Asian "balance of power politics take the place of American leadership" (p. 93), in other words, letting Japan take care of its own defense.

The result, as Nye sees it, would be a regional arms race. "Ironically," he says, "this would make U.S. participation in the region more costly and more dangerous as the United States had to balance the new and enhanced forces that would be created."

## **Economic Uncertainty**

Of all the propositions and attitudes that make up the Security Model, the most easily defined, and most often stated, is that continued Asian economic growth and prosperity depends upon the United States military guaranteeing the free flow of trade in the region. "The Asia-Pacific region is currently the most economically dynamic region in the world," The DOD report says, "and on that basis alone its security would be critical to America's future" (p. 6).

What is more, the United States takes credit for much of Asian economic growth, which it sees as tied directly to security policy. "The prosperity of Asia," the report goes on "is, in part, a result of successful American policies that have underwritten Asian security and have underpinned Asia's economic development" (p. 6).

Furthermore, Asian economic growth improves security. The DOD report says:

**The United States interests in the region are mutually-reinforcing: security is necessary for economic growth, security and growth make it more likely that human rights will be honored and democracy will**

emerge, and democratization makes international conflict less likely because democracies are unlikely to fight one another (p. 3).

### **The Imperialism Model**

Like the Security Model, the Imperialism Model looks outward. However, the principal script in this anti-base model is that militaries equal militarism and militarism brings destruction. In this model, the American military on Okinawa is not seen as a protective force, but rather as an aggressor that involves the island in wars that only serve American imperialistic goals. These acts of American aggression make the region less secure and make Okinawa a target for retaliation from outside nations with grievances against the United States. While elements of this model are occasionally used by Okinawan elites, it most often forms the foundation for liberal intellectuals, more radical elements of the anti-base citizen movement, and the Japan Communist Party.

### **History Proves Weapons Unnecessary**

Whereas the Security Model looks to the Cold War for justification of the need for military deterrence, the Imperialism Model looks back to the Golden

Age of the Ryukyus to explain why weapons of war are unnecessary.

Former Okinawa Governor Ota (1997) says:

In order to fully comprehend the current situation in Okinawa, one must also understand the history of Okinawa in relation to the mainland Japan. Okinawa once flourished as the Kingdom of the Ryukyus for 450 years. Because of Okinawa's ideal location in relation to mainland Japan, China and other nations in South Asia, it entered into prosperous trade relations with neighboring nations in the 14th century, establishing the Great Era of the Ryukyus (p. 4).

The Imperialism Model holds that during this Great Era, Okinawan good will and fair trade created such stable relationships that a military defense was never necessary. In his book, *Okinawa Heiwa to Sensō* (Okinawa at Peace and War), Ota (1982) claims that since this earliest period, "Okinawa has been known as a weaponless 'island of peace'" (p. 27). He asserts that not only Asians but also "visitors from Europe and America referred to Okinawa as the 'island of courtesy because of the island peoples' politeness and attention to manners" (1982, p. 27).

One of those visitors was English Naval Captain Basil Hall. Ota tells the story—often repeated by anti-base intellectuals—of how Hall, who was on his way home from the Ryukyus in 1816, met with the exiled Napoleon Bonaparte on St. Helena Island. Hall told the former emperor that in the Ryukyu Kingdom no weapons could be found—not a cannon, nor sword, nor even a spear. Napoleon was astounded. When Hall went on to explain that the Ryukyu Kingdom never engaged in war of any kind, Napoleon threw down his pen and

exclaimed that no such country could exist, and if it did, it was an abomination. Ota (1982) writes that Hall's published journals about his stay in the Ryukyu Kingdom met with similar disbelief throughout Europe and America (pp. 29-30).

For Okinawan elites like Ota, this story is useful for drawing the ontological boundaries between peace-loving Okinawans and warlike Others, especially the American government and military, who cannot understand the futility of militarism.

The fact that non-Okinawans, like Hall, have observed a difference between themselves and the pacifist Ryukyu people reinforces in Okinawans this sense of special pacifist identity. It is notable that when Ota testified before the Japanese Supreme Court in opposition to the American bases on Okinawa, he cited an American scholar's assessment of Okinawan culture rather than similar arguments made by Okinawan scholars. Ota said:

Professor William Lebra of the University of Hawaii in his *Okinawa Religion: Belief, Ritual and Social Structure* (1966) concluded that the cultures of Japan and Okinawa are fundamentally different. That is, in contrast to Japan's "warrior culture," Okinawa's is notable for an "absence of militarism." Other scholars define Okinawan culture as a "feminine culture" (*josei bunka*) or a "culture of moderation" (*yasashisa no bunka*) ("Governor Ota at the Supreme Court," p. 2).

In his testimony, Ota concedes that weaponlessness was imposed on Okinawans, first in the 15th century by Ryukyuan King Sho Shin's edict outlawing personal swords. Later, Japan's Satsuma clan, which had conquered the islands in 1609, also banned personal weapons of any kind.

("Governor Ota at the Supreme Court," p. 2). However, Ota suggests these policies acted to reinforce the pacifism that was already inherent in Okinawan culture.

He says this is evident in the way the Ryukyuan government responded to Meiji Japanization policies for the Ryukyus following the formal annexation of the islands to Japan in 1879. Okinawans accepted all the mainland's demands except one, the permanent stationing of Japanese troops on Okinawa, says Ota.

The Ryukyuan government argued: no matter how much one might strengthen military preparedness in these little islands, a success would be impossible to attain in defense against enemy attacks; arming the little island-state might cause suspicions on the part of other countries and invite an invasion. . .It is wiser to maintain the state in peace by courteous and friendly relations with the people of the neighboring countries' ("Governor Ota at the Supreme Court," p. 4).

The Japanese government ignored the wishes of the Okinawans and permanently stationed a military unit on the island ("Governor Ota at the Supreme Court," p. 4).

### **Destructiveness of Militarism**

Memories of the destruction caused by the battle for Okinawa guide much of the Imperialism Model discourse. During the last weeks of World War II the Japanese government used Okinawa as a breakwater to postpone an American invasion of the mainland. Approximately 200,000 people died in the



three-month battle. At least 100,000 of these were Okinawa civilians, one-third the island's population (Nakasone). What is more, nearly every structure and cultural artifact on the island was destroyed by the American aerial and naval bombardment known now as the "Typhoon of Steel." Stories also abound about Japanese brutality to Okinawan civilians.

Anti-base protester Shoichi Chibana is well known in Okinawa for burning the Japanese flag at the 1987 National Athletic Meet held in Okinawa. In his account of his arrest and trial, *Burning the Rising Sun*, he explains his anti-Japan feelings. He says during the battle for Okinawa, many civilians were suspected of being spies and were killed by the Japanese Army.

At the southern front of the main battlefield, many people escaped to a cave only to be driven out by Japanese soldiers. Without any means of self protection, they were killed by heavy U.S. shelling, the 'iron storm.' In the north, at Tonokiya, nearly 90 civilians captured by U.S. troops were murdered en masse by Japanese troops. The Japanese came at night, ordered the prisoners to stand in line on the shore and shouted: "Are you really Japanese? Aren't you ashamed to be the prisoners of the Americans?" and killed almost all of them with hand grenades (Chibana, p. 85).

The Imperialism model does not differentiate between the kind of militarism that caused this destruction and the United States' policy of military deterrence. As Ota (1999a) says:

Suffering from bitter wartime experiences, many of the Okinawan people have come to reject the American military bases and everything connected to war . . . The Okinawans have learned the hard lesson that

the military does not protect people. In addition, they are so strongly opposed to ever again being engaged in war that their resolve is almost like part of their flesh and blood (p. 36).

Whereas the Japanese used Okinawa as a breakwater, Ota (1997) says that throughout the history of United States-Okinawa relations, America has "only seen Okinawa as a pawn to be used geopolitically" (p. 6).

Rather than seeing American Commodore Matthew C. Perry as having "negotiated" the opening of Japan, as the DOD report suggests, Ota contends that by demanding unsuccessfully the right to establish a military presence on the island he was the first in a long line of Americans who have sought to exploit Okinawa. Ota (1997) says this type of militaristic mentality continued through the Cold War and into the present with the 1996 DOD report reaffirming the need for 100,000 American troops in Asia (p. 6).

### **No Outside Threats**

In its publication, *U.S. Military Bases in Okinawa: A Message from the Land of Courtesy*, the Okinawa Prefecture Military Base Affairs Office (February 1997) proposes that the end of the Cold War should mean the end of American bases in Okinawa, or at least, the withdrawal of the United States Marine Corps that comprises 76 percent of the 28,000 American troops on the island (p.11).

Now that the Cold War has ended, tension in the Far East has eased. The relationship between the U.S. and China has improved, and the U.S., China, South Korea, and Japan have reached an agreement to give joint aid to North Korea. Under these circumstances many experts argue that there is little necessity for keeping the Marine Corps in Okinawa to deal with emergencies in the region (Military Base Affairs Office, February 1997, p.11).

One of these experts, Chalmers Johnson (1996), argues that the Marines are not the appropriate force to handle the stated American policy. "The only credible military force that might deter China is the Seventh Fleet," Johnson says (p. 27). "A logical policy, therefore, would be to withdraw all ground forces from East Asia, which are both a source of instability in relations with host nations [as the Okinawan rape [of a 12-year-old by American soldiers] incident has demonstrated and a provocation to the Chinese, while strengthening American sea power in the Pacific" (Johnson 1996, p. 27). If additional troops were necessary to respond to a China threat, they could be as easily transported in from Guam or Hawaii as from Okinawa, he says (Johnson 1996, p. 27).

The "isolated and failing communist country" North Korea poses an even lesser threat, Johnson says. "South Korea currently has a 650,000-man army of its own that can handle any threat from the North other than one in which China or Russia joins or a nuclear threat" (Johnson 1999, p. 123). If the Marines are truly necessary to counter a North Korean offensive, "They would be based in Korea instead of training for jungle warfare on Okinawa," Johnson says (1999, p. 123).

## **Supposed Threats an Excuse for U.S. Hegemony**

Japan Communist Party Chairman Tetsuzo Fuwa (November 1995) agrees that the Marine Corps, which he describes as the "most dangerous (*bussō*)" and "most barbaric (*yaban*)" of all American forces (p. 106) is the wrong force to meet the stated objectives of the American government. He says the fact that the United States insists on maintaining this force in Okinawa proves that their mission was never to defend Japan.

The Marines in Okinawa are known as the "Third Marine Expeditionary Force," Fuwa says. "As their name indicates, their unit is designed for expeditions from Japan to the West Pacific, Indian Ocean, Mediterranean Sea and even to the coast of Africa" (Fuwa, November 1995, p.106).

What is more, it is not just the Marines that are unnecessary. Fuwa (November 1995) says, "No matter where you look, not one American military unit in Japan is designed to defend Japan" (p.106). The American Army in Japan only has command units created to support deployments outside Japan as well as espionage units. The Navy has a large port at Yokosuka on mainland Japan. However, the duty of this fleet is to act within a wide tactical range that spans from the West Pacific to the Indian Ocean, he says. "Recently, they even added a command unit for a submarine fleet that has a tactical duty in the Persian Gulf." (Fuwa, November 1995, p.106).

From the beginning the U.S. Air Force in Japan existed only as preparation for a war with the Soviet Union. Today their only duty is to transport men and materiel from the west coast of America to battlefields in other Asian countries, Fuwa says (November 1995, p.106).

Taking the argument a step further, the Japan Communist Party argues that by claiming that China and North Korea are threats worthy of the huge military build-up in Asia, America has laid bare its true purpose in Asia, which has always been to extend its hegemonic control over the region.

In the summary report of the 21st Japan Communist Party Conference in 1997, the party argues that "with the collapse of the Soviet Union, America lost the "Soviet threat" as the nominal justification for its huge military might." America has since tried to replace that threat with North Korea, Iran, Iraq, Libya, "the countries which together they call the 'rogue nations'" (*Nihon Kyōsantō* 1997, p.19).

America's argument is that since the actions of these countries are unpredictable, it is necessary to create powerful military alliances to punish them militarily when necessary. However, this is just an excuse, the report says. America is actually using the false threat of rogue nations to "tighten the dragnet that its military bloc has thrown around the world," in its efforts to "obtain global hegemony" (*Nihon Kyōsantō* 1997, p. 19).

Fuwa (October 1995) says Japan's part in this hegemony is to act as the base for American military adventurism. "'Maintain the Security Treaty' has

become the common slogan (*aikotoba*) of both the Japanese and American governments" (p. 81). However:

Our party has pointed out from the beginning that protecting Japan from outside threats was just the official (*omotemuki*) excuse. America's real purpose for maintaining the U.S.-Japan security treaty is to keep Japan as an outpost for its worldwide military strategy (*sekai senryaku*). . . .as the world's military police (*kenpei*), that strategy has been to involve itself in the world's various disputes in order to expand its military, economic and political power (Fuwa, October 1995, p. 81).

### **True Peace**

Ota (1997) argues that the use of American troops stationed on Okinawa for operations not directly related to the security of Japan violates the letter and spirit of the United States-Japan alliance. He says:

It is our position that the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty, which limits the scope of activity of the U.S. Forces in Japan to the Far East, cannot be interpreted as a basis for U.S. military operations beyond East Asia. It is unacceptable for Okinawan people to host U.S. troops with such purpose (p.7).

In his testimony before the Japanese Supreme Court, Ota suggested that participation in American hegemony was damaging to the character of the Okinawan people. He noted that Zenchu Nakahara, a scholar of ancient Okinawan poetry, was impressed with a total absence of words connoting ruthless killing (*satsuriku*) in the *Omoro Sōshi*, a collection 1,554 Okinawan

songs from the 12th to the 17th centuries. Nakahara inferred that the concept of violent killing was absent in Okinawan consciousness ("Governor Ota at the Supreme Court," p.4).

"In this way," says Ota, "my prefecture is dedicated to a way of life that shuns and abhors armed conflict" ("Governor Ota at the Supreme Court," p.4).

He goes on:

Many people in Okinawa are greatly troubled by the fact that contrary to their wishes, they have become participants in the killing and maiming of other people by allowing military bases in Okinawa from which the American forces have been deployed for military operations in other lands as in the Korean War earlier, and then the Vietnam and Gulf wars ("Governor Ota at the Supreme Court," p.4).

Invoking the "Golden Age of the Ryukyus," the Okinawa Prefectural Government Military Base Affairs Office (February 1997) claimed that the elimination of the bases would enable Okinawa once again to become a hub of international trade or "*bankoku shinryō no seishin*" (a bridge-builder between countries) (p. 15). In this way the prefecture might demonstrate to the world the meaning of "true peace" (p. 15).

The Okinawan people hope to transform an island of military bases, or the "Keystone of the Pacific," to the "Keystone of Peace," an island rich in greenery. Making use of Okinawa's long history of exchange with Asia-Pacific nations, we hope to establish our prefecture as the southern gateway to Japan (Military Base Affairs Office, February 1997, p. 15)

## **The Occupation Model**

The anti-base Occupation Model differs from the Imperialism Model in looking inward to the domestic problems caused by the bases. It is unconcerned with international issues. Instead, the principal script is that American-base-related crime, pollution and accidents are a greater threat to Okinawan peace and well-being than any potential outside threat. Although the United States returned Okinawa to Japan in 1972, the Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) between the United States and Japan gives American military personnel extra-territorial rights, while depriving Okinawans of control of large portions of land, airspace and coastal waters. These conditions are seen as tantamount to the continued American military occupation of Okinawa.

During the study period, this model made up the world view of the most powerful Okinawan politicians, academics and other societal elite. It is also the model that guides the discourse of some Japanese and American academics. These people share the attitudes that American and Japanese governments are prejudiced, unfair, oppressive and uncaring. Attitudes about American soldiers range from the view that they are arrogant and reckless to the belief that they are lecherous, amoral, and criminal. By contrast, Okinawans are viewed as long-suffering, gentle and kind.



Johnson (1999) expresses well the Occupation Model position that the American bases themselves, not any outside threat, are the real danger to peace when he writes:

. . . life for Okinawans involves a high level of anxiety that they might be robbed, raped, or killed by American soldiers, or that disasters might descend out of the blue or crop up from nowhere at any time. . . Okinawans want the bases withdrawn from their land, returned to its rightful owners so that they might use it for the peaceful economic development of Okinawa not for military adventures plotted in Washington, D.C. (p. 7)

I will consider each of these principal threats separately, beginning with various problems associated with American control of Okinawan land, air space and sea lanes. I will then look at how this model views American-caused crime, accidents and pollution.

## **Stolen Land**

With the end of the battle for Okinawa the United States took direct control of Okinawa. The American military transformed several former Japanese bases into United States bases and constructed more of their own. According to the Okinawa Prefectural Government Military Base Affairs Office (August 1997) 40 American military facilities occupy about 10.7 percent, or 24,300 hectares, of all the islands of Okinawa Prefecture (p.1). The largest and most important of these bases are on Okinawa island, where fully 20 percent of

the land is in use by the United States military (p. 1). When non-combat military personnel and dependents are added to the 28,000 United States soldiers in Okinawa, the total American population in the prefecture comes to about 50,000.

The statistic used most frequently by Okinawa elites as a symbol of the unfairness of this situation is that these American bases on Okinawa represent 75 percent of all United States military facilities in Japan. This is despite the fact that Okinawa accounts for only 0.6 percent of Japanese territory.

It is not just the percentage of bases on the island that angers Okinawan elites but the manner in which they were built in the postwar years. As Ota (1997) explains:

During this time, the Okinawan people were dislodged from their villages and towns by the U.S. Forces, and the U.S. military issued proclamations and decrees and forcefully confiscated their land. The start of the Cold War, particularly the establishment of the People's Republic of China in 1949 and the outbreak of the Korean War in 1950, led to the construction of U.S. bases in Okinawa at a furious pace in the 50s. The U.S. military even expropriated Okinawan land using *bayonets and bulldozers*, uprooting more Okinawans from their homes (p.2; my emphasis).

The "bayonets and bulldozers" trope is a regular part of the Okinawan elite discourse during the study period. Downplayed in this discourse is the fact that the Japanese government pays Okinawans tens of billions of yen annually in rent on this land on behalf of the American military.

## **Land Confiscation Violated Constitution**

The Japanese government was able to secure an early end to mainland occupation in 1952 by once again sacrificing Okinawa, this time by giving the United States indefinite control over the Ryukyu islands. University of Illinois Economics Professor Koji Taira, an Okinawan who publishes the *Ryukyuanist*, a quarterly newsletter on Okinawa studies, says separation from mainland Japan left the Okinawan people without legal recourse as their land was taken from them. Taira explains:

Had the Japanese constitution and laws been in effect in Okinawa during those days, the expropriation of land by brute force, as occurred then, would have been impossible. This gives rise to the Okinawan argument that the U.S. bases in Okinawa came into being in violation of the Constitution of Japan (p. 3).

Since reversion, a growing number of base-property owners have organized themselves as the Anti-War Landlords and have refused to renew their leases. However, the Japanese government has been able to circumvent the wishes of these landlords and force the continuation of their leases by employing the country's Land Acquisition Law. This law—Japan's version of due process—allows representatives of the local and national government to sign the leases as the landowners' proxy (Taira, p. 3).

## **Base-Caused Congestion and Urban Sprawl**

Another symbol of the inequity of the base land situation used by Okinawan elites is the fact that so much of the Okinawan Prefectural land in use by the United States—33 percent—was taken from private citizens. (An additional 30 percent is owned by Okinawan municipalities, 33 percent is national property and 4 percent is Prefectural property). In the most populated central region of Okinawa island, more than 75 percent of the base land is privately owned. By contrast, 87 percent of all property in use by the United States military on mainland Japan is nationally owned (Military Base Affairs Office, August 1997, p. 1).

Six cities on Okinawa island have more than 40 percent of their municipal areas occupied by bases. The result, says Ota, is that Okinawan cities "have come into being as erratic sprawls around the bases, without the benefit of zoning." Towns are characterized by mazes of narrow roads that are difficult for emergency vehicles to navigate (Ota 1999, p.208). The largest United States facility, Kadena Air Force Base, takes up 83 percent of Kadena Town (Okinawa Prefectural Government, August 1997, p. 1). Nearly 14,000 Okinawans are squeezed into the remaining 17 percent. "Under such circumstances," says Ota (1999), "it is almost impossible to live as (decently as) humans should" (p. 208).

Despite sustained demands for a redress of this problem, the American government has returned only 15 percent of base-use land since reversion. (The United States has agreed in principle to return an additional 20 percent of base-use land as part of consolidations recommended by the 1996 Special Action Committee on Okinawa [SACO] report). On the mainland, 60 percent of the land formerly occupied by the American military has been returned (Ota 1997, p2).

### **American Control of Sea and Air Zones**

Complicating the problem further is the fact that along with control of the land comes United States control of 29 sea zones and 15 areas of airspace (Okinawa Prefectural Government, April 1997, p. 1). All flights—military and civilian—into and out of Okinawa are under the primary control of American military air traffic controllers at Kadena Air Force Base. These controllers give preference to United States military planes landing at Kadena and Futenma Marine Corps Air Station. (*Nihon Kyōsantō* 1996, p. 127).

In order to avoid military aircraft, civilian planes flying north toward the Japanese mainland are required to fly at very low altitudes (no higher than 1000 feet) until they are out of American-controlled airspace which extends 50 miles beyond Okinawa island. They must then make a steep climb to reach normal cruising heights. Likewise, civilian planes entering Okinawa from the

North must prematurely lower to—in the words of the Japan Communist Party—this "unsafe and unstable 1000-foot altitude" 20 miles before landing at Okinawa International Airport in Naha (*Nihon Kyōsantō* 1996, p. 127).

### **Economic Threats**

In his testimony before the Japanese Supreme Court, Ota lamented the poor state of the Okinawa Prefectural economy:

The prefecture's per capita income per annum still remains at 74 percent of the national average or less than a half of Tokyo's. Besides, the unemployment rate is about 6 percent, twice as high as the national average. Moreover, the unemployment rate [for] youth in their teens and twenties reaches a serious 12 percent ("Governor Ota at the Supreme Court," p. 3).

This situation is directly linked to the "excessive burden of the bases," he said ("Governor Ota at the Supreme Court," p. 3). In its 1997 petition to the United States government for the reduction and realignment of U.S. bases in Okinawa, the Okinawa Prefectural government explains this connection:

The U.S. bases greatly hamper Okinawan Prefecture's future development, obstructing the prefecture's plans for construction of roads and systematic urban development, hindering the prefecture from securing sites for industry, and interfering with smooth operation of civilian air routes" (Okinawa Prefectural Government, April 1997, p. 1).

While at one time the United States bases were essential to the Okinawan economy, the Prefectural government asserts that this is no longer the case. In fact, since Okinawa's reversion to Japan in 1972, base related revenue has dropped from 15 percent to just 5 percent of the gross prefectural product. What is more, during the same period, the number of Okinawans employed by the bases dropped from 40,000 to just 8,000 (Okinawa Prefectural Government, April 1997, p. 2).

Taira argues that a contribution of 5 percent to the gross prefectural product is too small for the United States military, or any enterprise, that takes up 20 percent of Okinawan land. "In effect, the U.S. and Japan are forcing on Okinawa's economy a deadweight loss of 15 percent of its GDP every year. In a democracy, such an abuse of the state's taxing power should never be tolerated," he says (Taira, p. 2).

## **Crime**

For Okinawan elites and those who share the Occupation Model, the 1995 kidnapping and rape of an elementary school student by two United States Marines and a Navy seaman was part of a long history of American crime in Okinawa. Figures compiled by the Okinawan Prefectural Police show that since reversion in 1972, through December 1996, American military personnel on Okinawa and their dependents committed 4,823 crimes. Of these

514 were 'heinous' (*kyōaku*) crimes including murder, rape, and arson (Okinawa Ken Sōmujiibu, 1997, p. 108). In its base reduction proposal, the Ota administration claims this is a crime ratio of "one crime committed every other day" (Okinawa Prefectural Government, April 1997, p. 14).

Using slightly less complete figures, (1972-1995), the Japan Communist Party claims that Americans have committed 13 murders and 111 rapes since reversion. In its survey of base related problems, *Okinawa no Beigun Kichi Higai* (*Harm Inflicted upon Okinawa by American Bases*), the party concludes:

Since the beginning of the occupation of Okinawa, crimes committed by American soldiers have been the worst human rights problem in Okinawa. As a result of the maintaining and strengthening of base functions and constant training, in the more than 23 years since reversion, American-caused crime has never ceased. The number of attacks on young women, indecent acts, rapes, and other sexual crimes is particularly high (*Nihon Kyōsantō* 1996, p.75).

Among these crimes against women, the September 5, 1995 "schoolgirl rape" was not the first crime against a young girl. Almost exactly 40 years earlier, September 3, 1955, an American soldier raped and killed a six-year-old Okinawa girl. This so-called "Yumiko case," after the first name of the child, stood as the symbol of American brutality until the 1995 incident. (Arasaki, p.231)

Okinawa Prefectural Assembly member Suzuyo Takazato, like many who share the Occupation Model consciousness, considers crimes committed by foreign military personnel inherently more heinous than those committed by



Japanese civilians. Following the 1995 schoolgirl rape, Takazato co-founded Women Against Military Violence, which has toured Japan and the United States to call attention to sex crimes committed by Americans in Okinawa. The group bases its actions on a section of the platform adopted at the 1995 Women's Conference in Beijing that says: "Rape that takes place in situations of armed conflict or long-term military presence constitutes both a war crime and a crime against humanity" (Gerson, p.26). She explains how the present crime situation amounts to continued American military occupation:

After the war, 278 reported GI rapes were committed during the first six years of the occupation. Recent years have not been much better. Between 1988 and 1995, according to one study more "marines and navy sailors were tried for more rapes, child molestation, and other sexual assaults at bases in Japan than at any other U.S. military site in the world. The vast majority of these violations were in Okinawa (Gerson, p.26).

In stark contrast to the Security Model's attitude toward American soldiers as courageous, gallant, disciplined defenders of democracy, a common attitude in the Occupation Model is that United States soldiers are undisciplined, wild and reckless.

In a full-page ad in the *New York Times* the anti-base protest group, Japan Coalition on the U.S. Military Bases, says the problem is that many Marines "are in their teens and twenties, and are living abroad for the first time. There are many difficulties involved in this transition , and they are manifested

in the high crime statistics." The Marine Corps accounts for 90 percent of American-caused crime on Okinawa, the group says (Japan Coalition).

Others are less charitable in their assessment of the character of American soldiers. The Communist Party's Okinawa research group said it interviewed several Okinawans about their experiences with American soldiers and discovered that Americans are considered lewd and amoral:

One man said this: "My middle-school daughter heard three American soldiers call out to her from a car. They acted lewdly while trying to get her to ride with them. Her older brother who just happened to pass by shouted at them, 'What are you doing? Go home!' and trouble was avoided." Another woman said her daughter told her "Mother, today I was followed by some American soldiers." The words made her tremble (*Nihon Kyōsantō* 1996, p. 74).

One school forbade students from taking a short-cut home because the street ran too close to a base where American soldiers had been seen following young girls, the Communist Party report says. Another woman said she was on her way home from working in a field when she saw a group of Americans, who had just finished a training exercise, standing in the road completely naked washing themselves with the irrigation water. As she passed by they shouted at her and made lewd gestures. The Communist Party concludes:

Under such abnormal conditions it is possible that another schoolgirl rape will happen sometime. It clearly means that, to this day, the situation of being under American military occupation has not changed and, in fact, continues (*Nihon Kyōsantō* 1996, p. 75).

Adding to this sense of continued occupation is the fact that Under Article 17 Section 5c of the Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA), Americans suspected of crimes do not have to be turned over to Japanese police until they have been formally indicted by a Japanese court. Many Okinawans believe this extra-territorial right emboldens would-be criminals and hinders police from interrogating suspects and investigating crimes.

Worse still, three times in the past American suspects held on base have escaped to the United States. All three were later rearrested and returned to Okinawa, but suspicions about the lax treatment of American prisoners are a concern of many Okinawans (Miyagi, p.28).

## **Accidents**

Many Okinawans also believe that the SOFA hampers the investigation of military-caused accidents and fair reciprocity for damages. Each year Americans cause about 1,000 accidents on Okinawa, about 90 percent of which are traffic accidents (*Nihon Kyōsantō* 1996, p.83). Under the SOFA, if military personnel are off-duty when they are suspected of causing an accident, the Japanese police have the first right to investigate.

However, if the American suspect is on-duty, the American military has jurisdiction over the case. When the duty status is in doubt, local police are required to turn the suspect over to military police. If a suspect's commanding

officer signs a statement certifying that he or she was on duty at the time of the incident, the case remains with the military. It is widely believed that accident cases involving Americans are often closed by biased military investigators without fair compensation being paid. (*Nihon Kyōsantō* 1996, pp. 101-104).

The emotional impact of this belief is evident from Japan Coalition on the U.S. Military Bases' full-page appeal to Americans in the *New York Times*. In inch-and-a-half type it asks "Please Remove Your Marines From Our Soil!" Below the letters is a 9 X 6-inch black-and-white photo of an accident scene from April 1965. The body of a six-year-old girl lies lifeless on a clearly residential street. Five United States soldiers, their huge military truck in the background, stand over the body. One soldier has his hands on his hips, and no one is giving aid to the child. Black bars have been drawn across the eyes of the men to hide their identity, giving them an added look of criminality (Japan Coalition). The caption says the child was run over by the soldiers. What is more, it says:

During the period of U.S. military administration, even investigations by the Japanese police were obstructed and virtually no compensation was ever made to the bereaved. And the problem continues. From 1972 to 1995, 52,497 traffic accidents have been caused by U.S. military personnel. In many of these cases, the victims and their families have not received fair compensation (Japan Coalition).

While traffic accidents are by far the most frequent problem, they are not the most dramatic. In 1959, a United States jet fighter crashed into an Okinawan elementary school, killing 16 children and a teacher. In 1961, a

United States jet fighter crashed into an Okinawan home, killing two people and seriously injuring four. Between reversion in 1972 and 1996 there were 127 American aircraft mishaps, including 36 crashes. One of the most dangerous of these mishaps was in 1996, when an American military plane dropped an unexploded 1,000-pound bomb into a frequently-used sea lane seven miles from Naha (Military Base Affairs Office, February 1997, p. 7).

Live fire training exercises have resulted in 137 brush fires blackening approximately 1,466 hectares. (Okinawa Prefectural Government, February 1997, p. 7). Parachute drops have disrupted civilian life when soldiers and equipment have gone astray. The worst of these incidents was in 1965, when a military trailer being dropped by parachute landed on a home, killing a child (Military Base Affairs Office, August 1997, p. 5). The military subsequently stopped dropping equipment by parachute over the island.

As part of the 1996 SACO agreement, the military further committed to stop air-dropping soldiers over Okinawa and to move such exercises to smaller, less populated Iejima island, off the coast of Okinawa. However, in 1999 a parachute training exercise in violation of SACO over Kadena Air Base on Okinawa, reinforced doubt about the United States' willingness to honor its commitments.

Suspicion also abounds that the Japanese and American governments routinely hide problems and accidents from the Okinawan people. For many, this fear was confirmed in 1997 when it was revealed that the Japanese central

government had failed to inform Okinawa prefecture that the United States Marine Corps had mistakenly fired 1,520 radioactive depleted uranium rounds onto a prefectural island. This "accident" took place over a one year period from 1995 to 1996 (Ota, 1997 p. 4).

## **Pollution**

Training exercises are also blamed for various kinds of environmental pollution. Chief among these is noise. Citing a study conducted by his office, Ota (1997) says that because of aircraft noise, many people who live near air bases have less hearing ability than those in other areas (p. 4). "Furthermore the birthrate of babies with less than normal weight is very high. The report also states that many infants exposed to constant aircraft noise need to be watched for abnormal psychological and physical reactions" (Ota 1997, p. 4). The landing and takeoff of planes rattles windows and makes teaching difficult at schools near air bases. (*Nihon Kyōsantō* 1996, p. 117).

The firing of live shells over prefectural road 104 not only closed the road to traffic 108 times since reversion but denuded the target, Mt. Onna. This has caused soil erosion and run-off that damaged coral reefs in nearby Kin Bay. (Live fire exercises were moved to mainland Japan as part of the SACO agreement). Leakage of raw sewage and oil materials from treatment facilities have been responsible for the pollution of rivers and other nearby bodies of

water. The discovery of high levels of toxic chemicals such as PCB and mercury at Onna Communication Site, which the United States returned to Okinawa in 1995, creates doubt about whether the prefecture will be able to use other returned base land for non-military purposes. (Okinawan Prefectural Government, August 1997, p. 6).

### **The Cooperation Model**

The Cooperation Model underlies the ideology of Japan's ruling Liberal Democratic Party, many American Military leaders, especially those working in Japan, and some business and conservative labor organizations within Okinawa. Like the Occupation Model, the Cooperation Model is not concerned with the international security rationale for the American presence in Asia. Instead, it looks inward to domestic *benefits* of maintaining American bases on Okinawa.

This model views Okinawa, Japan, and the United States as friends and partners who aspire to equality in their relationships. The central script of this model is that the United States military presence in Japan is beneficial to all three parties. Japan is able to maintain its "peace constitution" without having to consider the need, or ramifications of, expanding its Self Defense Force. The United States gets Japanese economic support for its bases. Okinawa's economy benefits from base-land rents, construction, and commerce tied to the

bases as well as central government compensation in the form of financial aid and public-project underwriting. The bases also give the prefecture political leverage to be used for other kinds of support.

Those whose ideology is based on this model do not necessarily approve of the disproportionate amount of American military bases on Okinawa as compared to mainland Japan. However, they see the number of bases on Okinawa as an artifact of history, not a symbol of continued discrimination nor a threat to society. They believe rapid down-sizing or withdrawal would be economically and politically dangerous. Instead, they prefer to work towards gradual adjustment of base size over an extended period of time.

### **Base Benefits for the United States and Japan**

The domestic benefit to the United States of having its military bases in Japan is stated in the DOD report. "Japan supplies by far the most generous host nation support of any of our allies," it says (p. 25). Japan's central government not only pays the rent on base land and other land-use fees, it also pays for all local labor, utilities, and construction of facilities. It also compensates local communities for use of their municipal areas and waives all taxes, tolls, and customs on United States military operations. All together, Japan provides at least \$5 billion in support annually (Department of Defense, p. 25).



Military analyst Michael O'Hanlon notes that while Japan hosts 25 percent of all American troops abroad, its contributions account for more than 50 percent of all host-nation support. He says the United States would likely pay at least \$3 billion to station the same 45,000 troops in the United States. Thus, while America does not save the full amount (which he calculates as \$6 billion in 1997, two years after the DOD report), by having its troops in Japan, it nonetheless saves at least a third on operating costs (O'Hanlon, p. 155).

O'Hanlon figures that the United States "is also probably realizing \$25 billion a year in indirect savings from its bases in Japan, given the efficiencies of maintaining an East Asian-Pacific presence from nearby rather than from the continental United States" (p. 156).

Historically, Japan has also profited from this arrangement. While the amount of host-nation support is high, it is small in terms of percentage of GDP. Mochizuki explains that:

By relying on America's security guarantee, Japan can concentrate on its commercial interests, especially in Asia, without contributing much to the security order that makes its relentless foreign economic expansion possible. Without the political military cover provided by the United States, Japan would have to spend much more on defense to counter hostile neighbors or deal more forthrightly with its militarist past and absorb more Asian products so as to nurture friendly relations with the rest of the region (p. 6).

## **Okinawan Economic Benefit**

Okinawa also benefits directly from this arrangement. According to the Okinawa prefectural government the amount of rent paid landowners who lease their property to the United States is about 68 billion yen (about \$680 million) a year (Military Base Affairs Office, 1997, p.6). Mikio Shimoji, a Liberal Democratic Party National Diet member from Okinawa, places the figure higher, at about 85 billion yen (\$850 million) (M. Shimoji, personal communication, March 28, 1999).

Military analyst Ralph Cossa points out that 90 percent of the 30,000 base-property landlords regularly renew their leases with the United States military without question. The remaining 3,000 Anti-War Landlords who protest their leases own less than .02 percent of all base land, he says. Many own the smallest possible parcel of land, one *tsubo*, about 36 square feet, which they purchased for the express purpose of joining the anti-bases movement. "About half (the Anti-War Landlords) are not even Okinawa residents," Cossa says (Cossa, p.8).

Both the prefectural government and Shimoji agree that Okinawa makes an additional 50 billion yen annually on salaries paid to 8,500 civilian employees of the United States military. Another 50 billion yen is made each year from military spending in off-base business (Military Base Affairs Office, August 1997, p.6; M. Shimoji, personal communication, March 28, 1999).

Therefore, the combined revenue from rent, salaries, and off-base American commerce is between 168 billion and 185 billion yen (\$168 million to \$180 million).

The Japanese central government provides additional money for programs such as noise pollution reduction and security, bringing the total amount of directly-related base revenue to about 300 billion yen (\$300 million), Shimoji says. "If you ask if there is anything else that could replace that 300 billion yen, we can't say that there is" (M. Shimoji, personal communication, March 28, 1999).

Okinawan labor leader Shinichiro Isa broke away from Okinawa's main labor union, *Zenchūrō* because he says the union's leadership continued to support Ota's anti-base plans while the overwhelming majority of rank-and-file workers favor maintaining the bases. He is now the president of his own pro-base union comprised mainly of base employees, the Zen Okinawa Chūryūgun Rōdōkumiai (All Okinawa Garrison Forces Labor Union). Isa claims that business directly related to the bases is just the tip of the iceberg. Thousands of other jobs are indirectly dependent on the American military, he says.

If the bases go, not just the 8,500 people who work on the bases, but 200,000 people will lose their jobs. If that happens, those 200,000 people would have to leave Okinawa, because there's no work here. Even though (the Okinawa government says) there has got to be a plan for when the bases go, right now there is no planning being done. When they say that they are going to build factories or bring in companies, they're dreaming. If you ask, "What companies? Who is going to come?" they have no idea (S. Isa, personal communication, April 5, 1999).

Cossa believes that the Ota administration's "zero base" plan would actually discourage investment in Okinawa "from any quarter" that understands the link between the U.S. presence in Asia and "regional security and prosperity" (Cossa, p.8). For example he says:

In my own discussions with Taiwan businessmen, I detect a strong economic interest in Okinawa, but only if their economic activities do not undercut the U.S. presence—Taiwanese do not have to be convinced of the importance of the U.S. bases to regional security," he says (Cossa, p.8).

### **Non-base Options Limited**

Further complicating plans for a "zero bases" Okinawa is that not all the returned land could be used, Shimoji says. Only the bases in the central part of the island, Futenma, Kinser, and Naha Military Port are close enough to other economic resources to make their industrial development worthwhile. Even centrally located land is difficult to develop, he says. Shimoji points to the Ameku area near Naha as an example of previously-returned military land that remains idle.

Futenma, Kinser, and Naha Military Port, these three (bases-occupied areas) could be used (for industrial development). The other areas couldn't be used even if they were returned. I think it is best not to think we could develop every area that is returned. Even if the northern land is returned, that property certainly can't be used. The only option is to leave it as it is. Maybe there is some other way to use it, but it's not useful for

industry. These three areas are the only ones that I think could be used for industry (M. Shimoji, personal communication, March 28, 1999).

### **Base-linked Government Assistance**

In addition to revenue generated from the bases, Okinawa receives much more central government aid than any other Japanese prefecture as a means of compensation for the bases. Shimoji says Okinawa gets a 95 percent grant for all public works whereas the other prefectures get 60 percent. Furthermore, the Okinawan government has erected trade barriers to protect Okinawan industries (Barrett, p. 143).

Municipal governments also receive special aid for agreeing to house military facilities. Isa claims that this aid is one of the few ways that smaller municipalities can provide for their residents. For example, in 1999, Kin Village in northern Okinawa agreed to allow the United States Navy's Sobe Communications Facility to be relocated to their area. "It doesn't matter if you like it or not; if you want to provide places of employment for young people or make your community a little better off financially you don't have much choice" Isa says.

The mayor of Iejima (a small island off the coast of Okinawa) has a well thought-out idea. He wants to provide one-third of the island for bases, 60 percent is to be reserved for agriculture and tourism. Less than 1,000 people live on the island. Their idea is to coexist with the base there. They are diligently trying to make the things they could not make if the base was not there. For example, because the base is there they are

using their central government aid to do things like building a small golf course. If they couldn't build that, the area would be nothing but grassy fields. Now they have a place for their young people to work and gather (S. Isa, personal communication, April 5, 1999).

Masahiro Kamekawa is one of those municipal leaders who wants to coexist with the bases. As a city council member in the central Okinawan city of Urasoe, he sits on a committee created to encourage the relocation of Naha Military Port to his municipal area.

Kamekawa says there are benefits to having the bases. "Because the bases are here the Okinawan economy is being supported. We can't ignore that part." (M. Kamekawa, personal communication, April 13, 1999). He says:

What if all the bases were returned today? There would be terrible confusion. The problem is not just the base employees and those who depend on base-generated revenue. In the 25 years since reversion, the amount of national aid budgeted for Okinawa development has amounted to 10 trillion yen. And yet, even though we receive this 10 trillion yen, the Okinawan economy is struggling (M. Kamekawa, personal communication, April 13, 1999).

Kamekawa believes that the bases give Okinawa a certain amount of leverage with the central government that the prefecture can use to gain economic equality with the rest of the country. He says Okinawa needs to play its "base card" to obtain special trade and tax systems that will lift the prefecture out of its economic slump.

If we have the current Japanese system (when the bases are returned) then we can't compete. That's why I say we need a different system. Take the tax system: if we create factories in a free zone, and reduce the tax rate from 40 percent—as it is now in mainland Japan—to 10 percent [for Okinawa only]. . . If you don't have to pay that extra 30 percent in taxes, the cost of production will be reduced. If this special kind of system is created in Okinawa there is a possibility. . . That's why before the bases are returned we have to use the base card wisely and change the system (M. Kamekawa, personal communication, April 13, 1999).

## **Partners, Not Victim and Oppressor**

Those with the Cooperation Model mentality see the relationship between all three areas as aspiring to true partnership even if it is not equal yet. When asked about discrimination by Japan and America Isa says:

Many Okinawans like to talk about how we were invaded by Satsuma in the 17th century. And that during World War II only Okinawa experience a ground war. They have a victimization mentality. But that is all part of history; you can't say that we have to do things a certain way just because that has happened. The war was the war. You have to put that aside and realize that today the military is necessary to some degree (S. Isa, personal communication, April 5, 1999).

That is exactly the message Birdwell wants Japanese to accept. He says:

Recently [November 1997], we had the 40th anniversary of the establishment of the US Forces Japan, before that date 40 years ago, there was the Far East Command that had been set up by MacArthur during the war. That went away because the relationship between the U.S. and Japan had changed and matured and we were no longer the conquering occupiers, we are partners. Our effort is to make that clear to the Japanese (B. Birdwell, personal communication, November 24, 1997).

**Birdwell says he understands why that message is a hard sell in Okinawa.**

**If you look at the number of soldiers stationed in Okinawa and the amount of real estate that they occupy—bad choice of words—rely upon—we do not occupy any land in Okinawa—and you compare that to the size of Okinawa and its population, compare that with the amount of real estate and the number of Americans stationed on the mainland, and relative to the size of that area you can easily see that Okinawa is carrying a larger burden of our mutual defense. And I use the word burden only because that's the word that they often use (B. Birdwell, personal communication, November 24, 1997).**

**Cossa suggests that the ratio of land used by the United States in Okinawa as opposed to the mainland is less unfair than base protesters claim. "While it is true that 75 percent of all American bases in Japan are on Okinawa, the preponderance of Japan Self Defense Force bases are elsewhere," he says. "When one looks at the total amount of land taken up by combined U.S. and Japanese bases, only 20 percent are in Okinawa" (Cossa, p.8). Okinawa's government statistics show that this figure is closer to 25. (Military Base Affairs Office, August 1997, p. 1).**

**The Cooperation Model also views the way in which that land was appropriated as fair under the circumstances. In contrast to the image of "bayonet and bulldozer," Fisch says American military planners "were sensitive to the Okinawan attitudes toward the land and to the inevitable feelings of rootlessness experienced by Okinawans displaced by the base development program" (Fisch, p. 171).**



The concept of private land ownership was less than 50 years old in Okinawa at the time (Fisch, p. 170), and most records of land ownership had been destroyed in the battle for Okinawa (Fisch, p. 172). Even if the property rights had been more firmly rooted, some "tactical commanders" argued that "under the Rules of Land Warfare, the United States was not legally obliged to compensate Okinawan landholders for the use of their land" (Fisch, p. 174). Nonetheless, MacArthur demanded that fair compensation be made to Okinawans and set up a system to assess land values and for Okinawans to assert property claims (Fisch, p. 174).

Although Fisch notes that there were a number of misunderstandings and missteps in the process of building the bases, the end result created "some decidedly positive results."

In a very real sense the Okinawan people moved out of farming and into light industrial and service-oriented occupations. Many lost their psychological links with their rural heritage. Their society was transformed into one more capable of meeting the challenges of the late 20th century. This painful change had been brought about as more and more islanders found employment and a new way of life because of the construction and operation of the American military bases (Fisch, p. 178).

### **Bases not a Threat**

Shimoji says the fact that he has received electoral support demonstrates that many Okinawans feel as he does, that the American bases are not a threat to peace or safety. "The mass media report that the bases are a problem, that

they are a threat and that the people or Okinawans think they are suffering," Shimoji says. "But I don't think the basic Okinawan feels that way." He continues:

I have talked with many Okinawans and ask if the fact that we have these bases and 50,000 Americans on the island has any fearful effect on their daily lives, and I can tell you that there is no real feeling that this is a terrible thing. If you interpret a threat as being a fear, I don't think that Okinawans consider the bases a threat. That goes for me as well. I don't have the concept of the bases as a threat. I think there is a sense that we have to do something about the trouble caused by the bases, but I don't think the difficulty of solving this trouble amounts to a threat (M. Kamekawa, personal communication, April 13, 1999).

### **Crime Not a Significant Problem**

The two base-related problems that receive the most attention from the Okinawan government and media are crime and accidents. The Cooperation Model discourse on these problems is that Americans are unfairly singled out for criticism. This is especially true when one considers that Americans actually cause fewer of these problems than Okinawans.

No one disputes the Okinawan prefectural police statistics showing that Americans have committed 4,823 crimes between 1972 and 1996. However, Ames (who in 1999 moved from Air Force to Navy spokesman) says statistics can be misleading. "Per capita, the American crime rate [in Okinawa] is actually

about 40 percent lower than [the] Okinawan [crime rate]," he says (C. Ames, personal communication, February 12, 2000)

Okinawa prefectural police statistics confirm Ames's claim. The 50,000 American military personnel and their dependents represent about 4 percent of Okinawa's 1.2 million population. However, from 1972 to 1996 Americans committed only 1.9 percent of Okinawa's crime—less than half the crime committed by Okinawans per capita (Okinawa Ken Sōmujiibu, 1997, p. 108).

Okinawan police statistics do not include crimes committed by Americans against other Americans on base. Nonetheless, they reinforce the Cooperation Model argument that Americans do not pose a larger threat to Okinawans' safety than Okinawans themselves. What is more, while the total number of crimes in the prefecture has remained about the same each year over the 25-year period, the number of American-caused crimes and, therefore the percentage of the total, has steadily dropped since 1980 and drastically declined since 1986.

The type of crime committed by Americans is also important. As is often repeated by Okinawan elites, Americans committed 514 crimes in the "heinous" category (murder, rape, robbery, arson) between 1972 and 1996. However, this ignores the fact that 70 percent of all American caused crime in Okinawa is non-violent.

Also important is when these crimes were committed. Of the 514 heinous crimes, 300 were committed in the ten-year period of 1972 through 1981

(Okinawa Ken Sōmujibu, p. 108). In other words, Americans committed about 30 heinous crimes a year in the years immediately after reversion. However, during the next 15 years, United States military personnel averaged less than half that figure—about 14 heinous crimes a year. If the calculation period is shortened still further to the eleven years from 1987 to 1996, Americans committed an average of just six of these most serious crimes each year. The percentage of American-caused crime committed in Okinawa steadily declined each year from its peak of 6.9 percent in 1973 to just 0.4 percent in 1996 (Okinawa Ken Sōmujibu, 1997, p. 108).

Ames says it is important to note that the peak of American-caused crime on Okinawa was during and directly after the Vietnam War, a time when Okinawa was flooded with GIs preparing for, and on short leaves from, jungle combat. "These guys were thinking they might be dead in a week. They weren't that concerned about being good neighbors," Ames said (C. Ames, personal communication, February 12, 2000).

Ames particularly dislikes that fact that the American military has been targeted by Okinawan women's groups such as Women Against Military Violence. He says he does not deny the seriousness of the rapes that have been committed by Americans. "But if these women were true feminists, they would recognize that working conditions for women, pay and respect, is much better on the bases than in Japanese society in general. But they ignore that. It's

obvious that they are anti-base more than they are pro-woman," he says (C. Ames, personal communication, January 28, 1998).

### **Accidents Not a Problem**

A careful look at statistics used by the Communist Party to show American motorists posed undue dangers in Okinawa actually confirms the opposite. In the 15 year period from 1981 to 1995, the total number of traffic accidents resulting in personal injury in Okinawa was 40,143. Of these, Americans caused 810 or just 2 percent (*Nihon Kyōsantō*, p.83). Again, American military personnel comprise 4 percent of the population. This means that, per capita, Okinawans are more than twice as likely to cause a serious traffic accident as Americans.

As for other training accidents, with the exception of a few dramatic incidents, most aircraft accidents have taken place inside the American bases and therefore do not pose a significant threat to Okinawan civilians. What is more, under the terms of the SACO agreement, the United States has agreed to move all parachute training to sparsely populated Iejima. It has also ended all live fire exercises that have caused forest fires in the past.

## **SOFA a Fair Agreement**

Ames says it is also not true that Americans hide behind the SOFA to avoid paying damages in accidents.

They [Okinawans] are better off if they get hit by an American. Today everyone on this base [Kadena Air Force Base] has their insurance checked. There may be a mistake sometimes. . . A reporter told me that Okinawa has the highest rate of uninsured drivers in the country. It's something like one fifth of the drivers. (C. Ames, personal communication, January 28, 1998).

Ames says the idea that the SOFA gives Americans extra-territorial rights or that Americans have an occupation mentality are concepts left over from pre-reversion times when Americans did treat Okinawans as inferior.

Isa agrees. He says that when Americans became subject to the SOFA at reversion, it was actually a good thing for Okinawa because it meant Americans would be subject to Japanese laws.

Before reversion in 1972, during the 25 years that Okinawa was an American colony, a number of unbelievable incidents took place, rapes and traffic accidents and such. Because at that time the Americans had extra-territorial right some escaped to the America without taking responsibility for their actions. There are still Americans who have that kind of mentality. But today even though there are some who still have that mentality they no longer have the extra-territorial rights. They get judged by Japanese laws just like other Japanese. That's important (S. Isa, personal communication, April 5, 1999).

Isa believes the fact that the military does not have to turn over American crime suspects until after indictment is acceptable since it usually means little more than a 48-hour delay of justice. It is simply a matter of the military checking the identity of the accused and making sure their rights are protected. After that, the Japanese courts get them and that is how it should be, he says (S. Isa, personal communication, April 5, 1999).

Following the 1995 schoolgirl rape, the United States government responded to protests against the post-indictment hand-over condition of SOFA by amending the rule to allow suspects to be turned over to local police before indictment in cases where the crime is particularly serious. Such decisions demonstrate the military's willingness to cooperate, Isa says (S. Isa, personal communication, April 5, 1999).

Shimoji agrees. He says the real problem is not how the system handles Americans accused of crime but how Okinawan politicians use American crime for propaganda purposes.

Okinawans also cause accidents and crimes. These are taken care of by the courts and don't get used for political purposes. But in the case of Americans it doesn't just get taken care of by the courts—it also gets used for the purpose of political performance. If they (anti-base politicians) can create the impression that Americans are bad, they can extend their political power in a way different than how we (members of the LDP) do. For that reason these accidents and incidents are very politically useful (M. Shimoji, personal communication, March 28, 1999).

Shimoji says, "If we [Okinawans] want to solve the accident and incident problem we shouldn't just complain. We need to position ourselves to solve them," he says. That means better cooperation with military police.

Even though there is strict law enforcement inside the base, the problem is outside the base. We are seriously thinking that, within the range of Japanese police authority, it has to be thoroughly done outside the base as well. My thought is, why don't the prefectural police and the military police work together to patrol more aggressively? (M. Shimoji, personal communication, March 28, 1999).

Some cooperation already takes place. Shimoji says he was part of discussions with the military that led to the creation of the "Liberty Plan," a code of conduct for American soldiers interacting with Okinawans. It includes such things as lecturing soldiers about Japanese customs and culture and appropriate off-base behavior; not allowing soldiers to bring Okinawan women on base, nor allowing soldiers off-base in torn jeans or other inappropriate clothing. "Because when you wear inappropriate clothing you're more likely to cause trouble. If you dress properly you'll behave better," Shimoji says (M. Shimoji, personal communication, March 28, 1999)..

"Of course, this alone is not enough." Shimoji says. But it does point to cooperation, not antagonism, as the best means of dealing with crime and accidents.



## **Military Working to Limit Pollution**

Pollution is another area where many Cooperation Model adherents believe American-caused problems are exaggerated while pollution caused by local industry is down-played. Ames says:

Japan has high rates of heavy water pollution and things like that, but where is the story about that. Everything is concentrated on the bases. If Okinawans only get their information by reading the paper they may have the impression that all pollution is on the base. It's all here. [They may think] "we [Okinawans] are clean and pure, it's all their [the American military's] fault" (C. Ames, personal communication, January 28, 1998)

In a pamphlet prepared by the United States Marine Corps, *Caring for the Environment: Marine Corps Environmental Activities on the Okinawa*, the United States Marine Corps claims that "Pollution prevention is the cornerstone of the Marine Corps' environmental program on Okinawa. We seek to integrate pollution prevention ethics in all activities through hazardous material and waste minimization, materials substitution and resources recovery and recycling."

While the Marine Corps concedes that many of its activities produce waste materials such as "oils, old batteries and battery acids, solvents, and paints," it notes that these same materials are also produced by Japanese industries. The difference is that the Marine Corps follows stringent American

standards for managing wastes that are "in many cases more strict than Japanese law" (Marine Corps).

United States Marine Corps Public Affairs Chief Captain Kimberly Miller says it is often difficult to make the military's case about pollution because it involves criticizing local Okinawans. For example, she acknowledges that runoff from base-property damages shoreline coral reefs. However, she claims that a large part of the runoff comes from land on which the United States allows "tacit farming" by Okinawans.

Miller also claims that the bases actually help protect local wildlife by serving as preserves for animal species that would otherwise have been destroyed by Okinawan development (K. Miller, personal communication, September 24, 1997). The Marine Corps pamphlet suggests this as well when it says:

Marine Corps installations on Okinawa are islands of biodiversity surrounded by a sea of urban and agricultural development. Our installations support at least as many as 45 species identified by the Government of Japan as endangered or threatened. These included Pryer's Woodpecker and Okinawa Rail, species found only in Okinawa (United States Marine Corps).

As for noise pollution, Ames admits that it can be difficult to live or work near an air field. "I mean I work here (Kadena Air Force Base). I think it's noisy. It's an airport, of course it's noisy." However, he says the problem is largely confined to those neighborhoods closest to the air strips. "I think most

Okinawans have no opinion on [noise pollution]. If you went to the southern part of the island where they don't see the bases and asked about it, they may say they've read about it in the paper and think it's terrible, but that's it. Not everyone is out marching in the streets" (C. Ames, personal communication, January 28, 1998)..

The Air Force has cooperated with local authorities to change flight paths and times to cause as little disruption of Okinawan life as possible. "It is a problem, but we are making an effort and I think we should get credit for that effort," he said.

## CHAPTER 4

### THE JAPANESE, OKINAWAN, AND AMERICAN NEWS MEDIA

Whether newspapers in Okinawa, mainland Japan, and the United States favor one or another of the ideological models outlined in the previous chapter is largely dependent on the historical, cultural and structural forces that make them susceptible to elite persuasion or control. In this chapter, I will examine many of these forces.

I will discuss the media of each of the three areas separately beginning with Okinawan newspapers, their pre- and postwar histories, and their relationships to American authorities. Next, I will examine the historical conditions that shaped postwar mainland Japanese newspaper identity. I will then discuss some of the structural forces that both mainland Japanese and Okinawan newspapers share which may incline them toward the governmental elites in their respective areas. These include the way in which news values are reinforced through the *kisha* (reporters') club system, on-the-job training, and the relationships between reporters and editors, and reporters and their sources.

Finally, I will look at American reporters in Japan, including the structural problems they face such as limited resources and the problems in meeting the expectations of their editors in the United States. I will discuss how such problems may lead them to rely on traditional models of thought and

stereotypical images of Japan. I also look at the effect of the language barrier and the *kisha* club system of their access to sources.

### **Newspaper Readership in Japan**

The Japanese, nearly all of whom are literate, consume newspapers at rates higher than any other people in the world. The country's nationwide newspaper circulation in 1993 reached 71.6 million, or about 577 copies for every 1,000 people. The United States, with twice Japan's population, came in second with a nationwide newspaper circulation of 60 million, or just 236 copies for every 1,000 people. On average, each Japanese household subscribed to 1.2 newspapers in 1995 (Japan Almanac, p. 556).

More than half those Japanese who read a daily newspaper say they read one of the top three (Nester, p. 30). In 1995, these were the *Yomiuri Shimbun*, with a combined morning and evening circulation of 14 million, the *Asahi Shimbun*, with about 12 million, and the *Mainichi Shimbun*, with 6 million. The other two are the *Sankei Shimbun* with a circulation of 2.9 million and the *Nihon Keizai Shimbun* with about 4.2 million readers (Japan Almanac, p. 257).

In addition to the national papers, nearly all of Japan's 47 prefectures have a least one local newspaper. The two largest of these are the *Chunichi Shimbun* in Nagoya with a daily readership of about 3 million and the *Hokkaido Shimbun* with approximately 2 million readers (Japan Almanac, p. 257).

## Okinawa Newspapers

Okinawan is one of the few Japanese prefectures that has two major local newspapers. The *Okinawa Times* and the *Ryukyu Shimpo* each have an average circulation for a newspaper in a prefecture with average-sized populations like Okinawa. However, because of Okinawa's history and remoteness from the mainland, these two dailies have an influence over public opinion unequalled by any other local newspaper in the country.

During the 27 years of American Occupation, when Okinawa was politically and economically separated from the mainland, these two publications functioned as de facto national newspapers, providing their readers with local, national, and world news. National Japanese publications such as the *Asahi Shimbun* and the *Yomiuri Shimbun* were, in effect, foreign newspapers which arrived late (sometimes more than a day late) and were sold at significantly higher prices in Okinawa than on mainland Japan (Fukuchi, p. 234).

Today, national Japanese newspapers are flown into Okinawa the day of their publication and distributed in the early afternoon. However, the Tokyo versions of these newspapers remain high priced—about 1,000 yen (\$10) more each month than the local newspapers. Most local convenience stores and

newsstands carry only the *Ryukyu Shimpo* and the *Okinawa Times*, so it is difficult to purchase the national newspapers without subscribing to them.

As a result, national Japanese newspapers cannot compete with the cheaper, early-morning delivery of the *Times* and *Shimpo* or with attitudes of local consumers who have long accepted their local newspapers as sufficient sources of information. In 1993, the *Okinawa Times* and the *Ryukyu Shimpo* had daily circulation of about 170,000 each, while the national newspaper with the largest circulation in Okinawa, the *Asahi Shimbun*, had a readership of just 4,000 (Fukuchi, p.236).

### **Historical Identity**

Okinawan newspapers have a long history of serving elite powers. Over the course of their existence, they have supported the policies of the Meiji Oligarchs, the Japanese military government, the United States military, the pro-American postwar Okinawan civilian government, and the anti-base activities of the post-reversion prefectural administrations.

Okinawa's oldest newspaper, the *Ryukyu Shimpo*, was founded in 1892, the same year that the notorious Baron Kogoro Narahara became the eighth governor of Okinawa Prefecture. Kerr writes that Narahara was "a haughty samurai from Satsuma" who was appointed by the Meiji oligarchs to oversee the Japanification of Okinawa because they knew he would "rule with a firm

hand" (Kerr, p. 423). Rather than opposing Narahara, the *Ryukyu Shimpō* became a tool of his assimilation policies (Kerr, p. 423).

Former Jiji Press reporter Tadae Takubo notes that in the Meiji era the *Ryukyu Shimpō* was considered part of the ruling establishment. It went so far as to criticize local heroes like the anti-assimilation crusader Noburo Jahana. Yet, when then-Governor Ota refused to act as a proxy signatory on base-property leases in 1995, the same newspaper lauded him as a modern-day Jahana (Takubo, p. 48).

By 1940, Okinawa had three daily newspapers, the *Ryukyu Shimpō*, the *Okinawa Nippo* and the *Okinawa Asahi Shimbun*. This situation did not last. In November of that year, the Japanese military government decreed that henceforth each prefecture was allowed only one newspaper. Tokuzo Makiminato, a *Ryukyu Shimpō* war-time reporter, says this order was ostensibly to conserve paper for the war effort, but was actually aimed at giving the government stricter control over local news content (Makiminato, p. 11). To comply with the order, the three Okinawan newspapers merged to form the new *Okinawa Shimpō* (Makiminato, p. 17).

Two months after the consolidation order, the Japanese government made clear its intentions to control information with the announcement of a new set of press restrictions. The order limited or prohibited reporting on foreign affairs, finance, economic production, "or any other matter with the potential to be a major obstruction to the execution of national strategy" (Makiminato, p. 15).



Makiminato says despite the restrictions, the *Okinawa Shimpo* continued to publish throughout the entire war, moving its production to the safety of a mountain cave during the Battle of Okinawa. He and his fellow reporters would make dangerous early morning trips from the newspaper's cave to the caves of the Japanese military commanders to gather information. They would not be able to return to their own cave until early evening, when the American military took a routine break from its near constant bombardment of the island. When the military leaders had no information for them, the reporters would rewrite radio news broadcasts (Makiminato, pp. 24-25).

Throughout the night, the sound of the turning press leaked out of the cave. . .[when it stopped] policemen, student soldiers, and Japanese soldiers would come and distribute our meager newspaper from cave to cave before the break of dawn (Makiminato, p. 26).

After the war, the American military leaders allowed the *Okinawa Shimpo* to continue publishing. However, these new rulers of Okinawa—viewing the newspaper's professional reporters as collaborators with the Japanese military—replaced the entire editorial staff with amateurs. The Americans also demanded that the newspaper change its name as a means of disassociating itself from its wartime past.

The United States military paid employee salaries of this renamed and reorganized *Uruma Shimpo*. It also provided the newspaper with paper and ink free of charge, and allowed it to use the same presses the military used to

produce its English-language *Daily Okinawa*. Distributed by the military to Okinawans in its refugee camps, the *Uruma Shimpo* was popular for its articles that gave refugees in one camp news about refugees in other camps. However, the newspaper's main function was to disseminate American announcements and edicts (Sakuda, p. 40).

In the immediate postwar years, the American military on Okinawa closely controlled the means of newspaper production. All requests for publishing or photographic equipment had to be made through the United States military. Taking photographs anywhere on the island was illegal without a military-issued permit (Sakuda, p. 116). In 1946, three men were arrested for starting a newspaper, the *Shin Okinawa Shimbun*, with a printing press they had purchased from the American Navy, but without the proper permission of the military government (Sakuda, p. 43).

By 1948, the American military had begun to ease its press restrictions throughout Japan. In Okinawa, a number of new newspapers, including the *Okinawa Times*, came into being (Sakuda, pp. 50-51). However, the American military was still concerned that a concentration of media organizations in Naha could lead to the reemergence of militarist ideas. Therefore, they assigned each new newspaper a different circulation area. The *Uruma Shimpo* was assigned the most important area from Naha to central Okinawa. The *Okinawa Herald* was given the rest of central Okinawa including Ishikawa City. The area

south of Naha was assigned to the *Okinawa Times*, and the far northern region was assigned to the *Okinawa Mainichi* (Sakuda, p. 62).

Former *Okinawa Mainichi* reporter Shigeru Sakuda says it was obvious by this time that the American military was moving away from news censorship. The civilian government was less flexible. He says, "The civilian government, which was concerned only with pleasing the military government, followed a policy of prudentialism (*kotonakareshugi*) in all things. It liked rules, was authoritarian, and bureaucratic" (Sakuda, pp. 62-63).

For example, he says in 1948, the *Okinawa Times* was allowed to begin publishing on the condition that its editors translate their first ten issues into English and submit them to the civilian government, which would then pass them along to the American military leaders for pre-publication censorship. The *Okinawa Times* complied with this rule and its first ten issues were approved without change. Nonetheless, the civilian government hardened its position and demanded that the newspaper continue to submit pre-publication English translations indefinitely. It was the American military that settled the dispute by agreeing with the *Okinawa Times* that prior censorship was no longer necessary (Sakuda, p. 63).

The easing of censorship did not mean that the military had no influence on news content. Like the *Uruma Shimpo* the *Okinawa Mainichi* used the American military printing presses, ink and paper. A sense of how this influenced editorial policy can be gathered from an early front-page, one-

paragraph editorial the *Okinawa Mainichi* printed in English and Japanese and ran above the banner on November 19, 1949. It said:

We Ryukyans should express our gratitude to general (sic) Sheetze, Ryukyu Commanding General, for His (sic) great efforts for promoting the welfare of the people of Okinawa. The best way of expressing our gratitude is to co-operate with the Military Government in the realization of its policy, and to rise up and do our best in order to reconstruct Okinawa (Sakuda, p. 73).

In 1948, the *Uruma Shimpō* took a step away from military sponsorship by running advertisements and paying its own salaries (Sakuda, p. 42). That same year it built a new printing facility only to see it burn to the ground soon after completion. The newspaper managed to survive the disaster and in 1951 celebrated its independence from military control by changing its name back to the *Ryukyu Shimpō* (Toguchi, p. 294).

This did not mean that the reconstituted *Ryukyu Shimpō* was now completely out from under the American military's influence. In fact, the newspaper's fourth president, Yasukazu Matayoshi, had served in the military-appointed civilian government as Okinawa's lieutenant governor. In 1952, when the mayor of Naha suddenly died, Matayoshi entered the mayoral race, using his newspaper as a campaign tool. After winning the election, he continued on as both Naha mayor and *Ryukyu Shimpō* president, using his newspaper to promote his pro-American policies (Toguchi, p. 294).

By the early 1950s the *Okinawa Times* had taken a commanding lead in islandwide readership, largely due to its superior equipment and staff. It had successfully recruited many of the professional reporters who had been fired from the *Ryukyu Shimpo* by the American military when it reorganized the newspaper as the *Uruma Shimpo*. The *Okinawa Times* also took a much different editorial direction, coming out in favor of reversion to Japan, while the still ardently pro-American *Ryukyu Shimpo* opposed it (Toguchi, p. 295).

When *Shimpo* President Matayoshi died two years later, his funeral was attended by all the most powerful men of the civilian government and American military (Toguchi, 296). However, the newspaper he ran was in serious trouble. The *Shimpo* had a circulation of just 5,000 compared to the *Okinawa Times*, which had 30,000. The new *Ryukyu Shimpo* president, Masahiro Oyadomari, took on the job of revolutionizing the newspaper and making it competitive. This task included hiring a more professional editorial and management staff, as well as moving the editorial policy of the paper closer to the more popular, anti-base, pro-reversion stance of the *Okinawa Times* (Toguchi, p. 296).

### **Post-Reversion Okinawa Newspapers**

Tomoji Taira, the current managing editor of the *Okinawa Times*, remembers the pre-reversion time as a period when both his newspaper and *Ryukyu Shimpo* were independent. "But I can't tell you we did not feel any

pressure from the American military," he says. Today, the military has no influence on news content, he says. "The American military still has its own opinions on things and I'm sure that there are some things that they would rather we did not write, but no one [in the military] tells us that we should or shouldn't print this or that" (T. Taira, personal communication, March 31, 1999).

Taira says his reporters approach the military for information when there is an accident or incident of some kind. "The military cooperates with us, but they rarely give us the information we really want. The comments of military leaders are always very brief," he says (T. Taira, personal communication, March 31, 1999).

Military spokesman Christopher Ames admits that his office is wary of the local media. He says there is a "great deal of distrust" between the military and the Okinawan press. This is, he says, because the Okinawan mass media insist on reporting the dangers or problems caused by the bases—key elements of what I call the Occupation Model—but rarely deal with security issues or the positive things that the bases do for the Okinawan community—the Security and Cooperation models (C. Ames, personal communication, January 28, 1998)

"We never know how a story (on the military by the local media) is going to turn out," says Ames. "It's rare when you see a story about the bases, even if it's some cultural exchange program or something that should be positive, where the reporter doesn't say, 'but isn't this dangerous,' or 'isn't this ignoring

the will of the Okinawan people" (C. Ames, personal communication, January 28, 1998).

Ames says relations between the United States Air Force and the local media hit a low point several years ago when the Kadena Air Force Base public affairs office took a group of Okinawan and mainland Japanese reporters on a media orientation ride aboard a United States Air Force KC-137 aircraft. The mission was to demonstrate the plane's mid-air refueling capabilities. Ames says:

The mainland (Japanese) reporters wrote stories like "this is interesting, the United States Air Force has the ability to do this sort of thing.' And of course, the [Japanese] Self Defense Force wants some of these planes—some people are for it, some are not—that's the issue they focused on. But the [Okinawan] reports were all like 'I feared for my life as tens of thousands of pounds of jet fuel flew through the air between the approaching planes, this is dangerous!' (C. Ames, personal communication, January 28, 1998).

Ames says that since this experience he and his colleagues have been reluctant to work with the Okinawan media because, "After all, why would you want to shoot yourself in the foot." He says he recognizes the military's responsibility to be open and respond to local media questions, "but do we have the obligation to take them up on aircraft when we know the story is going to be, 'beware, there are bombs flying over your head!' (C. Ames, personal communication, January 28, 1998).

Lieutenant Colonel Billy Birdwell, the Deputy Director of Public Affairs for all branches of the services in Japan, sees anti-military ideology not only in how stories are covered by the Okinawan media but also in the kinds of stories that they fail to cover. "The Okinawan press continues to concentrate on everything negative," he says (B. Birdwell, personal communication, November 24, 1997).

I won't say that we never get good press," he says, "but they often ignore the good things we do, or significantly down-play them." Birdwell says the Okinawan media routinely ignore the variety of good-neighbor projects the military engages in such as cleaning up sea walls and beaches or helping to rescue lost hikers in the mountains. "I guess the Okinawan media does not consider such things news worthy," he says (B. Birdwell, personal communication, November 24, 1997).

Even more dramatic stories get little attention. For example, Birdwell claims that in 1997, two years after the schoolgirl rape, a United States Marine saved an Okinawan woman from being raped by an Okinawan man. "He heard screams, went into a brushy area, stopped the perpetrator, and then helped the young lady get to the police." The Okinawan press ignored the story, he said (B. Birdwell, personal communication, November 24, 1997).

For 15 years, Finland native Kari Valtoaja has worked closely with the Okinawan news media as the publisher and editor-in-chief of Okinawa's only non-military, English-language newspaper, the weekly *Japan Update*. He says the military would get better press if it realized that the local media are



ideologically anti-military, but not anti-American. Valtoaja says the military insists on promoting its good-neighbor activities as official military projects. "That will never fly [with local media]. [The military] could get coverage of the Marine Corps band performing with a local high school band, or whatever, if they got the schools to promote it—come see individual members of the military teaching our kids tuba," he says (K. Valtoaja, personal communication, October 22, 1998).

Ames says he understands this situation. "That's a common problem we face. They [the local media] don't want to recognize us with our military hat on. There is so much of that, [Okinawans think] 'as individuals, out of uniform, off-base, teaching our kids English, we are thrilled.' But as soon as you put a uniform on, there is this reaction of 'help, help I'm being oppressed.' That's the way their media takes it, too" (C. Ames, personal communication, January 28, 1998).

Valtoaja says he discovered the depth of the anti-military bias at the local newspapers when he tried to get the *Okinawa Times* and the *Ryukyu Shimpo* to run an advertisement he had created for the United States Marine Corps. The newspapers' advertising departments at first accepted the ad, which promoted one of several on-base festivals which the military invites the Okinawan public to attend each year. Later, the newspapers reneged on the deal, both telling Valtoaja that their printer's unions had refused to set the advertisement

"because it promoted the military," he says (K. Valtoaja, personal communication, October 22, 1998).

*Okinawa Times* chief political reporter Hidemitsu Sakihama says his newspaper is not intentionally anti-base. However, he admits that there may be more negative stories about the American bases in the *Times* than positive ones. He gives several reasons for this. He says United States military public affairs people do not understand the concept of newsworthiness and timeliness. "They send us news releases about soldiers visiting old-folks homes and such, but they often come after the fact, sometimes a day or two after the fact. Or, they call and say they have something going on that day and we can't get there." What's more, most of these types of stories would run on the society page where there is generally no room for them, he says (H. Sakihama, personal communication, March 11, 1998).

Most importantly however, he argues that it is the stories about base-caused problems that are the most newsworthy and most important to his readers. "This is a newspaper for the Okinawan people and it is written from their perspective," he says.

Taira agrees that human interest stories, or good-neighbor stories, are less newsworthy than the problems the bases cause. He says:

We do not cover everything that the military would like us to cover. We follow those things that are related to the mission of the military in Okinawa, but not much of the volunteer activities or other things they do. We don't have much interest in on-base [cultural] activities. What we

would like to know more about are the military operations that take place on base. And that is where we get the least cooperation (T. Taira, personal Communication, March 31, 1999).

The fact that the local media and the military approach the base issue from competing ideological models is clear from how Ames and Sakihama discuss the problem of crime reporting. Ames's thinking is firmly grounded in the Cooperation Model, in which it is only common sense that partners should receive equal consideration in the press. When he sees American-caused crime getting greater attention in the local media than crimes committed by Okinawans, he attributes it to "ethnic discrimination." He says:

I talk to reporters off-duty and I get the feeling that [they think] 'we are Japanese and special and you are the complete other.' Basically their philosophy is that, 'you don't belong here, so whatever you do is intolerable. You have to be perfect and if you are anything less than perfect well. . .We have one standard for ourselves and another standard for you.' It is that simple, a double standard. How else could you explain it? (C. Ames, personal communication, January 28, 1998).

Sakihama says to know whether American crimes and accidents really get biased representation in his paper or not one would have to do a case-by-case analysis. He says he is confident that media discrimination against Americans "is not a common phenomenon." However, he says, if Americans have the perception that the *Okinawa Times* is biased against them they should consider history:

**We have had this 50 years of history [with the American bases]. It's undoubtedly true that it's been fifty years of damage. If from the beginning there was not this 50 years of history, and Okinawans and Americans committed crimes at the same rate, we could understand [their criticism]. But that's not the case. When you consider this 50 years of history and then say, but today the crime rates are about the same, that's not a persuasive argument. We have this history and I write my stories based on that history. But I absolutely do not write intentionally to distort the truth or to make it look that Americans commit more crime than they do. Because people don't consider this 50 years of history, they criticize. But we have this experience that we cannot ignore (H. Sakihama, personal communication, March 11, 1998).**

Sakihama is clearly grounded in the Occupation Model. For him it is simply common sense that crime committed by an occupying army is more news worthy than crime committed by Okinawans. It would be ignoring the obvious—that historical oppression warrants consideration—for him to frame the story any other way.

### **Japanese Newspapers in General**

Both Ames and Birdwell see the mainland Japanese media as being much fairer in the way they frame stories about the American military in Japan. Ames goes so far as to say that the formerly government-sponsored television network Nihon Hoso Kyokai (NHK) "has been awesome. They're fair, they do both sides, they have criticized us on noise which we admit is a major problem, but they don't go out of their way to get us" (C. Ames, personal communication, January 28, 1998).

That is not surprising, according to Tetsuya Shibayama, a former *Asahi Shimbun* reporter who now studies problems in the Japanese press. He says mainland newspapers generally look at the base issue from a standpoint of protecting the United States-Japan Security Treaty. In other words, they share the Cooperation Model with the American military.

Shibayama says the mainland newspapers are just as ideological as newspapers in Okinawa. The difference is that the Okinawan media's anti-base ideology is more overtly stated than the mainland media's pro-base stance. Many mainland media organizations "are strongly disapproving of Okinawan newspapers," he says. Mainland reporters "think the [Okinawan newspapers'] anti-base position is strange. They don't aggressively say so, but [the mainland reporters'] true feelings are pro-base. They don't make that obvious in their stories either. They temper the messages they send" (T. Shibayama, personal communication, July 10, 1999).

Mainland Japanese newspapers do not understand the Occupation Model because reporters today have "no sense that Japan ever was occupied," Shibayama says. "Okinawans have to deal with the occupation's past in their daily lives." However, "Many young [mainland Japanese] people have never even seen an American base. On the mainland there are bases such as in Atsugi, but there are not many people who have bothered to go see them. On the mainland the bases have more of a symbolic existence. That's the

difference between mainlanders and Okinawans," he says (T. Shibayama, personal communication, July 10, 1999).

Hiroshi Fukuda has worked as a reporter for both Japanese and American news agencies and now teaches journalism at Sophia University in Tokyo. He says the fact that the bases are not in their back yard makes it easy for the mainland reporters to ignore "what they see as the problems of those small southern islands" (H. Fukuda, personal communication, December 10, 1998). On the mainland, says Fukuda, "Tokyo or Osaka, or even other places, we don't have this kind of dominant factor influencing editorial policy. One exception is perhaps the *Chugoku Shimbun* in Hiroshima and perhaps the local press in Nagasaki. They care more about the issue of atomic bombs and nuclear energy [than the rest of the country]" (H. Fukuda, personal communication, December 10, 1998).

### **Postwar Pacifism and Japanese Newspaper Identity**

Shibayama says the pro-base ideological direction of postwar mainland Japanese newspapers has much to do with the regret they feel over the role they played in the rise of Japanese militarism. In the 1930s, Japanese newspapers were enlisted to support their government's drive toward war, he says. Different newspapers offered different levels of resistance. Some openly supported the military government. "The *Asahi Shimbun* was the paper that

most agitated for war," Shibayama says. "If you go back and look at the articles from that time this is very clear" (T. Shibayama, personal communication, July 10, 1999).

After the war, the Allies shut down the newspapers in Germany, France, and Italy that had supported the Axis powers, but not in Japan. Shibayama notes:

It is often said that after the war, all that was left of Japan was the emperor and the newspapers. The bureaucracy, the central government, all of these things were changed. The thing that was changed the least was the newspaper system. Since they remained essentially the same as they were before the war, they were aware of their actions and felt remorse about their contributions to the war. So in the postwar years they made a 180-degree change. They wanted to make sure that the same kind of thing didn't happen again. So where they were ardently pro-military before the war, they have become ardent pacifists (T. Shibayama, personal communication, July 10, 1999).

Shibayama says that, in mainland Japan, pacifism has come to mean supporting the United States-Japan Security Treaty, which enables Japan to maintain Article 9 of the Japanese "peace constitution." As a result, for most of the Cold War era, it was taboo for the Japanese mass media to engage in even limited discussion of changing the constitution or expanding the role of the JSDF. That has begun to change since the fall of the Soviet Union. However, Shibayama says the Japanese media still frame their discussions of military topics in terms of how such ideas affect internal Japanese politics—what I call

the Cooperation Model—*not* their relevance to international affairs—the Security Model.

What's not being discussed is the question of what we should do about the constitution in light of the various conditions that have resulted from the end of the Cold War. The historical situation has changed and the international balance of power has shifted in various ways. But there is no discussion of how we should think about Article 9 given the outside situation or, since Japan is a pacifist nation, how we should express that pacifism. The discussion is completely domestic (T. Shibayama, personal communication, July 10, 1999).

Shibayama says this is because Japanese in general "don't want to think actively about moving in the direction of changing the constitution or violating Article 9." He goes on:

Article 9 is itself a kind of ideology in Japan. People accept it as the correct path. To change that would mean to change their own identity. So they try to protect or guard against that. This includes common Japanese, newspaper reporters, politicians and bureaucrats, everyone. . . I think this is a strange situation. It's not that the papers are reflecting ideology. The papers and the bureaucrats and politicians together create a Japanese ideology. So a strong ideology does not come through (T. Shibayama, personal communication, July 10, 1999).

In other words, Shibayama sees the Japanese mass media as part of a Gramsci-like system of social entities that work together to maintain status-quo power relationships by reproducing ideology—in this case the Cooperation Model ideology. This ideology is not obvious to readers because it is presented as common sense assumptions about Japanese identity.



## **Japanese Culture and Media Responsibility**

A variety of cultural factors help maintain this system of ideological reinforcement. Fukuda says one of these is *wa* (harmony), the Japanese tendency to avoid disturbing the status quo. "Japanese society is composed of people who do not want to cause trouble," he says. Ideas such as changing the constitution or Article 9, "have such potential to disturb the status quo" that reporters will acquiesce to government desires not to discuss them. He explains:

Government officials won't be able to tell correspondents or editors of particular news organizations that this is our concern, so you should report this or that. But those editors or correspondents who are normally or usually associated with these officials can easily sense how they should handle this issue. If these reporters or editors were in an adversarial relationship with them, as they are in the United States, they would be able to bring up this issue ignoring what the officials say about it. But here it doesn't happen that way. This is too simplistic, but because of this cultural background where people don't want to stir up trouble or cause problems unless it is absolutely such an important issue that it can't be ignored (H. Fukuda, personal communication, December 10, 1998).

It is not just military issues that receive such consideration. Spencer Sherman, a former producer of an English-language business program for NHK, says he was often dismayed at how hard it was to do stories on subjects about which the government was sensitive. For example, in 1992, his five-part series on Thailand was suddenly cut to three parts, and the heart of the series, a

report on the sex trade and AIDS, was deleted. His managing editor said simply, "We have good relations with Thailand." Sherman says, "the 'we' he was talking about was not NHK but Japan" (Sherman 1994, 32).

Shibayama says the problem is that throughout Japanese history, the government has always been superior to the people. Before the war, the constitution gave power to the emperor, who delegated his authority to the government. The people were considered the "children of the emperor," he says. The postwar constitution gives the people the power, but many are still unwilling to challenge authority (T. Shibayama, personal communication, July 10, 1999).

A lot of reporters see their democratic duty as providing government information to the people in an understandable way. And, if the government does something wrong that angers the people, it is [the media's] duty to report that anger to the government. They see this as the meaning of democracy. The American case is more that the people and the government are equals. Here it is not that kind of relationship (T. Shibayama, personal communication, July 10, 1999).

Discussing his own coverage of the Okinawa base issue, Kojiro Watanabe, a TV Asahi national news announcer, told me his and other reporters' stories about Okinawa rarely touch on the security issue because the "the central government doesn't say anything about it" (K. Watanabe, personal communication, December 21, 1997). When asked why reporters didn't push the issue themselves, he responded, "Since the central government doesn't provide any direction, reporters don't understand the [security issue]. Since they

don't understand it, they don't know how to press the issue themselves. It's a vicious circle" (K. Watanabe, personal communication, December 21, 1997).

Shibayama explains that "in America, if the press sets the agenda, the government will respond. In Japan, it's the other way around. The central government sets the agenda" (T. Shibayama, personal communication, July 10, 1999).

### **The Case for an Adversarial Japanese Press**

Not everyone agrees with this assessment of the Japanese press. Feldman says several studies have shown that in their postwar pacifist zeal, mainland newspapers, particularly the *Asahi Shimbun*, have regularly taken anti-government positions even when the government policies in question have been publicly popular. He says studies show:

All major newspapers were against the government drafts for the San Francisco Peace Treaty in 1952 and Japan-Korean Normalization Treaty in 1964. This was the stance of the newspapers, although public opinion polls clearly showed that the public supported the government in both these instances. Additionally, newspapers have persistently campaigned against the Self Defense Forces and were sympathetic to workers' strikes whereas the public tended to show support in the first case and took a negative stance in the latter (Feldman, p. 29).

Furthermore, Feldman says studies show that since the Meiji period, newspapers have had some "anti-government coloration." Particularly in the

postwar years, newspapers have shown "a strong tendency against authority, against government, and against the establishment." This can be interpreted to mean that Japanese newspapers have long functioned as a kind of "effective opposition" to government (Feldman, p. 29).

### **Investigative Reporting and Scandals**

Van Wolferen (1989) agrees that the Japanese newspapers "appear to play an adversarial role in the System." However, he says the press's "almost consistent 'anti-establishment' attitude is quite superficial" (p. 93).

The newspapers never really 'take on' the System. They will occasionally rage at some of its elements, but are rarely consistent for more than a few weeks. And the rage is often to the benefit of competing elements. Most important, they make no attempt to analyze the System, to provide a critical frame of reference enabling readers to ask questions concerning the System's essential nature and the direction in which it is taking them (van Wolferen, p. 93).

This is clear in the way that neither Japanese society, nor the media industry itself, rewards original investigative reporting. For example, in 1999, TV Asahi's popular television news magazine *News Station* did an investigative report about high levels of the toxic chemical dioxin in some Japanese farm produce. The report shed light on a number of important consumer issues. However, in the end, the program's anchorman, Hiroshi Kume, overstated the degree of the problem, was criticized by government and farmers, and

eventually made an on-air apology for the story. "It's a shame," says Shibayama, "because of that reaction, I don't think *News Station* will ever do another serious investigative report" (T. Shibayama, personal communication, July 10, 1999).

Even when investigative reporters get the story right, there are few rewards, he says. For example, in 1989, the *Asahi Shimbun* discovered that several LDP politicians were involved with the Recruit Corporation in an insider-trading scheme. What became known as the "Recruit Scandal" eventually led to the resignation of Prime Minister Noboru Takeshita. "In the United States," Says Shibayama, "a story this big would have won the Pulitzer Prize." In Japan, it should have at least won the annual NSK, Nihon Shimbun Kyokai (Japan Newspaper Publishers and Editors Association) award. Yet, the recruit scandal reporters were never honored by their peers, and their story did not encourage others to engage in investigative journalism, Shibayama says (T. Shibayama, personal communication, July 10, 1999).

Even with rare investigative reporting, political scandals are a regular part of Japanese journalism. However, here too, the round-about way that most of these stories make their way into the mainstream newspapers demonstrates, rather than disproves, the media's reluctance to attack the government.

Almost never is a political scandal first revealed in one of the five major newspapers or television networks. Instead, it is almost always broken in the

gossipy, sensational, cheesecake-filled weekly magazines which are roughly comparable to the American tabloid press.

Fukuda says mainstream newspapers sometimes leak scandalous information to the weekly magazines that are part of their publishing conglomerates. "They [mainstream newspapers] allow the weekly magazine to test the water, to see what the public and government reaction will be," he says (H. Fukuda, personal communication, December 10, 1998). Once the news has been splashed across the magazine cover, it often becomes fair game for the mainstream press, but not always. Even after some stories are made public in this way, mainstream newspapers and television networks can be reluctant to deal with them.

This was the case in 1989, when Prime Minister Sousuke Uno was embarrassed by a story of his paid liaisons with a geisha. Fukuda explains that the story was first uncovered by a reporter for the *Mainichi Shimbun*, one of the five major national dailies. However the newspaper did not use the information. Instead, it leaked the story to the *Sunday Mainichi*, a weekly magazine that is part of the Mainichi corporate empire.

Yet, even after the magazine ran the story, neither the *Mainichi Shimbun* nor any of the other mainstream media picked up on it. Sherman claims that at this point, *Mainichi Shimbun* editor Shuntaro Torigoe faxed the story to several foreign news bureaus. Only after the story was exposed in the foreign media was it fair game for the major Japanese papers (Sherman 1990, p. 37).

Such reverence for government extends to the imperial family as well. A case in point was the engagement of the Crown Prince to Masako Owada. Fukuda says that at the urging of the Imperial Household Agency, the NSK negotiated an agreement between Japanese news organizations not to report the impending marriage until the Agency itself made the announcement. He goes on:

No one is really sure what happened next. One of the stories is that the *Yomiuri* was very eager to break that agreement. They believed at the time that they had the most information. So they leaked the story to the *Washington Post*, which had its office in the *Yomiuri Shimbun* building. They have a close relationship with each other. At any rate, the *Washington Post* scooped the story, after which the NSK agreement collapsed (H. Fukuda, personal communication, December 10, 1998).

Once a scandal is exposed, the floodgates are open for all the information that the Japanese news media had known but not reported. Their belated attacks on officials and agencies can be ruthless as they compete to print the most details of the alleged malfeasance.

### **News Values and Competition**

Without investigative reporting, journalistic competition is often a race to see which news organization can get the government announcement faster than their competitors. For example, Shibayama says:

If a bank collapses, [Japanese] reporters want to get the news of that collapse from the Finance Ministry ahead of everyone else. It's not about judging from your own investigation that this bank is in danger of going under. If there is no announcement from the Finance Ministry, nothing is going to get written (T. Shibayama, personal communication, July 10, 1999).

Yasuharu Ishizawa says the result of this style of reporting is to create news that is rich in minutiae—how political leaders greeted each other, what they were wearing, at what time of day they sat down to talk—but absent of analysis (Ishizawa, p. 94).

This reporting tendency is exacerbated by the fact that all the big five newspapers publish both a morning and evening edition, creating tremendous pressure to update stories quickly. This is easier to do without analysis. Finding stories to fill both a morning and evening edition also helps homogenize Japanese news as a scoop from one paper's morning edition becomes common knowledge in the evening editions of all papers.

Ishizawa says this type of transmissional (*densetsuteki*) reporting also points to a fundamental difference in how "objectivity" is conceptualized in Japan as opposed to the United States (Ishizawa, p. 94). American reporters are trained to present both sides to every issue in order to produce "balanced objectivity." A report on a Democratic Party president's policy that did not include a Republican Party response would seem unbalanced and therefore nonobjective. This is not the case in Japan.



Japanese reporters try to provide "detached objectivity," reporting the facts as given without the necessary value judgments required for selecting sources and information for balance. The transmission of facts comes first. Analysis comes only after a general consensus on meaning has been reached by government and business leaders (Ishizawa, 98).

Ishizawa gives two main reasons why Japanese newspapers in particular have evolved to favor "detached objectivity." First, since the five major national papers in Japan opted not to pay for wire services in 1955, reporters have been forced to do all news gathering on their own. This limits the amount of time allowed for analysis, resulting in shallow coverage. Second, all the media get their information from the *kisha* clubs, a practice that forces their reporters to stick to an official line rather than risk a loss of access to sources through critical reporting (Ishizawa, p. 99).

### ***Kisha Clubs***

Feldman explains, "A press [*kisha*] club is a formal association of reporters assigned to one beat" who gather in a room prepared by the organization or government office they are covering. He says this room:

serves as the 'club,' the base and operation room for the reporter to gather, confirm, organize, and write all the news that emanates from a certain location; to receive briefings, handouts, press releases, and other communication; and to interact with their information sources. . . Each

club has anywhere from a dozen to three hundred or more reporters, depending on the nature of the agency and its importance (Feldman, p. 69).

Throughout Japan there are more than 1,000 *kisha* clubs—400 in Tokyo alone—that are attached to various government offices, political parties, key economic organizations, private individuals, local government offices, courthouses and police headquarters, etc. (Feldman, p. 70).

In Okinawa, space has been set aside for permanent *kisha* clubs in three major government offices, the Prefectural Government Office, the Prefectural Police Office, and the Prefectural Courts. A fourth *kisha* club convenes in the local office of the central government's Okinawa Development Agency when there is a special event or announcement. Reporters are assigned to cover city and town halls, but there are no municipal government *kisha* clubs (H. Sakihama, personal communication, March 11, 1998).

Although each club is particular to one agency or office, membership is controlled by either the NSK or the Nihon Minkan Hōsō Renmei (National Association of Commercial Broadcasters in Japan). Only official reporters attached to one of the 114 news organizations that belong to these organizations are allowed to be *kisha* club members and attend briefings (Feldman, p. 7).

The *kisha* club system has received a great deal of attention and criticism from Western analysts. Former *Newsweek* writer Robert Christopher describes a *kisha* club as a "journalistic collective" in which "a directorate of the club's

senior members decides what is important about this particular story and what is not—and all the club's members tailor their files to their papers accordingly" (Christopher, p. 199).

Merrill says the fear of being excluded from one's *kisha* club encourages reporters to follow the government line in their reporting. "Since few free-lance journalists exist in Japan, an outcast reporter literally has nowhere to go" (Merrill, p. 256).

Japanese reporters themselves tend to down-play the influence of the clubs on news content. Fukuda says, "I don't think the organization of, or the existence of *kisha* clubs, has anything to do with, or barely anything to do with, editorial policy. The editorial policy, the opinion or viewpoint of the news organization is not influenced by the *kisha* clubs or the relationship of the news organization and the *kisha* clubs." "However," he goes on:

If you are talking about the handling of information, then there is something to say for the power of the *kisha* club system. The flow of information is greatly influenced by that system. Because most *kisha* clubs are attached to the central government offices such as the *Ōkurashō* [Ministry of Finance], *Gaimushō* [Ministry of Foreign Affairs], or other offices, these offices do become the main sources of the information that newspapers and television stations carry. They provide information through news announcements, background briefings, or press conferences that reporters can't get in any other way. They become a very simple way for the government to control information (H. Fukuda, personal communication, December 10, 1998).

Okinawa Times' Sakihama is the president of the Okinawa Prefecture Government Office *kisha* club. He says that it is true that reporters are

sometimes expelled from the clubs. However, he says this only happens when reporters break the rules of the club such as publishing information that has been given to club members off-the-record.

Such measures are taken to ensure that one reporter does not have an unfair advantage over the others. It is never about controlling editorial content. Sakihama says *kisha* club reporters are free to criticize their club sponsors and the information they receive from them. "I don't know of one case," says Sakihama, "not one, when a reporter was suspended from the club for criticizing the official government position" (H. Sakihama, personal communication, March , 1999).

Fukuda says when reporters are suspended from their *kisha* club it is almost always the other reporters that do the suspending, not the agency or office that the club is covering. "Reporters make all kinds of deals among themselves about when and how they will cover certain things. Occasionally, a reporter decides it's in his best interest to break the deal and get the scoop. They may think it is worth it to get suspended for a couple of weeks or so. They almost always can go back, and things are pretty much "normal" (H. Fukuda, personal communication, December 10, 1998).

What is more, Fukuda says, "Reporters are not bound by the *kisha* clubs. They don't have to rely on the information that government officials offer at briefings and press conferences. They can do their own digging or develop other sources." He says when he was a member of the Ministry of Foreign

Affairs *kisha* club he found that other club members, even those from his own organization, did not like to share ideas or information with him. "I found I could get more useful information on my own," he says (H. Fukuda, personal communication, December 10, 1998).

Sakihama agrees. He says it is not true that club leaders decide news angles. "Reporters from within the same news organization might talk about an angle for a particular story," he says, "but reporters from different news organizations never get together to discuss how to report something. We are all competitors, we are not going to share our ideas."

Sakihama says the main problem with *kisha* clubs is that they make reporters lazy. "It's just a lot easier to take the information the government gives you and write a story about it than it is to go out and research a story on your own," he says.

van Wolferen (1989) sees this as the major problem with the *kisha* club system. Within the *kisha* club, he says, "There is hardly any incentive for individual journalists to investigate anything by themselves, and no reward at all for presenting a case in a manner that contradicts the conclusions of their colleagues" (p. 95).

## ***Ban Reporting and Yomawari***

The system of *ban kisha* (special assignment reporters), sometimes known as *banken kisha* (watchdog reporters), is designed to give news agencies full-time coverage of important government figures. However, its main effect may be to give individual politicians control over what is written about them. In this Japanese usage, "watchdog" does not mean that reporters stand watch against government corruption or malfeasance. Quite to the contrary, it is the practice of reporters staying close to their sources, becoming their friends and confidants and receiving special privileges and information from them.

For example, van Wolferen (1989) says, "The prime minister is followed every day by three people from each of the major newspapers, who stick to him wherever he goes and pick up whatever he says." He claims that when Nakasone was prime minister, *banken* reporters were allowed to follow him everywhere except during his weekly meditation at a Zen temple (p. 95).

Sakihama says that *ban* reporting does not exist in Okinawa. "We don't have the resources to keep a reporter with the governor at all times" (H. Sakihama, personal communication, March , 1999). However, on the mainland, *ban* reporting can create situations in which reporters reward their sources for giving them information by keeping quiet about the potentially damaging information they learn about the source.

Even when there is not this kind of overt quid-pro-quo a reporter who is close to his source may be reluctant to embarrass him. "It rarely happens that a reporter will decide that he has an obligation to write something if it means that the story will ruin a relationship [with a government source]," Shibayama says (T. Shibayama, personal communication, July 10, 1999).

Instead, he will choose to maintain the relationship rather than write the story. That way, it will be easier to report on that person the next time. This means that occasionally the secrets of the source become the secrets of the reporter. So there is a relationship between the cultural concept of harmony (*wa*) and the lack of investigative reporting in Japan (T. Shibayama, personal communication, July 10, 1999).

A similar practice is *yomawari* (nightly rounds), during which reporters literally make the evening rounds to the homes of officials whom they are covering. Feldman explains:

This kind of meeting with reporters enables a Diet member to provide information more openly, to explain issues related to their work in more detail, and even to disclose data that they will not reveal when meeting with many reporters in a press conference (Feldman, p. 88).

Fukuda says when journalists go out on *yomawari*, "maybe seven or eight reporters getting together at the doorstep of a source, let's call him Strongman Tanaka:

Tanaka comes out and will look around at who [the reporters] are, or where [which news agency] they are from and picks five or six to come

inside the house. The rest are told to wait outside. Four or five [of the reporters] will then be invited into the living room, the rest have to wait in the hallway. Then maybe three out of five will be invited into the dining room, and finally one reporter will be invited into the bedroom. This is a very simplistic example, but I have been told by my colleagues that this happens quite often. The reporter who gets into the bedroom may get some deep background information off-the-record that he will not share with the others. But even those who are only allowed into the living room are not allowed to write about the information they may get there (H. Fukuda, personal communication, December 10, 1998).

Fukuda says this kind of reporting was strongest from the 1950s through the 1970s, especially during the terms of Prime Ministers Tanaka, Fukuda and Ohira. "Those politicians used their relationships to control the reporters who covered them." Fukuda says that although *yomawari* is still a common practice, today, perhaps only Liberal Party leader and former LDP strongman Ichiro Ozawa can "manage or manipulate the press to his own liking," says Fukuda. "The last politician who really had the power to control the media in his own very very personal way was [LDP power broker Shin] Kanemaru" (H. Fukuda, personal communication, December 10, 1998).

Fukuda says that even as late as 1992, when Kanemaru was on the verge of being indicted for bribery, he was still able to manipulate the press.

Fukuda describes the scene outside Kanemaru's house:

From late August till early October (1992) he [Kanemaru] simply didn't meet anybody, no newspapers or individual correspondents, despite the fact that there were thousands of requests for interviews. He just stayed at home in Azabu where he used to live. His house was surrounded by a number of correspondents and cameramen and they were watching very carefully who went in and who came out. The interesting thing is that



among those who could get in and out were a few reporters. Yet, they never wrote anything about him. So the question was, what are they doing? Later it was discovered they were playing mahjong with Mr. Kanemaru (H. Fukuda, personal communication, December 10, 1998).

## **Journalism Education, and On-the-Job Training**

Beyond the *kisha* club, it is often said that Japanese reporters belong to what Akhavan-Majid calls a "university club" (Akhavan-Majid, p. 1008). He points out that almost all employment candidates who pass the networks and newspaper companies' rigorous entrance exams are graduates from the four most elite universities, Tokyo University, Kyoto University, Waseda and Keio. When membership in the university club is combined with membership in the *kisha* clubs, journalists become highly susceptible to the ideas of their peers in government and industry.

The same kind of problem exists in Okinawa but with a different political orientation. For example, Taira says he has about 90 journalists on his staff at the *Okinawa Times*. Although there are several universities in the prefecture, nearly all of the Okinawa-educated reporters at the newspaper are graduates of the national, and therefore most prestigious, University of the Ryukyus. It is this university where former Governor Ota began his anti-base crusade as a high-ranking faculty member.

Others dismiss the importance of elite university education on editorial direction. Watanabe says the major universities graduate hundreds of students

each year. It is ridiculous to suggest that they all come out thinking the same way, he says (K. Watanabe, personal communication, December 21, 1997).

Shibayama says the problem with education is not so much that the reporters all come from the same universities as the lack of journalism programs at most Japanese colleges (T. Shibayama, personal communication, July 10, 1999). Fukuda agrees. However, he says, "Even if we did have some better system of educating would-be journalists, it wouldn't have much of an impact [on the quality of reporting] given the influence of corporate policy. Unless those people who trained the newcomers to newspapers or news organizations change, I don't think anything will happen" (H. Fukuda, personal communication, December 10, 1998).

Fukuda is referring to what the Japanese call OJT (on-the-job training). All Japanese news organizations have their own training courses for new reporters. This creates the situation in which reporters are less likely to be trained how to write news stories in college than they are after they graduate and are hired by a news organization. What is more, once reporters join a news organization, they are expected to spend their entire careers there. They do not fill scrapbooks with articles they have written hoping to use them to land a job at bigger or better newspapers as American reporters do. In fact, Japanese reporters almost never receive a byline on the articles they write. As a result, reporters tend to be more dedicated to their news organization than to

journalistic values or ideals. Fukuda says that this system also encourages reporters to write stories that reflect the corporate viewpoint. He says:

The way the newspapers and other news media are organized, it seems to me that top management people and other top editors try to control the content of the news produced by their reporters. For example, at the *Yomiuri Shimbun*, everyone from the senior editors to individual reporters want to keep the content of stories in line with the thinking of [Yomiuri Shimbun] President Tsuneo Watanabe. His authority, as far as the *Yomiuri Shimbun* is concerned, his opinion, is sacrosanct. Everybody wants to be in line with Watanabe (H. Fukuda, personal communication, December 10, 1998).

Taira claims that this is not a problem at the *Okinawa Times*. He says, "We teach reporters how to write news stories, but we don't give them a manual on how to view things. There is no intentional attempt to do that. We don't tell them that the base problem is a certain kind of problem" (T. Taira, personal communication, March 31, 1999). Nor do editors get involved in how reporters write individual stories. "We [editors] don't go out and do the reporting. The stories come in from the reporters. For example, when the emperor visited Okinawa, we talked about how much space we would give the story but not what kinds of things could or couldn't be said" (T. Taira, personal communication, March 31, 1999).

Shibayama says that reporters do not have to be specifically instructed how to write their articles. They learn from trial and error what kinds of stories their editors reject, which they put on the front page, and they tailor their reporting to meet those expectations. "No one tells you that such and such is

taboo, but you learn it," he says (T. Shibayama, personal communication, July 10, 1999).

This is true in Okinawa as well. One reporter told me off-the-record that she often forgoes pursuing stories that would go against her news organization's anti-military position. A case in point was in 1999, when an intoxicated American soldier, driving in the early morning on a road outside his base, ran over and killed a teenage Okinawan girl on a motor scooter. The reporter said she would like to have done a story about what she sees as the problem of Okinawan children staying out late and being on the roads into the early morning. However, she knew that since the story could be perceived as mitigating the fault of the soldier, it would never be accepted by her editors.

Government officials can have a strong influence even on the corporate editorial policies of individual media organizations through the practice of *amakudari*. Literally "descent from heaven," the term is used to describe the practice of government officials retiring to high-level administrative jobs in the private sector—often in the areas of business they used to regulate as bureaucrats. In the case of the mass media, this means retiring members of the government's Ministry of Posts and Telecommunications finding positions on the boards of directors of newspapers and television networks. Conversely, representatives from the media conglomerates are often invited to sit on the boards of government *shingikai*, policy advisory committees (Akhavan-Majid, p. 1009).

## The American Press in Japan

In 1990, Japanese news organizations had a combined total of 237 journalists stationed in the United States. By contrast, American news organizations had only 70 full-time, and 25 part-time correspondents in Japan (Hewitt, p. 5). What is more, many of these American reporters—such as those for the two newspapers analyzed in this study—the *New York Times* and the *Washington Post*—are expected to also cover other Asian countries from their Tokyo base.

This stretches the resources of most of the Japan-based American news organizations and affects the amount and kind of news about Japan that makes it into the American newspapers. Major events usually get covered, but as *New York Times* Bureau Chief Nicholas Kristof told me, "We tend to write mostly about things when there is change. . . we tend not to cover the underlying structural problems" (N. Kristof, personal communication, November 24, 1997).

*Washington Post* Tokyo Bureau Co-chief Mary Jordan explained her schedule to me in late 1997:

The big stories that I'm working on now are the Korean economy and Thailand [economy], then there's the Global Warming Conference [in Kyoto Japan], then the [winter] Olympics [in Nagano, Japan]. We have written some stories about [United States-Japan] defense guidelines and how they were changed, and when there's a big [defense] story we tend to follow it more than other types of stories because there are so many

Americans soldiers here. But we can't follow up like we would like to. It's unfortunate, but that's the problem with reporting anywhere, it's the news, it isn't a book (M. Jordan, personal communication, November 25, 1997).

Not only are resources limited, but American reporters in relatively quiet Japan must compete for the limited space in the World News sections of their newspapers with events unfolding in much more volatile regions of the globe. This has become an even greater challenge in the Post-Cold War years as regional disputes have replaced superpower conflict as the dominant news items. As Rosenblum points out:

For years, the correspondents' rueful rule of thumb was that all anyone cared about was coups and earthquakes. Now even these don't necessarily qualify. Only major upheavals in prominent places need apply (Rosenblum, p.2).

### **Viewing Japan From Inside-the-Beltway**

The gatekeepers of international news—editors in New York or Washington—make the ultimate decisions about which news makes the newspaper or broadcast and which does not. As Charles Smith, a reporter for Hong Kong's *Far Eastern Economic Review*, says, most issues relating to US-Japan relations are complicated. "This makes it hard to satisfy editors who want clear-cut, black and white stories" (Hewitt, 7). Editors also tend to select stories they understand or that coincide with the American policy agenda inside the Washington beltway. As Edith Terry of the *Toronto Globe and Mail* noted:

Too much American reporting (on Japan) is driven by the political priorities set by Washington editorial boards. The result is a polarization along political lines (for or against Japan) and too little attention is paid to other political currents such as rising nationalism or regional issues such as the Japan-US-China triangle (Hewitt, p. 2).

Jordan says she has never had a problem convincing an editor to run a story (M. Jordan, personal communication, November 25, 1997). Neither has Kristof (N. Kristof, personal communication, November 24, 1997). However, Kristof says that on their own, American reporters in Japan have "toed the line that says what matters is politics." As a result, he says, the news he and other journalists in Japan create focuses too much on government and government officials and "not enough about the Japan that's out there" (N. Kristof, personal communication, November 24, 1997). He says:

If you were to look at all the *New York Times* stories that have been written about Japan in the last 20 years, I would say that probably 80 percent are about Tokyo, and probably 80 percent of the people we have quoted have been men over the age of 40. Probably 90 percent of those have been college educated, half have probably spoken English. It is an extremely unrepresentative sample (N. Kristof, personal communication, November 24, 1997).

Kristof says he has tried to go beyond this kind of reporting, such as in his series on rural life in Oita Prefecture in Kyushu. However, he still approaches every story with the same thought, "How do I write this story so that someone who is not interested in Japan is going to want to read it?" Perhaps even more

importantly, he also asks himself, "How do I relate this story to some larger issue?" (N. Kristof, personal communication, November 24, 1997). He says:

I think one misconception a lot of people have is that we or the *Washington Post* are writing only for those people who care about Japan. We're not. I'm really writing for people like my mother or people in Boston who have never been to Japan and don't know if Okinawa is part of Japan or China. So the point is to write engagingly to try and humanize it, try to lure people in who don't care. Secondly, to try to relate it to the person. I try to raise some kind of larger issues so that it is important in some broader sense. I use some incident or anecdote as a way of addressing larger more boring issues like the U.S. military presence in Japan or relations with China (N. Kristof, personal communication, November 24, 1997).

### **The Reporting Process and Model Building**

This process of creating compelling news stories can cause journalists to revisit the same mental models, or frames, again and again. For example, Kristof says his first step in approaching any news story is to go through his office's files of newspaper article clips to see what other reporters have already written about the issue. "In those files I can see people who are interested in the particular debate [potential sources] and can get a feel for the direction of where the story is headed [the frame]" (N. Kristof, personal communication, November 24, 1997).

From the previously written material Kristof says he often forms a thesis of what is happening and then creates a plan for whom he needs to talk to in order to test his idea. "I don't think I ever blindly go into anything," he says, "I try to go



into whatever it is with an idea of what it's about and then run that by people" (N. Kristof, personal communication, November 24, 1997). (One could say he searches for a way to incorporate the new information into his prior mental model of the situation).

If the story is that this (Okinawa schoolgirl) rape is going to make it harder for the U.S. to maintain its security presence in Okinawa, then I need to get some Okinawa government comment, US military comment, and some ordinary Okinawans (N. Kristof, personal communication, November 24, 1997).

Kristof says his plan also includes ways to get the quotes he needs to make his story interesting. For example, he says he knows from prior experience that Governor Ota will be a good source and that the American military will be a bad source. "The military in general has a real problem expressing themselves and making their case to the press. I just think they are not very good at PR. And they are extremely hostile. They don't come up with colorful quotes" (N. Kristof, personal communication, November 24, 1997).

And since the US military is not going to be particularly articulate, I'll try to talk to [United States Ambassador to Japan Walter] Mondale or someone in Washington who is going to articulate it better and also be more candid. And maybe I'll talk to a security person in Tokyo (N. Kristof, personal communication, November 24, 1997).

This search for color and drama has an effect on the ultimate shape of the story. "I don't want to do a story that harms someone because he is boring,"

Kristof says, "but I probably have to admit that boring people get worse press than interesting people. And, also again it's regrettable, but there are empathetic victims that get better press than others" (N. Kristof, personal communication, November 24, 1997).

## **Stereotypes and Orientalism**

The direction a reporter receives from prior articles on a subject may be only the tip of the iceberg when it comes to the kinds of images that guide news content about Japan. In his theory of Orientalism, Edward Said says all writers on the Orient build upon historically constructed images of their subject.

Every writer on the Orient (and this is true even of Homer) assumes some Oriental precedent, some previous knowledge of the Orient to which he refers and on which he relies. Additionally each work on the Orient affiliates itself with other works, with audiences, with institutions, with the Orient itself" (p. 20).

Jordan says the idea that all reporters bring preconceived ideas about Asia to their work is itself a stereotype. "I mean it's like saying all blacks are one way to say that all journalists are the same" (M. Jordan, personal communication, November 25, 1997). However, in all the American news stories about the Okinawan schoolgirl rape, Jordan wrote the one with the most overtly Orientalist overtones. Her story about differences between lifestyles of

**soldiers on American bases as opposed to the lives of Okinawans begins this way:**

**In Colonel Roberts's neighborhood in Japan, folks eat Whoppers and glazed doughnuts instead of fish eyes and dried sea snakes, the kids study at Bob Hope Elementary School, and their parents buy Chevys and Calvin Kleins and big fat Thanksgiving Turkeys (Jordan, October 1, 1995).**

**While it is true that there are no Whoppers off-base (although they dot the mainland, Burger King has yet to open a franchise in Okinawa), thousands of Okinawans eat hamburgers each day at MacDonald's and A&W Rootbeer restaurants. They also order hamburgers at Mos Burger, Lotteria, Dom Doms, and other Japanese fast-food restaurants. Fish eyes and dried sea snake are traditional Okinawan foods, but they are considerably harder to find on the island than a glazed doughnut; and although they do not send their children to Bob Hope Elementary School, Okinawan parents are well acquainted with Calvin Klein.**

**Jordan told me the idea for this story came from walking onto an American base on Okinawa and being amazed at how the military had tried to recreate America for the soldiers. She says the idea of contrasting hamburgers and sea snakes came from Okinawans themselves, "I started talking to Okinawans and hearing them say how these guys [American soldiers] never come off-base, that they just stay on base eating hamburgers all day and don't**

know what Okinawa is even like. This kind of thing kept coming up" (M. Jordan, personal communication, November 25, 1997).

Kristof admits that foreign correspondents "do tend to repeat stereotypes," and it is undoubtedly true that "we bring all kinds of subconscious baggage to our reporting on Asia." (N. Kristof, personal communication, November 24, 1997). Consciously, he says he is never concerned with making his articles fit with any popular conceptualization of Asia. Nor is he overly concerned that some of his stories may play to Orientalist ideas of Japan. "I recognize that Americans probably think of East Asia as the exotic Orient, or something," he says, "and I may do a story that resonates with that. But I guess I really don't see that as a problem as long as it is an accurate story, and we don't have a pattern of stories on that theme" (N. Kristof, personal communication, November 24, 1997).

Kristof says he has forgone reporting stories that he thought would be interesting, but that ultimately might give the wrong, stereotypical picture of Asia. This was more a problem when he was stationed in China than in Japan. He says:

In China for example, I thought that there were particular anecdotes that we could have written about that, while each little bit of the mosaic was right, it didn't add up to the mosaic that I thought represented China. In the case of Japan, if there was a stereotype—that's kind of a inherently insidious word—a generalization that I thought Americans had that were inaccurate, I would think that it would be great fun to debunk it. But alternatively if there was a nice feature of some kind that fit in with that stereotype or generalization, and was valuable, it wouldn't bother me that

it may reinforce the view that people have (N. Kristof, personal communication, November 24, 1997).

Kristof admits there is the danger that an article debunking a stereotype can have the negative effect of calling attention to a mistaken perception or reinforcing a generalization by seeming to show the exception that proves the rule (N. Kristof, personal communication, November 24, 1997).

Perhaps even more problematic is that by repeatedly debunking and reasserting stereotypes the image of Japanese as a contradictory people gets reinforced. Ian Littlewood notes that the image of the paradoxical Japanese has dominated Western thinking about the country almost since the two cultures first met. He says:

By the middle of the sixteenth century western travelers were used to encountering remote people who seemed absurdly different from themselves. With the confidence that comes from superior weaponry and a monopoly on religious truth they cheerfully defined these anomalous creatures as subhuman. But from the start, Japan was untypical. There was no military confrontation, no element of conquest. The traders and missionaries who made their way there were dependent on the favors of the host who had clear and unflattering perspectives of their own. To the Japanese these large, malodorous southerners were the barbarians; the usual European distinction between savage native and civilized westerner became difficult to apply (Littlewood, p. 3).

Westerners could not easily define their power relationship with regard to this civilized-yet-non-Christian people. "The Japanese was neither native nor Sahib" (Littlewood, p. 10). They were a paradoxical people. Ironically, this inability to find a location in relationship to the Japanese made it possible for a

variety of contradictory ideas and themes to be added to the discourse. Once incorporated into the discourse on the Japanese, these images—Japanese as simultaneously superior and inferior, possessed of strange spiritual powers or morally vacant, deviously clever and bumbling fools, outwardly like Westerners, but inwardly incomprehensibly different—would reemerge again and again in response to, and in spite of, an ever evolving power relationship between Japan and the West (Dower, 1986 and 1993).

This tendency is particularly true in stories designed to illuminate Japanese culture for Americans. A look at a variety of articles in the *New York Times* around the study period shows how contradictory images of Japan can exist within a single newspaper. For example, Kristof's story, "Japanese Schools, Safe, Clean, Not Much Fun," (Kristof, July 18, 1995) confirms the stereotype of the dreary Japanese life. In a different article, "Television is a Window to the Silly Side of Japan," Kristof's wife Sheryl WuDunn debunks that image. She writes, "If the Western stereotype of the Japanese is of a painfully serious people, then a night watching Japanese television will disprove it" (WuDunn, March 8, 1997).

A Kristof story headlined "Too Polite for Words" told readers that Japanese are so civil with one another that they don't have any swear words in their language (Kristof, Sept. 24, 1995). A later story by Karl Greenfeld debunks this myth by describing the "gritty sexy" Japan, filled with "gangsters, rock musicians, hostesses, porn stars, drug dealers and bikers" (Greenfeld). A story

by Andrew Pollack "The Life Force in the Briefcase, In Japan the Supernatural is Often a Business Tool," describes corporate managers who, disheartened by a sluggish economy, "seek solace and advice from mysterious forces" (Pollack, November 28, 1995). WuDunn paints a different picture of the tediously practical Japanese in her story, "In Japan, Bankers Make House Calls" (WuDunn, Feb. 9, 1997).

### **Japan as a Mirror**

Some scholars have suggested that when reporters use stereotypes or generalities to describe Japanese "national character," they are actually holding up Japan as a mirror in which their American readers can better visualize their own character, beliefs and values. David Campbell says Americans, perhaps more than any other people, need this kind of reflective Other in order to see themselves.

No state possesses a prediscursive, stable identity, and no state is free from the tension between the various domains that need to be aligned for a political community to come into being, and the demand that such an alignment is a response to rather constitutive of a prior and stable identity. Yet for no state is this condition as central as it is for America. If all states are 'imagined communities,' devoid of ontological being apart from the many and varied practices which constitute their reality, then America is the imagined community *par excellence* (Campbell, p. 105).

Campbell goes on to argue that both the mass media and scholarly works help create a self image for Americans by comparing them with outsiders.

"I think that is very true," says Kristof, "but I don't think it is a good criticism." He says that using a foreign culture to better illuminate one's own national character is not a fault, "I think in a way, it is something that we should almost aim for" (N. Kristof, personal communication, November 24, 1997).

There is a very genuine problem of keeping perspective when writing about foreign countries. I think we often get things wrong. But I think writing about other countries to tell us more about ourselves is not a problem, it's a responsibility (N. Kristof, personal communication, November 24, 1997).

Jordan takes a similar view, "I just wrote a story on the bullet train and I compared them to how fast the trains in the states go," she says. "Now, is that using Japan as a mirror? If people say why do you mention it, well people are interested. So yes, I often write to my audience and include things about the United States in my stories. When I write about Japanese women, I compare their lives to women in the states. If it were the same then it wouldn't be news" (M. Jordan, personal communication, November 25, 1997).

The concept of using Japan as a mirror has deeper ideological implications than which country has the fastest trains. The temptation to portray the Japanese as inherently different often leads to the problemizing of Japan. Campbell says this was particularly true in the 1980s, when the media transformed the bilateral trade deficit between the two countries into a "trade war" that was being unfairly fought by the Japanese. At the same time the Japanese purchase of American real estate was transformed into an "economic



invasion." This discourse dominated American media reports despite the fact that the United States also had trade deficits with "OPEC, Canada, the EEC, Latin America, Taiwan, Korea, and even Africa"; and West Europeans, especially the English and Dutch, owned higher percentages of American assets (Campbell, p. 224). The media discourse was a way of using Japan to make visible American fears about its own declining power.

During the Cold War reporters commonly used international communism as a mirror for visualizing American democracy. Herman and Chomsky argue that this caused the American media to provide much more coverage of the victims of communism than of the victims of authoritarian regimes friendly to the United States (Chomsky and Herman). Since the fall of the Soviet Union, communism has largely been portrayed as a system that failed because of the democratic challenge. This has implications for the coverage of Okinawa, since the ideas of what I call the Imperialism Model are most vociferously promoted by the Japan Communist Party. American reporters are inclined not to seek out the opinions of those clinging to this failed system. When others present such arguments, the American reporter may feel justified in ridiculing or ignoring them.

## ***Kisha Clubs and American Journalists***

A number of structural and cultural factors in Japan help incline foreign correspondents to pre-established models and stereotypes. Chief among these is the *kisha* club system which, until 1993, was completely closed to foreign journalists. In 1993, pressure from foreign news organizations forced the NSK to amend its rules to state that:

The *kisha* clubs (Press Clubs), as a matter of principle, should grant full membership to foreign correspondents who wish to join. They should permit foreign correspondents to attend both formal and informal press conferences, and should not obstruct foreign correspondents from fair and equal access to information (Hoshiyama, p. 31).

However, this declaration "in principle" falls far short of a mandate to open. In fact, few *kisha* clubs have changed their rules. The closed clubs limit access not only to formal news releases and statements but also to informal information and interpretation that could be gained from contact with Japanese reporters.

van Wolferen argues that this lack of regular access to information through *kisha* clubs forces many non-Japanese news organizations to rely on Japanese newspapers for information, leads to reports that feature numbers and cold facts instead of personalities, and feeds American stereotypes of the Japanese as a homogeneous people. "This means that the outside world gets a

picture of Japan. Often that picture is very misleading indeed" (van Wolferen 1984, p. 20).

Kristof is not concerned with lack of access. " I don't tend to work with other reporters, either Japanese or Americans, partly because reporters tend to spend far too much time talking to each other and socializing with each other," he says (N. Kristof, personal communication, November 24, 1997).

### ***Honne vs. Tatemae***

A second limit on source access is the inability of many foreign correspondents to deal with the Japanese cultural practice of dividing *honne* (one's true feelings) from *tatemae* (one's public position). Even if they could attend *kisha* clubs, foreign correspondents would be dismayed to find that generally only *tatemae* is offered in such settings. Correspondents who have been granted interviews with Japanese officials find that the same can be true even in one-on-one meetings.

Americans who cannot see past their cultural biases often interpret *tatemae* as deceitfulness. In 1991, the East West Center in Honolulu, Hawaii, asked 32 foreign reporters in Tokyo and 20 Japanese reporters in Washington to list the major problems they face in daily reporting. The response of one anonymous foreign correspondent is telling:

The absolute top "difficulty" is Japanese hesitancy to be frank and truthful with strangers, foreigners in particular. Their friends might judge them as show-offs, truth is relative, often dangerous to express. The language itself is vague (Hewitt, p. 88).

Kristof says he sometimes has problems "eliciting emotions and drama" from Japanese. "Partly that's because people are reluctant to get involved, I suppose, and in general I think [Japanese] people tend to understate their differences and conflicts" (N. Kristof, personal communication, November 24, 1997). However, he says the problem of *honne* vs. *tatemae* is "an issue all over the world. It's as much an issue in the US embassy in Tokyo as in the Diet," he says (N. Kristof, personal communication, November 24, 1997).

Jordan agrees. "Everybody knows that you have to take some statements by some people with a grain of salt, but that's true wherever you are. And if you are a good reporter and talk to enough people you can get the story. It might take a little more effort but that's the job, to try to get as close as you can to a story. Every place is different and has different problems" (M. Jordan, personal communication, November 25, 1997).

## **Japanese Language Problems**

Even if all *kisha* clubs opened their doors to foreigners, and Japanese sources gave straight answers, Western reporters' lack of Japanese language skills would remain a major obstacle to dealing with sources. One condition in

the NSK "Statement of Principle" on open *kisha* clubs is that all members be able to ask questions in Japanese and understand the answers without the aid of an interpreter.

In the EWC survey, reporters chose "The Japanese language" as the number one problem foreign correspondents face when reporting on Japan. "Access to news sources both official and in business is better than I expected," said David Sanger, the *New York Times* economic writer based in Tokyo. "Language is obviously the biggest obstacle" (Hewitt, p. 6).

This problem is getting better. The EWC concluded that the number of American correspondents in Tokyo who can speak Japanese well is increasing. This is largely because the journalism profession is able recruit from a growing pool of young people who have worked or studied in Japan. However, as one reporter pointed out, "We still have a long way to go, especially when you consider that only a handful can read the Japanese characters in newspapers and books (Hewitt, p. 3).

Kristof says he speaks enough Japanese to get by, "But I never read Japanese novels because I can't, none of the reporters here can. So we don't write about what Japanese are reading. I don't listen to Japanese pop music so I don't write about it. So on a cultural level, I think [not knowing the language] hurts." However, he says the biggest problem is not getting the quote, but translating it in an appropriate way. "In any case," he says, "one of the

advantages of working for the *New York Times* is that we have interpreters here" (N. Kristof, personal communication, November 24, 1997).

Jordan agrees. In anticipation of her assignment to Japan, she started learning Japanese a full year before arriving in Tokyo. However, even without this training, she does not believe language difficulties would have been a problem. "We have interpreters so the language is not a big problem and we have a staff that's been working here for 20 years and has been to Okinawa. We have people who know the culture. We have Japanese on our staff so it's not that difficult" (M. Jordan, personal communication, November 25, 1997).

In the next chapter, I will examine the effect of all the problems discussed above, by comparing how reporters from all three areas, Okinawa, mainland Japan, and the United States, covered a specific story—the Okinawa schoolgirl rape and its fallout.

## CHAPTER 5

### NEWSPAPER COVERAGE OF THE OKINAWA SCHOOL GIRL RAPE

It was a crime story, the rape of a 12-year-old Okinawan girl, that ignited anger and protest in Okinawa, sent American and Japanese political leaders scrambling to respond, and eventually helped bring about changes in the implementation of the United States Japan Status of Forces Agreement. Reaction to the rape would also give strength to an already active campaign to decrease the size, and change some of the activities of, the American military in Okinawa (see Chapter 6). For months after the crime, the words "schoolgirl rape" or in Japanese, "*shōjo bōkō jiken*" (young-girl-assault incident) would appear again and again in stories on the bases issue, even though most of these stories dealt only tangentially, or not at all, with the crime itself.

Almost from the day news of the rape broke in the *Ryukyu Shimpō*, the crime ceased to be the story. As events unfolded in the media, the crime, its victim, and the perpetrators moved further into a symbolic existence. To this day, the terms "schoolgirl rape" and "*shōjo bōkō jiken*" occasionally reappear in newspaper stories in all three areas, but the term has long since lost its pathos, its ability to shock and sadden. It has become part of the political lexicon of United States-Japan relations.

This is not to say that the crime represented the same thing to the press in Okinawa, mainland Japan, and the United States. In this chapter, I will show

that differences in how the rape story was framed by newspapers in the three areas can be linked to a preference for one or another of the ideological models outlined in Chapter 2 as guided by the different styles of reporting discussed in Chapter 3.

I begin this chapter with an overview of the crime and the political controversy that it brought to the fore. I then examine the influence of the "rape taboo" on Okinawan initial coverage of the crime, and how even first reports indicated that the Occupation Model guided reporter response to the crime. I then examine how the story changed with the involvement of governmental elites and the general trend of focusing on protest in Okinawan newspaper reporting during the period of most concentrated reporting, September through October 1995. Next, I will discuss trends in the mainland Japanese newspaper coverage of the case over the same two-month period. I discuss the tendency of mainland newspapers to frame the story in terms of debate within the Japanese central government and how this indicates a preference for Cooperation and Security Model themes.

I will then look at American newspaper reporting on the case. Although these newspapers also adopted Cooperation and Security Model themes, they differed significantly from Japanese newspapers in their focus on United States-Japan relations rather than domestic politics. Finally, I will look at how each area framed key moments of the story during the months from November



to March. These include the trial of the rape suspects, their conviction, and reaction to their sentences.

### **Background**

On Monday September 4, 1995, four United States servicemen, stationed on two separate bases in the northern part of Okinawa, decided to spend the Labor Day holiday together. The men rented a car from an on-base company ("*Beihei ga Joshijidō Bōkō*") and drove to a local music store. Around noon they discussed hiring a prostitute. (Sullivan, November 8, 1995).

However, one of the men, Navy Seaman Marcus Gill, said he did not have the money to pay for sex. As Gill drove the other men around in the car, he began to talk of committing a rape. Through his lawyer, one of the men, Marine Pfc. Rodrico Harp, said at first the other three thought Gill was joking. As the discussion grew more serious, the men decided to drive to another on-base store to purchase duct tape to bind their victim, and condoms. Realizing that the others were serious about the plot, one of the soldiers asked to be let out of the car. He did not inform anyone of the impending crime, but would later assist military police in identifying the perpetrators (Pollack, November 8, 1995).

The remaining three continued to a small village in the northern part of the island. Sometime between 7:30 and 8 p.m., the men spotted their victim, a 12-year-old girl on her way home from purchasing school supplies at her

neighborhood stationery store. Harp got out of the car and pretended to ask the girl for directions. The third serviceman, United States Marine Pfc. Kendrick Ledet, grabbed the girl from behind and pushed her into the car.

As Gill drove, Harp and Ledet taped the girl's hands and legs and hit her in the face and stomach to subdue her. The men traveled to a secluded farm road between sugar cane fields, where at least one of the men, Gill, raped the girl. Harp at first admitted to also raping the girl. He later recanted, saying United States military police had coerced his confession. Prefecture and military police accepted Ledet's statement that he had not raped the girl but not Harp's (Sullivan, November 8, 1995). The ordeal lasted about 20 minutes, after which the men left the girl bleeding and alone on the deserted road. She managed to walk to a nearby home, from which the Prefectural police were called (Pollack, November 8, 1995).

Using information provided by the Okinawan police, the American military investigators were able to obtain the names of the men from the on-base rental car company. The fourth man, who did not participate in the crime, also identified the perpetrators to military investigators. Together the military and prefectural police searched the men's barracks. The military police also questioned the men and obtained their confessions (*"Beihei ga Joshijidō Bōkō"*). On September 6, the men were taken into custody (*"Americans Charged"*).

## **SOFA Issue Politicizes the Crime**

Under the rules of the Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA), the American rape suspects were confined to a military prison pending their indictment by a Japanese court. Okinawan police petitioned for an early hand-over of the prisoners which the military denied. However, American officials assured the prefecture that the suspects would be duly transferred to their authority after they were indicted. The military also allowed prefectural police 24-hour access to the suspects (*"Higisha Dassō de Kenmin ni Fushinkan"*).

News of the rape created a wave of anger in Okinawa, where the Status of Forces Agreement would be identified as a symbol of the American military's continuing "occupation mentality" (*"Migara Hikiwatashi ni Chiikyōtei no Kabe"*). This complaint became an issue for the Japanese central government when the Okinawa Prefectural Assembly passed a resolution requesting the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs to ask the American Government to review the need for the SOFA (*"Chiikyōtei Minaoshi Teiki Sezu"*). Okinawa Governor Masahide Ota took the resolution with him to Tokyo, where he planned to make the request in person. However, before Ota had even arrived, Foreign Minister Kono announced that the SOFA did not hinder the investigation. United States Ambassador to Japan Walter Mondale agreed with Kono that no change in the SOFA was necessary (*"Hitei Hatsugen o Hihan"*).

Rather than put an end to this issue, Kono's announcement stirred debate within the central government and Japan's political parties about the need for a review of the SOFA. The matter was complicated by the fact that for the first time, the Japanese government was comprised of a coalition of the liberal Democratic Socialist Party (DSP), which had long opposed the Security Treaty and the SOFA, and the conservative pro-treaty Liberal Democratic Party (LDP). Surprisingly, opinion on the revision question did not break along party lines. The DSP itself came out in favor of review (*"Chiikyōtei Minaoshi o"*). However, the party's first Prime Minister, Tomiichi Murayama, was against it, as was Chief Cabinet Secretary and DSP member Koken Nosaka. On the other hand The Secretary General of the Defense Agency, LDP member Seishiro Eto, at first favored review. (*"Kenmin no Koe ga Seifu Ugokasu"*). The government quickly moved to set up a joint United States-Japan committee of experts to study the issue (*"Un'yō Kaizen Sōki ni"*).

The "expert committee," comprised mostly of Foreign- and Justice-Ministry representatives, answered to the United States-Japan Consultative Committee, the so-called two-plus-two group made up of the United States secretaries of state and defense and the Japanese ministers of foreign affairs and defense. The expert committee was charged with finding ways to "improve" SOFA implementation rather than revising the agreement. The debate continued as to what constituted improvement and whether improvement alone was enough.

Further complicating the issue was the sense of inconstancy in the American government's position. Ambassador Walter Mondale had rejected the idea of SOFA review outright (*"Hitei Hatsugen o Hihan"*). Yet in his radio address on September 21, President Clinton indicated that he would look favorably on the issue (*"Chiikyōtei Un'yō Minaoshi o Hyōmei"*). His statement came just a week before the September 26 2-Plus-2 meeting in New York at which the United States and Japan reaffirmed the importance of the Security Treaty.

Both United States and Japan governments were influenced by a desire to have a consensus on the issue before the planned Clinton and Murayama summit in Tokyo November 17, at which the two leaders planned to sign a joint declaration reaffirming the need for the Security Treaty. Clinton would cancel the summit just days before it was to start, citing his need to be in Washington during the congressional budget crisis (Harris).

### **American Appeasement Efforts**

In the background of these political maneuverings was the growing anger in Okinawa where protests and rallies—largely led by anti-base community and women's groups, but with the support and encouragement of the Okinawan government—continued to increase in intensity and size. As the protest numbers grew, the American government responded with apologies

from increasingly more important officials. First was the Consul General in Okinawa Aloysius O'Neill, and Okinawa Area Military Coordinator Major General Wyane Rollings on September 12 (*"Chiji Tsuyoi Fukaikan"*). They were followed on September 19 by Ambassador Modale and Lt. General Richard B Myers, the top United States commander in Japan. (Jordan, September 20, 1995). President Clinton apologized on September 21 (*"Chiikyōtei Un'yō Minaoshi o Hyōmei"*).

In fact, for weeks after the crime, nearly every American official in the United States-Japan relationship spotlight offered an apology of some kind. United States Secretary of State William Christopher expressed his regret over the incident at the 2-Plus-2 meeting in New York on September 26 (*"Bei ga Seishiki Shazai"*). Secretary of Defense William Perry apologized on November 1, as an attempt to smooth the way for the Tokyo leadership summit (Kristof, November 2, 1995).

In its efforts to calm Okinawan anger, the United States military tried canceling training exercises including its controversial live-fire practice over prefectural road 104 (*"Zainichi Beigun ga Renshū o Chūshi"*). This was followed by the Marine Corps "day of reflection" on October 5, during which all military activities were canceled and Marines were required to attend cultural sensitivity classes (Pollack October 8, 1995). On October 10, the military placed some off-base night club areas off-limits to soldiers in the early morning hours (*"Beigun ga Shin'ya Tachiiri Kinshirei"*).

## **The Focus Shifts**

The focus of Okinawan protest began to shift from the rape and SOFA issue to the larger problem of reducing the size of the bases following Ota's September 28 refusal to act as the proxy signatory on leases for military-base land owned by the so-called anti-war landlords. The indictment of the three American rape suspects and their transfer to Okinawan officials further eased SOFA-related tensions. However, the need for a review of the SOFA would remain a theme in many protests throughout October, including the largest anti-base demonstration in Okinawa since reversion on October 21, which was attended by an estimated 85,000 people. On October 25, the United States and Japan agreed that improving SOFA implementation meant that rape or murder suspects could be turned over to the Japanese investigators before indictment on a case-by-case basis.

From this point on, the rape case became more a series of occurrences rather than an ongoing part of the anti-base movement. The first of these events was the opening of the soldiers' trial on November 5, and the suspects' guilty pleas. This was soon followed by an insensitive comment by Admiral Richard Macke, commander of the United States forces in the Pacific, that the problem could have been avoided if the men had used their rental car money to hire a prostitute. Macke was subsequently forced to retire. As is common in the Japanese judicial system, the trial continued a day here and there until March 6,

when the men were convicted. Gill and Harp were sentenced to seven years, and Ledet six and a half years, in a Japanese mainland jail.

### **First Newspaper Reports**

U.S. Marine Corps Chief of Media Affairs Captain Kimberly Miller had been on leave when the crime occurred. She learned of the events of September 4, when she returned to Okinawa two days later. The suspects had been arrested that day. However, the story had yet to be reported in any media. Miller said her office decided against releasing the information to the press, "because the victim's family didn't want anyone to know about it" (K. Miller, personal communication, September 24, 1997) . She said her office was conscious of the fact that rape carries a stigma for the victim in Japan. "In the Japan culture to be raped is considered partly the girl's fault," she said, "and my understanding is that the whole family had to move to a different city and everything. So when the story ran, someone took away the parent's wishes right there" (K. Miller, personal communication, September 24, 1997).

The fact that she was dealing with a rape may have made it easier for Miller to avoid embarrassing the Marine Corps with the release. She admitted to me that the military was in no hurry to implicate their own. "I don't know how much you know about public affairs," she said, "but we are not going to go out with a press release that says Marines are suspects in a rape. We're going to



wait until the people are charged" (K. Miller, personal communication, September 24, 1997) .

Off the record, one *Ryukyu Shimpō* reporter echoed Miller's concerns about rape and Japanese culture. The newspaper knew of the crime but did not report it for two days because of a request from the family of the victim to be left alone, the reporter said. "If the suspects hadn't been Americans the story probably would not have been run at all."

From the beginning, the newspaper handled the story with caution. "We decided we couldn't ignore the crime, but we didn't turn it into a major story either," the reporter said. For example, everyone in the Okinawan mass media knew the name of the victim, the town in which she lived, and the school she attended, but all these facts were concealed from the reader, the reporter said. There was never any effort by any local newspaper to do the kind of reporting that would be common in just about any other kind of crime story, such as obtaining a comment from the victim's family, neighbors, teachers or classmates.

The first report of the rape did not appear until the Friday September 8 evening edition of the *Ryukyu Shimpō*. This was four days after the crime, and two days after the suspects had been arrested. The *Shimpō* ran the story on the next to last page of the newspaper in the section normally reserved for stories from the police blotter. It read:

### **Prefectural Police American Soldiers Suspected of Assault [*Bōkō*] Three Detained**

By the eighth, the prefectural police had obtained an arrest warrant for three American soldiers suspected of assaulting a female [*fujō*]. The three men are in the custody of military investigators.

The incident occurred on the evening of the fourth in the northern area of the main island [Okinawa], where three American soldiers are suspected of forcing an elementary school student [*shōgakusei*], who was on her way home from shopping, into a car and driving to a nearby beach where the three men assaulted the elementary school student. After the incident, the prefectural police undertook an emergency deployment to search for the automobile in which the three men fled the scene. Prefectural police continued their investigation by ascertaining the identity of the three men from the rental car they used in the crime. Prefectural police have made a request to the American side that the persons be turned over. ("*Bōkō Yōgi de Beihei*").

The *Shimpo's* sensitivity to the fact that this was a rape can be seen in the headline where there is no mention of the sex or age of the victim. In fact, it is not clear from the headline what the three Americans did. The term *bōkō*, assault, is a Japanese journalistic euphemism for the stronger, more culturally-unacceptable word for rape, *gōkan*. The reader must infer from context whether the assault was sexual or not. Since there is no mention of a female victim in this *Shimpo* headline, a reader skimming through the newspaper might infer that this was a brawl outside a local tavern, a common occurrence.

Throughout the entire study period, the Okinawan newspapers consistently used the word *bōkō* to describe the crime. The only exceptions were the few stories specifically about women and the military. In these reports the term *seibōryoku*, (sexual violence) occasionally appeared. (The taboo on

direct expression of terms for rape broke down when anger at the verdicts the men received forced a discussion in the media of Japanese attitudes about rape).

In the lead paragraph of the first *Shimpo* story on the crime, readers are told that the victim was female (*fujo*), but the fact that she was a child is downplayed. In the second paragraph the story says that the victim was an "elementary school student," (*shōgakusei*) her exact age not revealed. The following morning, September 9, the *Shimpo* followed up on its initial report with a slightly longer—five-paragraph—story. The fact that the victim was an "elementary school student" had moved from the second paragraph to the first. However, the victim's sex was not discussed until the next to last paragraph where the Prefectural Board of Education Chairman (*Ken Kyōikuchō*) is quoted as saying the "suffering inflicted on this young girl and her family is beyond knowing." Again the story ran on the local news or "society page" (*shakaimen*)—page 29 of 30.

Many Japanese newspaper stories include a small title headline that tells the reader to which prior story or subject the article relates. Within days, almost all Okinawan and mainland Japanese newspaper stories related to the crime would carry the title head "American Soldiers Young Girl Assault Incident" (*Beihei Shōjo Bōkō Jiken*) or just "Young Girl Assault." However, in this second *Shimpo* story the title head was the still much less sensational: "Three American Soldier Assault Suspects" (*Bōkō Yōgi no San Beihei*).

The *Okinawa Times* was more bold in dealing with the rape in its first story on the crime September 9, 1995. Like the other newspaper, it put the news on the society page—page 31 of 32—but gave the story the priority placement in the upper right hand corner. The *Okinawa Times* was also the first to feature the victim's youth in the headline which was twice the size of the *Shimpo* head and highlighted by a black background (both type size and background shade—from black text alone, to black on various depths of gray, to white text on black—are indicators of importance in all Japanese newspapers). It read, "Soldiers Assault Juvenile Girl" ("*Beihei ga Joshijidō Bōkō*").

### **Politicization of the Crime in First Reports**

Even in these first brief reports, it is clear that the *Ryukyu Shimpo* had begun to politicize the story by moving toward making Okinawa's dissatisfaction with the terms of the SOFA the central issue. Although reference to the SOFA is missing from the headline, the fact that the suspects are being held on base is presented in the lead paragraph of the *Shimpo's* September 8 scoop. The fact is problematized at the end of the story when the reader learns that the police have "requested" (*motometa*) the hand-over of the suspects. In the newspaper's follow-up story the next morning, the element of conflict between Okinawan police and the American military had grown. The headline reads, "American Military Refuses Transfer," a fact that is also the main point of the

lead paragraph ("*Beigun Hikiwatashi Kyohi*"). A secondary headline reads "Prefectural Board of Education Chairman Demands Strict Enforcement Of Official Discipline" suggesting a general lack of such.

In the text of this second *Shimpo* story, the Okinawan police are again identified as the ones who obtained the warrant for the servicemen's arrest, while the American military appears to be not only uncooperative but also stubbornly protective of their own. Overnight the prefectural police's "request" for the suspects had become a "demand" (*yōkyū*), as the newspaper's focus turned to the negative actions of the Americans who are said to have used the Status of Forces Agreement as a reason to refuse the hand-over. There is no mention of the cooperation between American and Japanese investigators.

The lack of such information stands in contrast to the inclusion of other, seemingly less significant, detail. For example, the first *Shimpo* story says the victim was "on her way home from shopping." This seemingly mundane fact would be repeated again in many Okinawan stories on the crime. The September 9 *Shimpo* story gives an indication of why this fact is important to Okinawan reporters. The story quotes the head of the Okinawan Human Rights Association, who "points out" that:

The fact that a foreign military [*gaikoku no guntai*] can come into a residential area and do things such as assaulting a child is beyond words, except to say that it is the concentration of bases in Okinawa that always makes this a possibility. The Security Treaty gives the primary right of investigation to the American side. Soldiers have lost their sense

of citizenship to begin with, and the bases, by their very existence, are a hotbed of crime [*hanzai no onshō*] ("*Beigun Hikiwatashi Kyohi*").

Even in this brief early report, the Shimpo is shifting the frame away from the crime and the individual soldiers (*gunjin*) and toward the culpability of the American military in general (*guntai*). It is the very existence of a "foreign military" in Okinawa that brings danger even to what should be the safest parts of the island and makes the most mundane everyday activities (such as shopping) dangerous. This fact is said to be "pointed out" from the source giving it the feel of common sense.

The first *Okinawa Times* report on September 9, "American Soldiers Assault Juvenile Girl," also problematizes the custody of the suspects with a large subheadline, "American Military Holds the Suspects" (*Beigun ga Migara o Kōsoku*). The SOFA is problematized again in the lead, as is the fact that the girl was returning from shopping, a fact that is repeated twice in the first three sentences. The *Okinawa Times* is also the first of many to characterize the attack on the girl as an "ambush" (*machibuseru*) giving the crime the feel of a military operation.

This story is different from the first Shimpo articles in that it does explain some of the details of the prefectural police and the American military criminal investigators' "joint investigation." ("*Beihei ga Joshijidō Bōkō*"). On the surface, the inclusion of this information appears to support the Cooperation Model. However, The writer quickly mutes the significance of this cooperation by

reiterating that "because the Status of Forces Agreement gives the first jurisdiction to the American side, the suspects are not in Japanese custody." This is followed by a string of five quotes from prominent Okinawans who, like the sources in the second *Shimpo* story, demand stricter law enforcement and place the blame for the crime on the very presence of the American military—one of the central propositions of the Occupation Model. These quotes go unanswered by any military or American government official. An example of the tone of these comments comes from Okinawa Women's Network representative Seiko Urasaki who says:

To the degree that we have bases in Okinawa, this type of incident is possible. "How true it is that the American military is aware that their bases equal battlefields and that their consciousness of crime is weak. Having these bases is no different from having battlefields, so women must always face the possibility of these kinds of problems (*"Beihei ga Joshijidō Bōkō"*).

In a sidebar story on the same page the work of the American investigators is further recontextualized into the Occupation Model with the suggestion that the American participation in the investigation actually amounts to interference into what should be Okinawa's exclusive rights of jurisdiction. The headline on this commentary (*kaisetsu*), piece reads, "The SOFA Wall In the Way of the Handover of the Suspects [*Migara Hikiwatashi*], Voices Requesting Change are Growing" (*"Migara Hikiwatashi ni Chiikyōtei no Kabe"*).

The story begins with an explanation of the SOFA, which the writer says was "agreed upon from the concept that the legal systems of countries where troops are stationed are not sufficient to protect the rights of American citizens" but which is actually "an obstacle to Japanese investigations every time an incident occurs involving American soldiers." The anonymous writer's comments and the source's opinions intermix in the second and third paragraphs:

Attorney Nagayoshi, head of the Okinawa Human Rights Association, points out that "for America to use the shield of the Status of Forces Agreement to refuse to hand over the suspects is outdated [*jidai okure*]. Isn't it strange that the [suspects] should be on base, out from under a watchful eye."

Even though more than 25 years have passed since reversion, American soldiers continue to commit heinous crimes one after another. Nagayoshi says, "This latest incident is a crime that exposes an occupation mentality and is hard to forgive. Because their [American soldiers] everyday training treats the human right of Okinawans lightly, they commit cruel crimes without concern (*"Migara Hikiwatashi ni Chiikyōtei no Kabe"*).

This Occupation Model attitude that American soldiers in general—not just the suspects—are criminally indifferent to Okinawan rights is clearly stated and goes unanswered. This became common as the story progressed, as did comments on the inherent unfairness of having the suspects confined to base. Much less common was discussion of the great degree of access to the suspects the Americans were giving Okinawan investigators, and the lack of restrictions on their interviews.



On September 22, the *Shimpo* ran a story on what improving the SOFA would entail. One problem it identified was the need to provide local police with better access to American suspects on weekends and late at night when the military prison office was closed. (*"Un'yō Kaizen no Kyōgi Kikan Setchi"*). No mention was made of whether this was a problem in the current case, but it implied that it was. In fact, it was not.

In a story in the next day's *Shimpo* "Suspect Escapes Cause Prefectural People to Distrust : In This Case An Attitude of Cooperation is the Exception" (*"Higisha Dassō de Kenmin ni Fushinkan"*), it is clear that the newspaper was aware that Okinawan investigators had been given full access to the rape suspects. This story was installment 10 in the newspaper's 11 part series titled, "Still 'Under Occupation,' the Young Girl Assault Case" (*"Ima Mada 'Senryōka, 'Shōjo Bōkō Jiken"*). In the last half of the story, the reader is told that the American suspects are in solitary confinement, constantly monitored, and that efforts are being made to give Okinawan investigators 24-hour access to them. However, as the headline and series title suggest, these facts are incorporated into a larger Occupation frame on conflict and injustice. The first half of the story deals with past cases in which American suspects, confined on base, have nevertheless been able to escape and flee Japan. The improved American cooperation in this case is presented with suspicion and as an aberration.

Of all the reports on the investigation in either Okinawan paper during September and October, only one, an interview with Consul General O'Neill

provided more of the Cooperation Model themes than those of the Occupation or Imperialism Models (*"Kichi ga Aruyue no Jiken"*).

### **Story Development in the Okinawan Press**

In the first Okinawan newspaper reports on the crime, the most important government official quoted was the prefectural school board chairman. Had no high-ranking governmental elite acted on the news, the story might well have ended with these first reports. The story broke in the back pages of the Friday and Saturday editions of the *Ryukyu Shimpo* and *Okinawa Times*. In the absence of any governmental response over the weekend, neither newspaper ran any reports about the crime in either their Sunday or Monday editions.

The story dramatically reappeared on Tuesday, when both the *Okinawa Times* and the *Ryukyu Shimpo* made Governor Ota's comments on the crime their main front page story. The *Ryukyu Shimpo* story carried the headline *Chiikyōtei Minaoshi Fukume Kōgi* (*"Chiji Tsuyoi Fukaikan"*). A subhead read "American Side Conscious Regret." The *Okinawa Times* story was discussed in Chapter 2. Its headline read, "SOFA Review [Demand] Included in Protest, Prefecture Severely Criticizes American Military" (*"Chiikyōtei Minaoshi Fukume Kōgi"*). Both newspapers carried the same photograph of the governor sitting in discussion with Consul General O'Neill, who had visited the governor in the

Prefectural Government Office in order to offer his "regret" (*ikan*) over the incident.

As mentioned in Chapter 2, This *Okinawa Times* story led by paraphrasing the governor as saying the "barbarity [*bankō*] of the American military remains the same as before reversion." What is more, it immediately followed O'Neill's apology with the governor's dismissive comment that "Each time there is an incident, the United States military apologizes and promises that it will not happen again. What is the United States military thinking" ("*Chiikyōtei Minaoshi Fukume Kōgi*").

In the *Shimpo* story the governor's remarks are more measured, "This is not a problem that can be ended with apologies of words," the governor is quoted as saying. "The proper systemic reparations must be made. Naturally, the men who committed this crime must be turned over to the prefectural police, but the Status of Forces Agreement does not provide for this. If we do not make systematic changes to the Status of Forces Agreement and the Security Treaty, the same kind of thing will occur again," he says. The story includes the additional information that the governor refused to accept a letter of apology from Major General Rollings saying, "the general should have come in person to make the apology" ("*Chiji Tsuyoi Fukaikan*").

Although the language here is not as forceful as in the *Okinawa Times* story the frame is essentially the same. Neither story is about the apologies offered by Consul O'Neill or General Rollings. The discourse on regret and

forgiveness offered by the Americans exists only as it is recontextualized through Ota. The Governor dismisses both—O'Neill provides only words, and Rollings is not even concerned enough to call in person. Ota's discourse on the systematic discrimination and insensitivity toward Okinawa by the American government and military is the primary discourse, the frame, of these stories.

Miller lamented to me that the rape story would never have become as big as it did "if the governor hadn't picked up the ball and run with it" (K. Miller, personal communication, September 24, 1997) . An Okinawan reporter told me off the record that some have criticized the Okinawan journalists for allowing the Ota administration to manipulate them and the story for his own political purposes. "But what could we do," the reporter said, "We couldn't not report what the government was doing." Yet, judging by the large volume of rape-related stories and the direction these stories took, it seems clear that once the governor had legitimized the story, reporters were eager partners in framing the news in terms of the Occupation Model.

Beginning with these first two front-page articles, the weeks to come would see the Okinawan newspapers saturated with stories related to the case. On September 12 alone, the *Shimpo* ran three large rape-reaction stories (including the report on the governor's remarks) with photographs and large headlines highlighted with black backgrounds. It also ran six additional smaller stories (two to three paragraphs). The *Okinawa Times* ran two major stories and five medium sized reports (five to seven paragraphs). None of these stories


dealt specifically with the suspects (other than to state the problem of their confinement on base) the victim, or the investigation. In other words, on this one day, the two newspapers ran a combined total of 16 stories just on reaction to the crime.

Remarkably, both Okinawan newspapers would maintain nearly identical reporting focus and intensity on rape/SOFA issues through early November, when stories about Governor Ota's refusal to sign anti-war landlord leases and demands for base reduction would take precedence (see Chapter 6). Figures from the *Okinawa Times* give an idea of how both newspapers handled the issue. This one newspaper ran 348 stories related to the rape/SOFA problem from September 9 until the end of October, about 7 stories a day. Although many of these stories were small, together they amounted to an extraordinary 81,664 square centimeters of newspaper page area.

Of the 348 *Okinawa Times* articles in this two-month period, only ten stories dealt mostly with the facts of the crime. The subject matter of the rest moved back and forth between five main topics: 1) Okinawa's general anger at the American military and Japanese government as expressed through rallies, demonstrations, meetings, and statements. Most of these stories would be about citizen protests (142 stories) rather than Okinawan officials (15 stories); 2) American and Japanese governmental positions and actions (69 stories) and the Okinawan criticism of those efforts (5 stories); 3) Stories about support for a review (*minaoshi*) of the SOFA. Again citizen demands were most often covered

(62 stories), rather than Okinawan government actions (21 stories) 4) neutral discussion of the SOFA, or stories about discussion of the SOFA (24 stories). Figure 3 shows the percentage of the total area each theme occupied.

**Figure 3. *Okinawa Times*: Percentage of Area Dedicated to Rape-Case Themes from September-October 1995**



These figures show that stories of anger and demands for change accounted for 76 percent of the newspaper space dedicated to the issue. Government responses, positions, statements etc. accounted for just 15 percent. Only 5 percent of the articles on the SOFA were neutral discussion rather than calls for review.

The Occupation Model script that underlay nearly all the rape-related reports in the first few months after the incident was that of the long history of abuse and discrimination suffered by Okinawans. The fact that this frame was

the product of the reporters' own mental models and not just their sources, is clear in the ideological commonalities between the frames of hard news stories and the special series of news analysis reports that both newspapers ran. While editorial in nature, these special reports most often ran on the general news page as opposed to the opinion page. What is more, they were not labeled as commentary (*kaisetsu*) or opinion (*shasetsu*). This is demonstrated in the following examples of the three most common story theme categories.

### **General Anger Stories**

Beginning on September 13, the *Ryukyu Shimpo* began its 11-day series of stories "Still 'Under Occupation': the Young Girl Assault." The headline on the first installment in this series read, "Not One Shred of Human Rights Consciousness" (*Jinken Ishiki no Kakeramonai*). The sub heads read, "Voices Are Saying the Bases are a Hotbed [*Onshō*] of Crime," and "Anger at the Repeating Incidents."

Two days later, similar headline language would be used for a hard news story on a special school board meeting. It read, "Not One Shred of Morality" (*Dōtoku no Kakeramonai*). Although this claim is in quotation marks in the headline, none of the several sources in the story actually say that American soldiers are completely devoid of morality. In fact, the only mention of morality comes in the comments of School Board Chairman Nagazato, who

says, "I feel astonished and strongly indignant over this unbelievable incident. I cannot think that [American soldiers] are taught morals and ethics and how to behave as human beings before they are sent to Okinawa" (*"Dōtoku no Kakeramonai"*).

The claim that American Soldiers have a low appreciation of human rights would be repeated again and again in comments of sources in this type of general anger story. It would also appear regularly in headlines such as the September 27, 1995 *Shimpo* story, "The Bases are the Root of Many Evils" (*Kichi wa Shoaku no Kongen* which carried the large subhead "'Protect Human Rights!' Fervor" (*"Jinken Mamore' to Kisei"*). The headline is meant to summarize the comments of several speakers at a rally held at the Okinawa Peace Center.

The next day, September 28, 1995, the same newspaper ran a story about a statement to be submitted to the Japanese government by various political parties in advance of a visit to Japan from United States Secretary of State William Christopher. Referring to the American military, the headline read "A Low Sense of Human Rights Consciousness Exposed, The Prefecture's Pain is not Understood" (*"Jinken Ishiki no Hikusa."*).

In many stories the "low sense of human rights consciousness" and lack of understanding would be summed up in the phrase "occupation mentality." In a *Ryukyu Shimpo* news roundup about various protest activities, the headline in bold white letters on black read, "Occupation Mentality Exposed."



Subheadlines read "A Wave of Protests from Various Groups" and, "A Whirlpool of Anger at the American Military." ("*Senryō Ishiki Marudashi: Kaku Dantai ga Hajō Kōgi*"). The actual words, "occupation mentality" are used in the story, but come near the end in a quote from the chairman of the Okinawan branch of the Japan Communist Party. Here again, it is the newspaper that has chosen these Occupation Model words to frame the comments of all the various sources in the story.

This same language appeared in the *Okinawa Times's* first series of special news analysis reports on the crime that began on September 12. The seven stories all carried the title, "Indignation" (*Ikidōri*) and in smaller type "American Soldiers Assault Incident." The first article in this series carried the headline "Occupation Mentality Exposed: Prefectural Residents, Growing Distrust of American Military " ("*Senryō Ishiki Marudashi: Kenmin, Beigun ni*"). The lead paragraph read in part:

Watching the American young-girl assault case carefully, the prefecture, Prefecture Board of Education, and various political parties visited the Military Base Affairs Office and appealed in the sternest tone for thorough law enforcement. [They said] that this crime exposes an occupation mentality. Moreover, it had damaged the human rights of women ("*Senryō Ishiki Marudashi: Kenmin, Beigun ni*").

The general-anger-type story reached its apex with coverage of the Okinawa Citizens General Rally on October 21, 1995. Both the *Okinawa Times* and the *Ryukyu Shimpo* dedicated seven full pages to speeches and issues

raised at the rally. On page 22, the *Okinawa Times* included a full-page aerial photograph of the 85,000 protesters packed into the Okinawa Convention Center grounds in Ginowan. The headline above the photograph read, "An Unforgivable 50 Years of Intense Pressure: We Won't Accept This Burden in the Future." The poetic caption read,

A wave of prefecture residents crammed into the meeting ground of the prefectural people's general rally to denounce the young-girl-assault incident and demand a review of the SOFA. The park where children's playful voices are usually heard was completely filled with the anger of 85,000 people. "Withdraw the bases from Okinawa!" "Review the SOFA!" Powerful fists were raised into the blue sky. The emotional feelings [*atsui omoi*] of the prefectural citizens who have, for the past 50 years, been controlled by the bases, overcame social status and bound them tightly together ("*Yurusenai 50 Nen no Jūatsu*").

The front page featured a closely cropped picture of the protesters above the headline "Reduce the Bases, Review the SOFA: The Concentrated Anger of 85,000 People." The protesters in the photograph hold signs that say, "American Soldiers Young Girl Assault Incident Unforgivable! Repeal the Security Treaty," "The Barbarism of American Soldiers is Unforgivable, Repeal the Security Treaty and the SOFA," and "Bases are Unnecessary, Protect Women's Human Rights." ("*Kichi Shukushō shi Kyōtei Minaose*").

## **Demands for a Review the SOFA**

Perhaps the most commonly repeated phrase in headlines about the rape case throughout September and October was "*Chiikyōtei Minaoshi o*," (Review the Status of Forces Agreement). Even when the words did not appear in headlines they were often written on the banners held by protesters in photographs accompanying the stories. The fact that this discourse of the anti-base demonstrators was the same as that of the *Okinawa Times* is evident in the fact that the newspaper adopted, "*Minaose, Fubyōdō Kyōtei*" (Review It! The Unfair Agreement) as the title of its second set of special news analysis reports which began on September 23, 1995. The phrase "*minaoshi o*" took on a stronger and stronger connotation with each demonstration and rally. Here, the use of the command form "*minaose*" is closer to "revise!" or even "eliminate" than to the direct translation, review.

This is clear from the content of the reports which attempted to show that the SOFA caused many more problems than just the slow transfer of criminal suspects. Each story in this series supported one of the principal themes of the Occupation Model most often reiterated by the Ota administration.

For example, "The Benefit of an On-Duty Decision, Works to the Advantage of American Criminals" ("*Tsugō Yoi Kōmuchū Handan*"), explained how soldiers can avoid Japanese justice if they can prove or fake that they were on duty when they committed a crime. "American Military Planes Exempt From

National Laws" (*"Beiheiki, Kokunaihō Kara Jogai"*) explained that the United States military planes are allowed to fly lower and produce more noise than Japanese law allows Japanese planes.

"No Public Compensation for American Accidents" (*"Beigun Jiken ni Kōteki Hoshō Nashi"*) tells readers that American-caused traffic accidents often result in no compensation awarded to Okinawan victims. "Environmental 'Consideration' To the End Dependent on American Military Efforts" tells readers that Americans actually have very little consideration for the environment (*"Kankyō Akumade 'Kōryo'"*). In none of the above stories are military sources given a chance to offer the kind of rebuttal they provided me as related in Chapter 3.

### **Government Action/Okinawan Reaction**

Most of the stories in the Government action/Okinawan reaction category were straightforward reports in which the government's position, statement, or action would be explained without comment. Often, the newspapers let general-anger stories or anti-SOFA category of stories serve as the opposition voice. Occasionally, a story about government action would be followed by a separate article recontextualizing that action within the Occupation Model. (Follow-up articles praising government action were less common).

An interesting example of this second type of action/reaction story was the news that the United States military has set up an "off-limits zone" from midnight to 6 AM around the "Gate Two area" of bars and adult-entertainment just outside Kadena Air Force Base in Okinawa City. The action was a response to local Okinawans' demands for strict law enforcement and improvement of soldier morality. The *Ryukyu Shimpō's* story on the action was headlined, "American Military Off-Limits Order, Midnight to 6 AM to Improve Morality." The text quotes the Marine Corps Public Affairs Office as saying, "This is not a direct response to the young girl assault, it is a separate problem that has been in discussion before the incident." Seeming to support the need for such a ban, the story mentions that a month before, an American soldier had used a toy gun to threaten a bar hostess in the problem area (*"Beigun ga Shin'ya Tachiiri Kinshirei"*).

On page seven of the same edition, the *Shimpō* ran a much larger story criticizing the action. A large headline horizontal across the top of the page read "Base Town At a Loss [*Tomadoi*]." Vertical subheads said, "Expressions of Anxiety and Calm" and "Voices of Doubt about 'Improving Morality'" (*"Kichi no Machi ni"*). The story lead says:

Anxieties are running high in the base town of Okinawa City with the announcement of the return to off-limits. The [off-limits] time, being from midnight to 6 AM, will not affect many places, but with the soldiers already staying away because of the high yen, it looks like this could be a double blow to various eating and drinking establishments (*"Kichi no Machi ni"*).

In the second paragraph an unidentified member of the Okinawa Chamber of Commerce says that the policy may not have much effect in the short run but if it continues for an extended period it could effect more than just the night club business. The source goes on to suggest that the off-limits rule will have no more effect on individual morality than the military's other failed attempts at showing contrition. "Perhaps though this off-limits the American side is showing its position," the Chamber of Commerce source says. "However, when the Marine Corps had its day of reflection [regarding the schoolgirl rape], [Air Force] soldiers from Kadena acted like it had little to do with them" (*"Kichi no Machi ni"*).

This story could have been an opportunity to discuss the Cooperation Model theme that the bases are important to the prefectural economy. It could also have been framed as a sign of American concern for improving its relationship with Okinawa. Neither of these frames is adopted. Instead, the fact that the military has chosen this response to demands for improved morality is presented as evidence that the Americans are unconcerned about the impact their actions will have on Okinawa City business owners and unaware of what really needs to be done. In other words, the Cooperation Model discourse on the bases' economic benefit, and American efforts to be good neighbors has been recontextualized into the Occupation Model discourse on American insensitivity to Okinawan problems.

Some Japanese government actions were also covered first with an uncritical and non-analytical story only to be followed later by strongly critical follow-up story. This was the case on September 19, 1995, when the *Ryukyu Shimpo* reported that Foreign Minister Kono had rejected an Okinawan Prefectural Assembly request that the central government ask the American military for a review of the SOFA. The page one story on Kono's decision was headlined: "Status of Forces Agreement Review Will Not be Requested" [from the United States by the Japanese government]. The subheads read, "Government Confirms at Cabinet Meeting," and "Not an Obstacle in Young Girl Attack Incident Investigation," (*Chiikyōtei Minaoshi Teiki Sezu*).

All the information in the story is attributed to an announcement made after the Foreign Ministry meeting, meaning it had to have been distributed through the *kisha* club system. As is often the case with *kisha* club stories the information is presented as it was offered by the government, without comment, analysis, or response. The dry tone of this piece is interesting since the rejection—which came as Governor Ota was still en route to Tokyo to support the request with a personal visit to the foreign minister—was particularly insulting and dismissive of Okinawan concerns. This government-action story does not mention the governor's trip. Instead, it allows to stand unanswered Kono's comment that he can "understand the feelings of the people of Okinawa,

but it cannot be said that the Status of Forces Agreement is an obstacle in the investigation" (*"Chiikyōtei Minaoshi Teiki Sezu"*).

The next morning the *Shimpo* responded to the foreign minister's comments with a locally-created non-*kisha* club response. The headline of this report expressing a put-down of the central government that would be unthinkable from a *kisha* club reporter says, "Refusal Statement Criticized: "Cabinet Members Do Whatever the Bureaucrats Tell Them" (*"Hitei Hatsugen"*). In the text of the story, the Okinawan vice governor "points out" that Kono "does not understand Okinawa, which for 50 years since the war has had the Security Treaty and the Status of Forces Agreement thrust upon it" (*"Hitei Hatsugen"*). He goes on to express one of the central themes of the Imperialism Model, "The Security Treaty and the Status of Forces agreements, which were created during the Cold War, trample on today's international situation and should be reevaluated" (*"Hitei Hatsugen"*). The story also quotes unnamed "voices within the prefecture" as complaining that the central government has "reduced this problem related to national sovereignty to the small issue of turning over the suspects (*"Hitei Hatsugen"*)

In part nine of its special "Still Under Occupation," the *Shimpo* is even angrier about how the central government has marginalized the SOFA review request. The report, "Prefectural People Unsettle the Government, SOFA Review Discussion Turbulent," (*"Kenmin no Koe"*) reads in part:



The fact that each section of society and each class has requested that the Status of Forces Agreement be reviewed can only be because this incident has revived the memory of the loathsome (*imawashii*) occupation era. The people of the prefecture have come to taste the humiliation (*kutsujoku o ajiwattekita*) of the unfairness of this agreement in which, while various heinous crimes are occurring, the investigative jurisdiction does not extend to the Ryukyu government [*Ryukyu seifu*].

With this history in the background, the government's response to the voices boiling up for a review of the SOFA takes the form of putting a lid on the prefectural people's demands just as they are suddenly reaching the larger level of central government debate ("*Kenmin no Koe*").

### **News Frames in the Mainland Japanese Newspapers**

#### **Focus on the Central Government**

The mainland Japanese newspapers were even more cautious than the Okinawan newspapers in dealing with the schoolgirl rape case. The *Asahi Shimbun* picked up on the story on September 9, the morning after the first *Ryukyu Shimpō* report, but gave it just three paragraphs buried in the middle of its society page—page 39 of 40. In bolded text-sized type, the headline read, "Arrest Warrant Issued for Three American Soldiers Suspected of Assaulting a Female ("*Fujo Bōkō no Utagai de*").

The *Asahi* story was sandwiched between two larger, more prominently headlined stories, one about a Colombian man caught smuggling cocaine into Japan, and the other about new satellite technology that can aid in the detection of gun smugglers at sea. After this first story, The *Asahi* would print nothing

more about the rape case for five days, when it would reapproach the story from the viewpoint of central government politics and American efforts to placate Okinawans.

Readers of this first *Asahi* story were given no indication that the crime was creating conflict between American and Okinawan investigators or governments. Instead, the *Asahi* noted that the United States military and Okinawan police had "worked together" to identify the suspects from their rental car records. In the last paragraph the reader learns that the suspects would be held on base until being indicted by the Japanese police. However, this is presented as a having been "decided upon based on the Status of Forces Agreement," suggesting that all parties had agreed to the situation (*"Fujo Bōkō no Utagai de"*).

The *Yomiuri Shimbun* would not deal with the rape at all until September 15, (*"Nichibeī Chiikyōtei no Minaoshi Mōshiire"*) eleven days after the crime, and a full week after the news broke in the *Shimpo*. Even then, the newspaper buried the news in the middle of its next-to-last page, and focused entirely on the political problem of the SOFA and not the rape itself. The sparse details of the rape as reported in the first *Okinawa Times* and *Ryukyu Shimpo* stories would not appear in any *Yomiuri* report until September 20, after the newspaper had already run three stories on the political side of the story (*"Yōgisha, Hikiwatashi Kīsogo"*). (The political frame adopted by the mainland papers is discussed in detail below).

Like the *Ryukyu Shimpō* and *Okinawa Times*, both mainland newspapers studied used the euphemism for rape, *bōkō* constantly until the verdicts were announced. The only exception was the *Asahi Shimbun's* October 17 story, "Tape Covers the Characters for 'Rape' [*Reipu*] on Advertisements for *Shukan Bunshun's* Coverage of the American Soldiers Incident" ("*Reipu' no Ji*"). This story told how one weekly news magazine, *Shukan Bunshun*, used the word "*reipu*," the Japanese adaptation of the English word "rape," in a story on the Okinawa incident. Osaka city subway officials, fearful that the word violated the victim's "human rights" (*jinken*), used white tape to cover the word on advertisements for the magazine posted inside city trains ("*Reipu' no Ji*").

In the first few days after the rape story broke in the *Shimpō*, Okinawa newspapers reported on a flurry of activity involving local, national and international actors. As mentioned above, within the prefecture, the Governor met with the American Consul General O'Neill and refused General Rollings's apology. The Prefectural Assembly as well as several Okinawa city assemblies passed resolutions of protest, and other local government agencies and citizen groups were expressing their anger. In Tokyo, the head of the central government's Okinawa Development Agency expressed his shock and regret over the incident, and a representative from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs visited the American embassy to request that steps be taken to make sure a similar incident did not happen again.

Neither the *Asahi Shimbun* nor the *Yomiuri Shimbun* reported any of these events. Despite the mounting activity, these newspapers still saw the incident as a local rape story, or at least not a story with the potential to significantly affect United States-Japan relations. This is clear from the fact that, while it was ignoring the above activities, the *Yomiuri Shimbun* dedicated the center of its September 13 front page to American Secretary of Defense William Perry's speech to the Japan Society in a New York City hotel. In his remarks, Perry warned of the dangers of changing the Japanese constitution to allow more JSDF participation in United Nations peacekeeping operations (*"Kaishōron wa Kiken"*). The newspaper made no mention of the challenge to the United States-Japan security treaty taking place in Okinawa.

It was not until the mainland newspapers could frame the story in terms of a clear national policy issue that they took an interest in what was happening in Okinawa. The debate within the central government over reviewing the SOFA provided that frame. The *Yomiuri's* first Okinawa rape-case report was a one-paragraph story in the lower right hand corner of its September 15 society page (page 34 of 35) (*"Nichibei Chiikyōtei no Minaoshi Mōshiire"*). The story told of the Okinawa Prefectural Assembly's request to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs for help in obtaining a review of the SOFA. The rape itself was mentioned as background and given just one sentence. The entire story read:

## **Appeal for the Review of the Status of Forces Agreement In Okinawa Prefecture, the Case of a Young Girl Assault**

On the fourth of this month, in Okinawa Prefecture, an incident occurred in which three American soldiers assaulted a female elementary school student. By the 14th, Okinawa Prefecture had requested that the Ministry of Foreign Affairs make the appeal to the American side that the Status of Forces Agreement has been a hindrance (*kabe*) to the investigation and should be reviewed. A protest to the American Embassy in Japan also made clear [the prefecture's] intentions. The prefecture's alienation (*hanpatsu*) from the American military in Okinawa is growing with protests and resolutions made one after another in prefectural cities, towns and villages and a plan to hold a general citizens conference ("*Nichibeī Chiikyōtei no Minaoshi Mōshiire*")


The previous day the *Asahi* had dedicated five paragraphs to the prefecture's request and had given it better placement on page 18. It also used the news to repeat some of the facts of the case, including that the victim had been bound with tape, and to provide the additional detail that a fourth soldier had been involved in the planning of the crime ("*Chiikyōtei Minaoshi Yōsei*"). A shorter adjoining article reported the American military decision to cancel a planned live fire exercise over prefectural road 104 in consideration of Okinawan anger over the rape ("*Zainichi Beigun ga Renshū o Chūshi*").

On September 19, the pattern of reporting on Okinawa in terms of central government debate was established with a series of short stories, each relating without comment the different attitudes of various government agencies. *Asahi's* morning edition carried a story on page three suggesting that the Director-General of the Defense Agency was taking a positive attitude toward SOFA review while Minister of Foreign Affairs Kono was more negative


*("Bōeichōkan: 'Chiikyōtei Minaoshi o")*. The evening edition of the *Asahi* carried the news of Kono's formal rejection of Okinawa's request (*"Minaoshi wa Motomezu"*), as did the *Yomiuri*, which ran the news on page two (*"Chiikyōtei Minaoshisezu"*) along with a brief story on Ota's trip to Tokyo where he was told the bad news (*"Ken Gikai ga Kōgi Ketsugi"*).

Throughout September and October the number of stories about Okinawa and the rape case continued to build in both mainland newspapers, but the frame which emphasized central government politics continued to dominate. The *Asahi* would run far more reports on the rape/SOFA issue, 145 stories accounting for 17,776 square centimeters. The *Yomiuri* ran slightly more than one-third the number of reports, 51 stories, which occupied just more than one-third the area, 6,220 square centimeters, of newspaper space. Figures 4 and 5 show how the total area each newspaper devoted to the rape/SOFA reports was divided by theme.

**Figure 4. *Asahi Shimbun*: Percentage of Area Dedicated to Rape-Case Themes from September-October 1995**



**Figure 5. *Yomiuri Shimbun*: Percentage of Area Dedicated to Rape-Case Themes from September-October 1995**



The figures above show that both newspapers concentrated far more on American and Japanese government reaction to events in Okinawa than to the events themselves. Reports on the crime accounted for 2 percent of total coverage in the *Asahi* and 5 percent in the *Yomiuri*. Stories about demands for change of the status quo from both Okinawan government and non-government groups account for 30 percent in the *Asahi* and 29 percent of the *Yomiuri*. Government actions, positions, declarations accounted for 37 percent of the *Asahi's* attention to the rape/SOFA issue and 45 percent of the *Yomiuri*. When the category "Discussion of the SOFA" is added to government positions one can see that the *Asahi Shimbun* dedicated 67 percent, and the *Yomiuri* 66 percent, of their attention to the actions of government and discussion about how to handle the policy side of the problem.

### **SOFA Politics Stories**

The category of "U.S./Japan Government Responses" included official apologies and military actions such as the halting of exercises. However, most of these stories dealt with the internal politics of the central government as it grappled with the issue. These stories were nearly all written in the transmissional style of *kisha* club reports. That is, they did not go beyond announcing what took place at government meetings or was announced at press conferences. They thereby followed the Japanese journalistic tendency



toward detached objectivity, providing government information without editorial comment or analysis. The effect was a preponderance of stories in which the government appealed for understanding about the need for the Security Treaty with little explanation of why it was important. In other words, the emphasis was on the need to cooperate with the United States—the Cooperation Model—rather than on rationales for the American military presence—the Security Model.

An example of the tone of the majority of these stories is the October 5 *Asahi Shimbun* report, "The Problem of Improving the SOFA Takes the Direction of the Head of State Summit," ("*Shunō Kaidan de Hōkō*") which says in part:

At a meeting on the fourth, Foreign Minister Yohei Kono and Secretary General of the Defense Agency Seishiro Eto discussed responses to the continuing problem of improving the SOFA that was brought up by the young-girl assault incident in Okinawa, and in the same prefecture, Governor Masahide Ota's refusal to act as the proxy signatory for the forced use of base property. The result was that they decided that in order to bring about a resolution of these problems they should be a topic of discussion at the heads of state summit between Prime Minister Tomiichi Murayama and American President Bill Clinton. It was decided that with the growing opposition within the country to such things as the American bases in Japan, it was important to obtain the understanding of the Okinawan people in order to hold fast [*kenji suru*] to the Security Treaty System. ("*Shunō Kaidan de Hōkō*").

An interesting element of this story is its reference to the problem of "improving" the SOFA. Following the establishment of the special expert committee to study the SOFA problem, both mainland newspapers substituted

this central government preferred language, "SOFA improvement" (*Chiikyōtei kaizen*) for the term still favored by the Okinawan government, "SOFA review" (*Chiikyōtei Minaoshi*). The newspapers made the change in all articles, title heads, and even index listings about the SOFA.

It is also noteworthy that the story relates the government's sympathy for the people of Okinawa. However, that sympathy has a purpose—to obtain the Okinawans' understanding of the importance of maintaining the Security Treaty System.

### **Neutral SOFA Discussion**

In September and October, The Yomiuri Shimbun dedicated just nine stories (21 percent of its rape/SOFA reporting) to neutral discussion of the SOFA. These were mostly reports about the establishment or schedule of the "joint expert committee" or meetings between government officials in which the direction of the discussion—for or against SOFA review—was not specified.

The Asahi Shimbun gave the issue much more attention, 40 stories, accounting for 37 percent of the space allotted to rape/SOFA-related news. In addition to the same kinds of stories that made up the Yomiuri reporting in this category, the Asahi also published several news analysis stories that did not take a clear position for or against SOFA review.

For example, on September 20, the newspaper dedicated half of its page 8 to a look at how other American military host countries feel about the SOFA issue. In the story, "After the Cold War: A Look at SOFA from Various Countries" (*"Chiikyōtei' Kakkoku de Miru"*) explains that the United States and South Korea began the process of revising their Status of Forces Agreement following an incident involving violent soldiers on a subway train in May 1995. The incident sparked outrage and public calls for change similar to what was happening in Okinawa, the story explained.

However, Germany "has no sense of unfairness" with regard to the SOFA agreement it has with the United States. The story says that in Germany, it is rare for the local courts to ask for suspects to be turned over to German authorities even after indictment. Transfer usually takes place only after a conviction (*"Chiikyōtei' Kakkoku de Miru"*).

### **Protest Framing**

As mentioned above, Okinawan newspapers also contained these type of *kisha* club reports on government positions and neutral discussions. However, such stories were overwhelmed by the large number of protest stories. This was not the case with mainland newspapers, where protest coverage was slight. However, here too, the Asahi showed much more interest in protests and demonstrations (22 stories) than the Yomiuri (7 stories).

In the *Asahi* most of these stories ran in the back pages. It finally gave the anti-base movement in Okinawa front page coverage with a large photo of the September 26 demonstration sponsored by the Okinawa Peace Movement Center. It also gave the demonstration, attended by about 3,000 people, a second, medium-sized story (7 paragraphs) and photograph on page 35 of the same edition and carried the headline, "Okinawan Anger Reaches Peak" (*"Okinawa no Ikari Chōten"*).

The *Yomiuri* also covered the protest. In fact, the demonstration was the only one that the *Yomiuri* reported throughout September. It was a small story (three paragraphs) but ran on the front page with a photograph. The small, bland headline read, "3,000 Protest at Gathering." However, departing somewhat from the measured tone of most *Yomiuri* stories, it included a quote from the group's leader, Zenshun Arakaki, who said, "The only way to make sure an incident like this does not happen again is for there to be a full dismantling/removal (*tekkyo*) of these bases that are a hotbed of crime and a repeal (*haiki*) of the Security Treaty" (*"3,000 Nin Kōgi no Shūkai"*). More comments from rally speakers were provided in a seven paragraph pictureless report on page 30 (*"Ikari Uzumaku Kenmin Taikai"*).

The *Yomiuri* would not report again on any Okinawan protest until the huge October 21 rally. While the *Asahi* made this extraordinary event its top story and dedicated most of page one to the story, the *Yomiuri* did not. In seeming defiance of the importance of the demonstration, a headline across the

top of the Yomiuri's Tokyo edition heralded, "Importance of Security Treaty Reaffirmed: Joint Statement Draft Outline: Indispensable to Peace and Prosperity; The Understanding of People of Pacific Asia Region Countries Requested" (*"Nichibei Anpo no Jūyōsa Saikakunin"*). (The rally was the top story in the Western edition of the Yomiuri).

Below this summit story, in the center of the page, was a photograph of the dense, banner-waving crowd at the Okinawa rally and a two-paragraph report with average-sized headline, "85,000 People Protest at Gathering: Resolution Adopted Demanding Base Reduction" (*"8 Man 5 Sennin Kōgi Shūkai"*).

The fact Murayama and Clinton would sign a joint statement reaffirming the Security Treaty at their summit meeting November 17 had been known since a reaffirmation of the Security Treaty was agreed to at the September 26 2-Plus-2 meeting. The only news in this top Yomiuri story on October 22 was that a draft of the statement had been written.

Here was an example of the *Yomiuri* framing a story with placement rather than words. This newspaper was telling its readers that despite a massive demonstration, the Security Treaty remains important and secure.

## The Rape Case in the American Newspapers

The *Washington Post's* Mary Jordan claims to have been the first Western reporter to go to Okinawa to cover the crime. Her story "Rape of 12-Year-Old Fans Okinawans' Anger at U.S. Military Presence" (Jordan, September 20, 1995,) appeared on September 20. A smaller story in the *New York Times* by Andrew Pollack "Rape Casts Harsh Light on U.S. Military" (Pollack, September 20, 1995) appeared on the same day. Pollack's story was written from Tokyo and focused on the reaction of American officials in Tokyo.

One reason American reporters were slow to respond to the story was undoubtedly the language barrier. As discussed in the previous chapter, a lack of Japanese fluency limits many American reporters' ability to cultivate their own sources in Japan. As a result many draw their story ideas from what the national Japanese newspapers are covering, particularly the English language papers. In other words, the fact that the rape story was initially given little space and was buried in the back of the national newspapers kept American reporters from noticing it.

Jordan says she knew nothing about the incident until September 18, when she read about it in the news-in-brief section of the English-language newspaper, the *Japan Times*. "I was outraged," she says. "I just remember opening it [the *Japan Times*] up and saying, 'what?' Because you know the kid

was underage, and it was three Americans. So I booked a flight [to Okinawa] that day" (M. Jordan, personal communication, November 25, 1997) .

American reporters may also have been slow to respond to the story not *because* it was a rape—as was the case with the Japanese press—but because at first it was *only* a rape. In other words, it did not fit the "coups and earthquake" criteria for international breaking news. Jordan insists it was the rape, not its political implications, that led her to Okinawa. However, she admits that from the start she knew the story was much larger than the crime. "I think everyone knew when this act happened that there was going to be big fallout. So it was hard to separate the event from the fallout," she said (M. Jordan, personal communication, November 25, 1997) .

*New York Times's* Nicholas Kristof admits that for him, the story was always the fallout, and not the rape itself, he said:

I don't think that the story there [in Okinawa] was really that a kid got very brutally raped, because that happens all the time all over the world, and often they are murdered which is obviously more serious . . . In fact, the stories we ran [in the *New York Times*] weren't about the rape. They were about Okinawa more broadly and the security implications of this crime. I mean, I don't think there is any reason simply to write about any kind of crime, even if it were a murder, if it didn't have these kinds of implications. I wouldn't write about it. The *New York Times* doesn't cover your average double murder in Omaha, so why write about a rape abroad unless it has these kinds of political implications? (N. Kristof, personal communication, November 24, 1997).

## **The Security Model in American News Stories**

In fact, neither the *Washington Post* nor the *New York Times* ever covered the rape itself as a crime story. Jordan begins her first story by locating the rape within a history of crime and conflict between the United States and Okinawa. She begins by presenting popular Occupation Model scripts:

Over the years, the Okinawan people have been angered by rapes and murders committed by U.S. servicemen here, but it has been decades since anything has focused their fury as sharply as what happened on Sept. 4. On that day, a 12-year-old girl was raped on her way home from shopping in what local authorities say was a premeditated attack committed by three U.S. servicemen (Jordan, September 20, 1995).

She quotes Governor Ota that some soldiers "think that Okinawa is a colony of the United States." Jordan relates other Occupation Model themes that are part of the Ota administration's discourse on discrimination and abuse. She says Americans have committed "12 killings and more than 4,500 crimes ranging from petty to serious." Ota's Chief of Staff Choko Takayama says "The point is that these guys are stationed here as representatives of the U.S. government; their crime is regarded here as a crime by the U.S. government. Prefectural Assembly Representative and Okinawan women's rights activist Suzuyo Takazato agrees and adds that "'many many' more rapes occur than are reported" (Jordan, September 20, 1995).

Although there are counter arguments to each of these points as presented in Chapter 3, Jordan does not present them. Instead she counters



each of these points with a script from the Security Model. She notes that "President Clinton and Prime Minister Murayama are scheduled to meet in Tokyo to reaffirm and strengthen the security pact," a point she repeats a few paragraphs later when she says, "The two leaders plan to reaffirm the pact, which both have cited as crucial to maintaining peace and stability in East Asia where many see North Korea as belligerent, China as unpredictable and Russia as potentially unstable." What is more, where some nameless critics say that United States troops in Japan are a waste of money, Assistant Secretary of Defense Joseph Nye responds, "Security is a lot like oxygen; you tend not to notice it until you begin to lose it." (Jordan, September 20, 1995).

Jordan's story builds upon the Security Model by recontextualizing challenges from the Okinawan elite version of the Occupation Model as issues that need to be addressed in order to preserve the important military relationship. It is a frame that pits the world view of one elite group, the Ota administration (whose language is adopted, right down to the importance of the victim's shopping trip) against another, the Clinton Administration. While it presents many of the arguments of the Occupation Model, the effect is to call attention to the importance of the Security Model by illuminating a challenge to it that needs addressing. The question is, "How do the United States and Japan deal with the problems the bases cause the Okinawans while maintaining the vital security treaty?"

Missing from Jordan's report are any of the Cooperation Model themes such as the importance of the bases to the Okinawan economy or the fact that American crime is lower per capita than Okinawa crime. Missing also are the scripts of the Imperialism Model that claims the bases were never necessary to begin with, that they serve only American hegemonic interests.

Jordan's overview story is the only one of its kind in the Washington Post during the study period. However, the New York Times published three such stories, one at the beginning of October, one in November, and another in early December. The three stories appear just before or after a major event related to the issue and rehash many of the same ideas as the overview stories that preceded them.

Andrew Pollack wrote his overview in response to the United States Marine Corps "Day of Reflection." The headline reads "Marines Seek Peace with Okinawa in Rape Case." As this suggests, Pollack uses the United States military's responses to the problems in Okinawa as the news peg to discuss a wide range of issues. Like Jordan, Pollack presents many of the Okinawan elite's Occupation Model views. However, Pollack writes to reaffirm the Cooperation Model rather than the Security Model. His lead paragraph also takes dramatic license with the problems he is addressing:

**For at least one day this week this island had some peace. The big guns that fire shells over Highway 104 were silent. The deafening planes that drowned out the lessons of elementary schools were grounded. No**

parachutes dropped from the sky onto the small practice field—or into the residential area nearby (Pollack, October 8, 1995).

This first paragraph gives the impression of an island continually under siege by the American military. While this is certainly the image that the Ota administration wanted the world to see, it is a large exaggeration. The live fire exercise that Pollack refers to takes place over Prefectural Road 104, which—while important in that it connects two larger roads on either side of the rural northern area of the island—is by no means a highway. Pollack makes the live-fire practice sound like a daily occurrence that endangers motorists. In fact, from 1972 to 1994, just 153 such practices were held over the road, which was closed to motorists for a total of 287 days during the 22-year period. Likewise, parachute drops occurred only 173 times between 1979 and 1994 (*Kyōsantō* 1996, 107).

Pollack points out that the rape has strained the United States-Okinawa relationship. However, the military is presented as concerned and doing more than it is obligated to do to resolve the problem. The behavior of the suspects is separated from that of the military in general. "To a man," says Pollack, "the Marines interviewed said the suspects in the rape cases were not representative of the corps. 'Those people are not Marines in my opinion,' said Pfc. Chad Ellis" (Pollack, October 6, 1995). Even so, Pollack says the Marine Corps is "acting as if the case is part of a systematic problem. Gen. Charles C. Krulak, the commandant of the Marine Corps, flew here specially from

Washington to meet with the troops. Discipline is being tightened and the sale of alcohol at stores on base is being halted at 9 p.m.." He says:

The public displays of contrition are in part aimed at keeping the outcry from Okinawans in check. The [rape] incident has given new momentum to calls by some Okinawans—but by no means all—to remove the bases at a time when the United States and Japan are trying to justify their necessity with the end of the Cold War (Pollack, October 6, 1995).

Pollack's report is interesting in that the only named attribution it provides is that of military officials and soldiers. He attributes the majority of the facts he cites to "Okinawan officials" whose concerns are responded to by "American officials." For example, he says, "Okinawan officials say this [SOFA] impedes their criminal investigations and puts the Americans above the law. . . American officials say they have cooperated fully in the recent rape case and played a key role in tracking down the suspects." What is more, the Americans have gone the extra mile in their efforts. "Still, as part of the response to the rape, a United States-Japan committee is reviewing the status of forces agreement" (Pollack, October 6, 1995).

Pollack casts doubt upon the comments of Okinawan officials by juxtaposing them against what he cites as the true feelings of Okinawans themselves. "As for the bases, a poll taken by the local government a few years ago showed about 80 percent of Okinawans favor removing or reducing them, but interviews with people here suggest opposition to the bases is not that fervent. . . Okinawan officials say the bases now account for just 5 percent of the

economy. . .But some Okinawans wonder if profitable uses can be found for the land" (Pollack, October 6, 1995). Pollack's story includes very few of the Security Model themes.

Each of the three issue overview stories in the New York Times was written by a different member of the newspaper's Tokyo Bureau, and each gives one the impression that the newspaper is discovering the problem anew through the eyes of each. They differ from either Okinawan or Mainland reports not only in directions but in the fact that much of the reporter's personality can be felt in the text. Pollack's report has the feel of a moderate aware of Okinawan complaints but also the rational responses to them.

A story by WuDunn, "Rage Grows in Okinawa Over U.S. Military Bases: Years of Noise and Now the Rape of a 12-year-old" (WuDunn, November 11, 1995) provides an emotionally sympathetic look at the problem in Okinawa. Describing the noise in one elementary school near a base, she says, "The floor trembles and the classroom is engulfed in a roar. It is not an earthquake or Armageddon, but an interruption that occurs at least hourly, an American helicopter soars into the sky from the American base next door." She quotes a 12-year-old who says, "It's very scary. . .I heard a plane once crashed" (WuDunn, November 11, 1995).

Kristof's "Welcome Mat Is Wearing Thin for G.I.'s in Asia" (Kristof, December 3, 1995), is more firmly rooted in the Security Model with powerful statements such as "Some Koreans, Japanese and Americans alike worry that

a far-reaching dynamic is under way that may lead to a dramatic reduction in the United States troop presence in Asia. They fear that this would be a disaster for the region, setting off an arms race and major new wars that might ultimately involve the United States" (Kristof, December 3, 1995).

As described in Chapter 4, the wider range of style in the American stories as opposed to the Japanese is likely a result of the American system of rewarding individual insights with by-lines and career advancement, whereas the Japanese tendency is to value adherence to the news organization's policy position.

### **Influence of the American Press on Japanese Reporting**

On September 21, the day after Jordan's first story ran, the *Yomiuri Shimbun* reported on the American newspaper's interest in the story with an article on page 2 of its morning edition. The text of the *Yomiuri's* report on the *Washington Post* focuses on the way the paper linked the story to other issues in United States-Japan relations, something the *Yomiuri* itself had yet to do ("*W. Posutoshi Nado*"). The entire text reads:

#### **Young Girl Assault Incident W. Post and Others Give Large Coverage in America**

On the 20th, the American newspaper the *Washington Post* published a large story about the assault of a young girl by three American soldiers on its international page. The story reported that the incident comes at a

delicate time for United States-Japan relations as both sides prepare for President Clinton's visit to Japan in November at which time a joint declaration on the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty is planned despite criticism in both countries that it is anachronistic.

The same newspaper sent a special correspondent to Naha who filed a detailed report about the local people's reaction to the incident, and the various incidents that American soldiers have committed to date. Comments about the unprecedented distrust [of the United States] were introduced, such as those of an office worker who said, "In the past we thought that the American soldiers were kind, but now I cannot believe that."

In America CNN television also took up the incident in a large report demonstrating an unusual interest in this incident committed by American soldiers ("*W. Posutoshi Nado*").

The comment of the office worker in this story is interesting in that it is the first time that either the *Yomiuri* or the *Asahi* had mentioned anything about Okinawan citizen reaction to the incident despite having their own reporter on the scene in Okinawa. The fact that the *Yomiuri* singles out the comment about the incident happening at a "a delicate time for United States-Japan relations" is also telling in that it is the first time the *Yomiuri* acknowledged a connection between the crime and international relations. Either the newspaper had not recognized or had tried to down-play this connection. The fact that the *Yomiuri* did not consider this case a major incident can be understood in the last sentence where there is a sense of surprise at the American media's "unusual interest in this incident" ("*W. Posutoshi Nado*").

As discussed in the previous chapter, foreign press attention can open the doors for Japanese newspapers to report information on which they had

been holding back. Some evidence suggests the *Washington Post* story may have influenced the way the *Yomiuri* treated the story. The *Yomiuri* ran its first front page story on an Okinawa rape-related topic in its September 20 evening edition just hours before Jordan's story would appear in the morning-edition September 20 *Washington Post*.

The *Yomiuri* story—a report that the DSJ was supporting a SOFA review—was wholly expected and no more deserving of front page placement than Kono's rejection of review the day before (*"Chiikyōtei Minaoshi o"*).

It is possible that the *Yomiuri*, which shares a building and a working relationship with the *Washington Post*, knew the American newspaper was about to publish a major story on Okinawa and tailored its front page accordingly. It is also possible that Mondale's apology for the rape the previous day pushed the story to a new level. Still, immediately after its report on the *Washington Post*'s interest in Okinawa, debate on the SOFA became a regular *Yomiuri* front page story.

Whether or not her story actually had an effect on the editorial policy of the mainland papers, it is clear from Jordan's description of her first day in Okinawa, that the local media fully expected her visit to improve the kind of press Okinawa had been getting.

Jordan recalls her first step after arriving in Okinawa was to visit the offices of the *Ryukyu Shimpo* to get the local journalist's reaction to what was happening on the island. The Okinawan newspaper had already had a week of



intense reporting on the story. "They immediately sat me down and wanted to interview me," says Jordan. "At the time the national media really hadn't done much with the story yet, so they were excited to see that someone [outside of Okinawa] was interested in them" (M. Jordan, personal communication, November 25, 1997) .

The *Shimpo* ran a story on Jordan's visit together with her photograph on page 22 of its morning edition ("*W. Posutoshi mo Shuzai*"). The story read:

A reporter from one of the most prestigious American newspapers, the *Washington Post*, arrived in Okinawa on the 18th to cover the American soldiers' young-girl assault. The newspaper's Far East Bureau Co-bureau Chief Mary Jordan came with the newspaper's Tokyo Special Correspondent Shigehiko Togo. After arriving in Naha they came to the *Ryukyu Shimpo* offices where they gathered information about such things as the development of the story and the prefecture residents' feelings about the American military. She says she plans to stay in Okinawa until the 20th gathering information on the areas around the bases and the activities of American soldiers.

Regarding the incident, Jordan pointed out, "It's a terribly tragic thing. If such an incident had happened in the United States, there is no doubt that there would have been a great deal of anger." She said "I want to send in a long, detailed report right away to call the American people's attention [to the incident]" ("*W. Posutoshi mo Shuzai*").

### **Press Coverage of the Trial and Conviction of the Rape Suspects**

#### **American Trial Coverage**

The overview stories described above usually came before or directly after major events and acted to update the reader's model of Okinawa in

preparation for more specific bits of information to be provided by event reporting. Event stories that were published directly after an action, statement, or happening were by far the most common kind of story in American coverage of Okinawa during the study period. Event stories were occasionally followed by an "issue story" which differed from the overview-type of story in that it would look at just one main issue arising from the event itself.

Okinawan newspapers' event reporting focused mostly on citizen protests. Mainland Japanese newspapers concentrated on central government politics. The American reporters mostly covered events involving Japanese and American national leaders, and—in stark contrast to either Okinawa or the mainland—developments in the case, the three suspects, and their families.

Even with their detailed descriptions of the evil committed by the three Americans, these reports about indictment and trial also acted as a mirror for Americans to view themselves positively. They did so by portraying the defendants as good boys gone bad—"young men who sought honor and face disgrace" as one report referred to them (Smothers, November, 6 1995)—and by deflecting attention away from the crime and to problems within the Japanese judicial system.

In a story co-written by Jordan and Sullivan, the quality of Japanese jurisprudence is called into question in the headline, "Americans Charged With Rape Turned Over to Police: Japanese Indictment of the Three U.S. Servicemen in Okinawa Means Conviction Likely." The lead paragraph

reiterates that indictment is "a move that in Japan virtually guarantees conviction" ("Americans Charged with Rape Turned Over to Police").

Kristof takes an even dimmer view of Japanese justice, writing that the October agreement allowing rape and murder suspects to be turned over to Japanese investigators before indictment:

...raises concerns about the legal protections afforded to American soldiers accused of crimes abroad. Japanese interrogators sometimes rough up suspects, or soften them up by depriving them of sleep, and that is why the United States in the past has not wanted to hand over American troops. (Kristof, October 26, 1995).

In a subsequent story Kristof writes that for Americans in Japan and South Korea "local justice sometimes seems like an oxymoron." This is because:

There are no jury trials in either Japan or South Korea, and police interrogators are often accused of harsh methods of questioning to induce confessions (Kristof, December 3, 1995).

Kristof offers no authoritative source or example to back up these claims. What is more, he uses the lack of a jury system as prima facie proof of American legal superiority. Many Japanese find the American trial system—which they see as leaving the fate of defendants in the hands of untrained and emotionally-swayable jurors—as hard to understand as many Americans find Japan's no-jury system. It is interesting that at his indictment, one of the American suspects,

Harp, would claim that it was American military investigators, not the Japanese, who coerced his confession.

American coverage of the rape trial provided much more graphic detail of the crime than did any of the Japanese newspapers. For example, in his report on the first day of the defendants' trial, Sullivan relates parts of the rape story in narrative style, including the fact, presented by the prosecutors, that Harp had "disposed of the servicemen's underwear which was stained with the victim's blood, along with her notebook and shopping bag" (Sullivan, November 8, 1995). He also obtained an interview with Harp's Japanese lawyer, Mitsunobu Matsunaga, something that no Japanese paper attempted to do, and reported the lawyer's statement that:

Harp and Ledet did not rape the girl. After Gill raped her, Matsunaga said, "Gill got out of the car and told Ledet, 'You go next.' Then Ledet went into the back seat and he said as he looked at her, she was so small and skinny, he didn't feel right to rape her." Harp also looked at the young girl and decided "he didn't feel right" about raping her either, his lawyer maintained" (Sullivan, November 8, 1995)

This information is interesting not only because it demonstrates the kind of graphic description used, but also because it assigns an element of conscience to the rapists, something that was absent from all Japanese reports.

A more conscious effort to humanize the defendants ran two days earlier in the November 6, story, "Accused Marines' Kin Incredulous: Families

Complain About Conditions of Trial in Okinawa." For the article the reporter had traveled to Georgia to learn the details of the three defendants' upbringing. The reader learns that Ledet was a self-taught mechanic who worked in a garage in high school. His uncles and cousins were all in the service. "Getting into the Marines was all he could talk about." Gill is remembered by classmates and teachers as a strapping 275-pound football player who anchored his high school's offensive and defensive lines. He played the trombone in his school's marching band and was featured in the *Houston Chronicle* as a kind of player who would forgo half-time breathers to make music in the stands. According to his barber, Roderico Harp was "a proud little fellow" in his ROTC uniform who had good manners. His sister said he dreamed of entering the military. "It was his way to make something of himself." (Smothers, November 6, 1995)

The story also highlights the families' anger and dissatisfaction with both the American and Japanese justice systems. Ledet's sister raises the idea that the three men are being prosecuted because they are black. "It's political and it's racial. We are black and we all come from small towns. I'm looking at three young black men who may face life in prison and just don't think this would be happening if they were white" (Smothers, November 6, 1995).

Harp's sister expresses anger with the American government for apologizing for the crime before the men are convicted, suggesting it is a violation of the principle of presumed innocence.

Two days later the New York Times again gave space to the families' grievances in the story of their press conference in Atlanta, "Protest by Relatives" (Smothers, November 8, 1995), at which the families claim that the men's confessions were coerced. Harp's mother demands, "Y'all wake up...Don't let them take three American boys away from us and throw them to the wolves" (Smothers, November 8, 1995).

### **Okinawan and Mainland Japanese Views of the Rape Trial**

On its long report on the first day of the Okinawa rape suspect's trial, the New York Times mentioned that "one of the most dramatic moments" was when a statement from the victim was read in which she told how she was now afraid of Americans, and that she would like the men who assaulted her to "go to jail for the rest of their lives." Her father is quoted as saying, "I would like to kill those American soldiers" (Pollack, November 8, 1995). These facts were midway through the long story, paragraph 13 of 26.

The *Ryukyu Shimpō* brings these moments into its headlines and makes the victim the focus. Across the top of page one of the November 8 *Ryukyu Shimpō* ran the horizontal headline, "Three Defendants Admit to Most of Charges." Vertical subheads said: "A Planned Crime Is Revealed: The Emotional Distress of the Victim Pointed Out" ("*3 Hikoku*"). The story

emphasizes the conspiratorial nature of the crime. It begins with an account of the three defendants admission of guilt and then goes immediately to the victim:

In its opening statement the prosecution pointed out that it was a premeditated crime with the men purchasing in advance the military-use tape used in the crime. It then entered into evidence the statement of the victim which said "I want [the criminals] to be put in jail for the rest of their lives" which made clear the emotional distress of the victim. In addition various statements were offered into evidence including those attesting to the emotional and physical effect of the crime on the victim and the Board of Education Chairman's demand to the military for stricter education ("*3 Hikoku*").

On the inside of the same edition the victim's voice is heard again in a large headline across the top of the society page. "[Put Them] In Jail for the Rest of Their Lives: The Victim's Statement Silences the Courtroom: The Entire Content of the Heinous Crime Made Clear: The Cruelty Brings Tears and Anger Anew." This story repeats the victim's words in more detail along with the father's statement "If the law allowed I would like them to be executed" "If the law allowed I would like to kill them" ("*Shinu Made Keimusho ni*").

A Kyodo News Service report on the Atlanta protests of the defendants' mothers appeared on the front page of the *Shimpo's* November 8 evening edition where the issue of racism is presented as an undesirable complication in the case:

The Families of the three black American soldiers who have become defendants in the Okinawa young-girl-assault case held a press conference in Atlanta, Georgia where they insisted that [the defendants]

confessions were coerced and that they are innocent. They were supported by members of a black organization that claims racism, raising fears that the case could become embroiled in racial problems.

Depending on how it develops, the issue of racism could have an effect on American public opinion which has fresh in its memory the Simpson murder trial in which the entire country was split in two over the debate about the not guilty verdict (*"Jihaku Kyōsei' to Kaiken"*).

This story is vague about who supposedly coerced the confessions. It contains none of the other complaints about the lack of lawyers present at long Japanese interrogation or fears about the Japanese judicial system.

A shorter story on the same page quotes an unnamed source in the Okinawan police department as saying the claims of forced confessions "are not a problem for the investigation. Because America is a country with a strong consciousness of human rights, in some ways they cannot understand our common sense." Another unnamed police investigator claims there was never any coercion (*"Sōsa ni Mondainai"*).

The Asahi Shimbun gave the least attention to the opening day of the trial with five paragraphs on the society page. The story, "Indictment Facts Uncontested: Okinawa young-girl-assault case, Trial Begins for Three American Soldiers," recounts the courtroom admissions of the soldiers and nothing more. The mothers' press conference was covered on page 10 of the evening edition. However, the story is limited to the mothers' criticism of the American government for turning the men over to the Japanese. It does not mention any of the criticisms about the Japanese judicial system.



The Yomiuri ran a large photo of the defendants being taken to court on page one and a story detailing the first day including the victim's statement on the society page. It ignored the defendants' mothers completely.

Of all the Japanese newspapers, the *Okinawa Times* gave the most details of the defendant's mother's press conference. However, it did so by reporting that the *New York Times* had reported it. The headline read, "Have the Trial in America: The 3 defendants' Families Dissatisfaction and Irritation: The *New York Times*." (*"Beikoku de Saiban Shite"*).

American newspaper stories about the conviction and sentencing of the three men also develop the themes of excessive or unfair Japanese jurisprudence with little concern for Okinawan feelings that the sentences—seven years for Harp and Gill, six-and-a-half years for Ledet—were too light.

In his story about the verdict, Pollack writes that the prosecutors sentences were "considered somewhat heavy for this type of crime but not totally out of the range of expectations" (Pollack, March 7, 1996). He goes on to quote the lawyer for the families, who says the verdicts will be appealed. Ledet's sister is represented as saying the three men are being used as "scapegoats in an effort to get the military bases removed from Okinawa. "I think it is inhumane to sacrifice life in exchange for land," she says. Daryl Johnson, president of the Okinawa chapter of the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People, says, "The sentence was excessive compared

to the verdicts that would have been given to Okinawan nationals." He adds, "I'm not sure this is because they are Americans or African-Americans" (Pollack, March 7, 1996). Almost as an afterthought Pollack adds one sentence, "But some women's groups here [Okinawa] have said that even a 10-year sentence would be too light" (Pollack, March 7, 1996).

In an issue story, "Long Hours of Prison Labor Await U.S. Servicemen Convicted of Okinawa Rape," the Washington Post's Sullivan focused on the severity of Japanese prisons the Americans would be entering. He says:

The Japanese prison system has been criticized for its harsh treatment of prisoners. Human rights activists say Japan's prisons are places of excessive punishment for even the slightest violations of Draconian rules, such as opening eyes during a daily "self-reflection" period. Japanese deny those allegations and are proud of the Japanese practice of including hard labor with most sentences. . .

Human Rights Watch/Asia, in a report on Japanese prisons a year ago, accused them of having almost no regard for prisoners' basic rights. The report said prisoners are in solitary confinement for weeks or months at a time, and that minor infractions such as not sitting properly result in solitary confinement or beatings (Sullivan, March 8, 1995).

The story paints a picture of Japanese delighting in the severity of their system and American officials who are reticent to say anything about it because "they might inflame the Japanese in the wake of the rape case." The story does not comment on how Okinawans feel about the punishment the men would face.

## **Collapse of the Rape Taboo**

The *Okinawa Times* ran seven stories on reaction to the verdict in its March 7, morning edition and four more in its evening edition. None expressed concern for the hard labor the suspects faced. To the contrary, the overriding concern was anger and opposition to the Japanese legal system for being too lenient. The headlines of one story read: "Too Light' Prefectural People Opposed: Indicates [Law] Soft on Female Assault: Voices are Requesting a Review of the Law (*"Karusugiru' Kenmin wa Hanpatsu"*).

The anger at the sentence was severe enough to break the rape taboo in all the Japanese newspapers. The *Okinawa Times* uses the word "*gōkan*," (rape) for the first time in its story, "Criminal Code Problems, A Whirlpool of Dissatisfaction" (*"Keihō ni Mondai, Fuman Uzumaki"*). The report quotes a member of Women Against Military Violence as saying, "Under current Japanese law, rape [*gōkan*] is ranked as less severe than robbery. This law is based on old concepts and we must think about how to revise them" (*"Keihō ni Mondai, Fuman Uzumaki"*).

Even the *Asahi* and the *Yomiuri* used the words *gōkan* and *reipu* in post-verdict reports. However, as with the Okinawan newspapers, the use of these sensitive words was still confined to secondary stories about anger at the

verdict and Japanese attitudes about rape and the law. The words were never used in headlines.

The Yomiuri's page one story on March 7, told of the verdict and included the reaction of Ambassador Mondale that it was a fair trial, but did not question the prison terms assigned (*"Beihei 3 Nin ni Jikkei Hanketsu"*). Likewise the Asahi ran a page one story explaining the verdicts and recapping the facts of the crime which also included a quote from Ota that the United States and Japan must continue their work on reducing the bases. However, it did not discuss public attitudes about the sentence.

The Okinawa newspapers went further than the mainland newspapers in linking the crime to the presence of the military bases. For example, the March 7, evening edition front page story, "Opposition: "Sexual Assault Not Considered" Suzuyo Takazato, head of Women Against Military Violence actually expresses anger that the military nature of the sexual assault was not considered in the sentencing. "This sentence which does not take military violence into consideration must be sharply questioned. . .military training instills violence and to the degree that this is not solved a second and third victim will come out" (*"Seibōryoku Fumtō' to Hanpatsu"*).

## **Case Study Conclusions**

The fact that it was a rape, and especially the particularly brutal rape of a child, that drew media attention to the problems of military bases in Okinawa, ultimately made the story much larger than it would have been had it begun with almost any other incident. However, ironically, the fact that the case was a rape also initially hindered Japanese acceptance of the incident as an acceptable news topic. Okinawa's *Ryukyu Shimpo*, wrestling with a request from the family of the victim not to report the news at all, was the first to report the incident. Nonetheless, it at first downplayed its scoop, running the story in the back pages and obscuring the details of the crime. The next day the other Okinawan newspaper, the *Okinawa Times*, ran the story in its back pages with more detail and less obscuring of the nature of the crime.

Even in these first few reports, one could see the influence of the Occupation Model on how the story was framed. Okinawan reporters ignored the cooperation between American military and Okinawan investigators, choosing instead to focus on conflict, namely the American military's insistence on following the rules spelled out in the Status of Forces Agreement that preclude the hand-over of American suspects to local police until after

indictment. They also linked the actions of the individual soldiers to the existence of the bases, making the American military culpable in the crime.

The story moved to the front pages when local government elites acted on the news of the crime by refusing to accept apologies from American military and government as resolution of the problem. Soon Okinawan newspapers were saturated with reports of citizen protests, which were encouraged by and often participated in by members of the Okinawa prefectural government.

Even with these events in Okinawa unfolding in saturation coverage by the local newspapers, mainland national newspapers all but ignored the story. This began to change when a clear policy issue emerged—requests from Okinawa that the central government aid in their demands for a review of the SOFA. Both the *Asahi Shimbun* and the *Yomiuri Shimbun* largely framed the rape case in terms of the government debate on how best to solve the SOFA issue without damaging the United States-Japan military alliance. Both newspapers also adopted the government's language choosing to refer to the issue as "SOFA improvement" rather than "SOFA review." Perhaps because the central government was divided on the issue, and not along traditional party lines, the mainland newspapers were freer to pursue their own corporate editorial philosophies with regard to the issue. The more liberal *Asahi Shimbun* provided much greater coverage of the Okinawa problem including citizen demonstrations and analysis of the problems with the SOFA. The more conservative *Yomiuri* provided far less coverage of the Okinawa question

overall and even less analysis. It only reported on Okinawa demonstrations when they became too large to ignore. The Yomiuri even chose to run a story reaffirming the Security Treaty above the news that 85,000 people gathered in an Okinawan park to protest the alliance.

The American newspapers did not become interested in the rape story until the issue had become highly politicized. The first American reporter to cover Okinawa learned about the rape from an English-language Japanese newspaper, indicating that the language barrier had an impact on American coverage of the issue. The American press may also have been slow to recognize the importance of the story until it became a problem with ramifications for the Security Treaty.

The importance of drama for American reporters can be seen in the way they exaggerated much of the Occupation Model discourse in their overview reports on the problem. However, rather than affirming the Occupation discourse, these reporters used the discourse to demonstrate either the challenge to the Security Model, or the efforts being made by Americans to work with Okinawans to solve the problems, the Cooperation Model.

Most of the American reports focused on specific events. Many of these were about negotiations on the base issue that made only brief reference to the rape. Those event stories that dealt mostly with the rape were about the suspects and their trial. These American stories moved the discussion away from discourse of military violence or American culpability in the crimes of its

soldiers by concentrating instead on problems with the Japanese justice system. The suspects were humanized as good boys gone bad and now caught in a dangerous and inferior legal system. These stories acted as a kind of mirror for Americans in which they could see themselves as just and humane people despite the actions of their countrymen. There was little emphasis on the victim. By contrast, Okinawan trial reports put the victim in the headlines and made her the focus of their reporting.

Similarly, when the Okinawa court convicted the three Americans and sentenced two of the men to seven years and the other to six-and-a-half years in jail, the American newspapers focused on complaints that the sentences were too long and the hard labor to which the men would be subjected. The Okinawan newspapers, and to a lesser extent, the mainland newspapers as well focused on the anger swelling among some groups that the sentences were too light. In contrast to the American reports, many of the complaints aired in the four Japanese newspapers were that the Japanese legal system is too forgiving of rapists. The Okinawa newspapers linked problems with Japanese jurisprudence with the American military by favoring the discourse of anti-base activists who were demanding that the military aspect of crimes committed by soldiers should be factored into any future sentence. These activists recontextualized the sentencing of the men into a larger Occupation Model discourse on oppression by arguing that more such trials would have to be held as long as the American military stayed in Okinawa.



## **CHAPTER 6**

### **NEWSPAPER COVERAGE OF THE OKINAWA BASE ISSUE**

Although sometimes reported in the American media as the impetus for the anti-base protests in Okinawa, anger over the 1995 schoolgirl rape simply lent strength to an already well-organized and active anti-military movement within the prefecture. In this chapter, I will look at newspaper coverage of events related to the Okinawa base issue that were influenced by the rape, but events that would likely have occurred even in the absence of the crime. I will show that—as was the case with newspaper stories of the rape analyzed in the previous chapter—reporters writing about the broader issues of the American military in Okinawa tended to reproduce the discourses of the elites within their respective areas.

I begin with an overview of the events related to the base issue that led up to, and took place during, the study period. I then look at representative newspaper articles regarding several key moments in the controversy. These include 1) Governor Ota's refusal to act as the proxy signatory on Anti-War Landlord leases with the American military, and the turmoil this created within the Japanese central government and United States-Japan relations; 2) The central government's legal action against Governor Ota and the Japan Supreme Court's ruling; and 3) President Clinton's meeting with Prime Minister Hashimoto in Japan in April 1996, and the two leaders' "Japan-U.S. Joint

Declaration on Security," which strengthened the overall United States-Japan military alliance, while at the same time accepting the recommendations of the Special Action Committee on Okinawa for easing the burden of the bases on the prefecture.

### **Overview**

Masahide Ota had campaigned for and won the governorship of Okinawa in 1990 on a platform of reducing the presence of American military bases on Okinawa. His anti-base statements and activities were a regular item in the local Okinawa newspapers years before the rape occurred. As mentioned in the previous chapter, a report on Ota's meeting with the *hansenjinushi*, or "Anti-War Landlords" was featured prominently on page two of the *Okinawa Times* ("*Chiji, Hansenjinushi to Menkai*") on September 9, 1995, the same day that the newspaper buried on page 31 its first report about the schoolgirl rape ("*Beihei ga Joshijidō Bōkō*").

Japan's Land Acquisition Law gives the central government eminent domain over privately-owned land necessary for the construction of roads, airports, railroads and other public works. Since reversion in 1972, the law has been used to force Okinawan landowners to lease their property to the American military. The overwhelming majority of the approximately 30,000 base-property landlords willingly renew their leases with the military when they

expire every five years. However, a group of about 3,000 landowners, collectively known as the *hansenjinushi* "Anti-War Landlords," have repeatedly protested the forced use of their land by refusing to sign their leases. Many *hansenjinushi* purchased their property—a large number own the legal minimum of one *tsubo*, about 4 square yards—for the express purpose of protesting the bases.

Under the Land Acquisition Law, if any landlords refuse to renew their lease with the military, the mayor of the town or city in which the property exists is empowered to sign the documents as their proxy. If the mayor refuses, the duty falls to the prefectural governor. In 1995, the mayors of three cities in which contested leases were coming due—Naha, Okinawa City, and Yomitan—all refused to sign leases as the unwanted agents of protesting landlords. This left the signature duty to Ota. In the years between 1972 and 1995, no Okinawan governor had ever failed to enforce military leases.

Ota announced his decision to side with the *hansenjinushi* during the question-and-answer period of the September 28, 1995 session of the Prefectural Assembly. By this time, the rape had begun to capture the attention of the world media and public outcry over the crime undoubtedly made Ota's decision easier. However, it is more than likely that the governor would have taken the same course without the additional public support for his anti-base positions that the rape engendered. In 1991, Ota had bowed to central government pressure and made what he referred to as the "bitter decision" (*kujū*)

*no sentaku*) ("*Chiji, Hansenjinushi to Menkai*") to sign a set of leases over the objections of the *hansenjinushi*. It is unlikely he would have done so again in 1995. The Ota administration had hoped to make that year, with its fiftieth anniversaries of the Battle of Okinawa and the end of World War II, a watershed year in their campaign against the bases.

### **Reaffirming the United States-Japan Security Relationship**

On the pro-base side of the ideological divide, 1995 was to be the year that the American and Japanese governments planned to reaffirm and expand the United States-Japan security alliance. This joint effort had begun independently in both countries. In 1994, Prime Minister Morihiro Hosokawa commissioned a panel to review Japan's defense policy framework—the National Defense Program Outline (NDPO)—in light of the end of the Cold War. While reaffirming the basic foundation of the United States-Japan security relationship, the so-called Higuchi committee (named after its chairman Hirotaro Higuchi) recommended a streamlining and restructuring of the Japan Self Defense Forces (JSDF) and a reinterpretation of existing regulations to allow for closer cooperation between American military forces and JSDF troops (Mochizuki, p. 9).

The American review of the security relationship with Japan began earlier with the Bush administration's East Asian Security Initiative, which the

succeeding Clinton administration renamed the East Asian Strategic Review. The Bush plan had included plans to reduce America's Asia-based forces in response to end of the Soviet threat. Under the Clinton administration, the Department of Defense (DOD) scrapped plans for a draw-down. Instead, in February 1995, it issued *The United States Security Strategy for the East Asia-Pacific Region*, which announced the administration's "steadfast commitment" to maintaining 100,000 troops in the region (Mochizuki, p. 10).

Shortly before the release of the DOD report the United States began an effort to transform the independent American and Japanese reviews of the military situation into a joint project. This process became known as the "Nye initiative" after then—Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Joseph Nye (Mochizuki, p.11). The Nye initiative included meeting between the so-called "2-Plus-2" group made up of the United States secretaries of state and defense and the Japanese ministers of foreign affairs and defense. Its first effect was to influence the final draft of the new Japanese policy guide to replace the old NDPO. The new version—which was adopted in November 1995 despite the Okinawa controversy—included a stronger affirmation of the need for the United States-Japan security alliance than was part of either the Japanese defense program as it was originally adopted in 1976, or the recommendations of the Higuchi committee (Mochizuki, p. 13).

The culmination of the Nye initiative was to have been a joint declaration affirming the United States-Japan security relationship to be made at a summit

between President Clinton and Prime Minister Murayama following the APEC meeting in Japan in November 1995. Clinton canceled his trip to Japan just days in advance in order to deal with the congressional budget crisis.

### **Turmoil within the Japanese Central Government**

The turmoil that Ota's decision was causing within the country and the Japanese central government likely factored into Clinton's decision to forgo the head-of-state visit. Within days of the governor's refusal to sign the leases, the central government's Director of the Defense Facilities Administration Agency Noboru Hoshuyama was sent to Okinawa to convince the governor not to follow through on his refusal threat. Ota not only did not change his mind, but also refused even to meet with the agency director during his three-day stay on the island.

Hoping to placate Okinawan anger in time for their November 20 meeting, both the Clinton and Murayama administrations began signaling in October that they were willing to discuss base "consolidation." Hoshuyama, fresh from his humiliating experience in Okinawa, criticized the prime minister's cooperative posture toward Okinawa, calling Murayama "Thick-headed" (*"Shushō Atama ga Warui"*) for talking about base reduction—an idea he labeled absurd (*hiriseiteki*)—instead of taking "established steps" to force the governor to sign the contested leases (*"Hoshuyama Chōkan o Kōtetsu"*).

Hoshuyama argued that unless the governor was dealt with swiftly, Japan's "reputation as a law-abiding country will be jeopardized" ("Hoshuyama Resigns"). Although he denied actually having called the prime minister "stupid," Hoshuyama was forced to tender his resignation to his boss, Defense Agency Director Seishiro Eto.

In early November, Ota traveled to Tokyo to meet with the prime minister about the lease issue, taking with him a list of ten demands, including the return of Futenma Marine Corps Base. During their five-hour discussion at Murayama's private residence, the prime minister assured Ota that he was "putting all his effort into solving the problem" (*"Chiji Shomei Kyohi o Hyōmei"*). However, he agreed to only one of Ota's demands—that the joint United States-Japan Special Action Committee on Okinawa (SACO), recently established to study ways to solve the base issue, pay more attention to suggestions originating within Okinawa prefecture.

Ota publicly expressed his gratitude to Murayama for being the first prime minister to listen seriously to Okinawan complaints. But he did not budge on his refusal to sign the leases. After the meeting Murayama emerged from his residence to tell the waiting press corps that he would "decide what to do now that [he] had fully gauged Governor Ota's position," a remark that was widely interpreted as a signal that he had given up on persuasion and was ready to proceed with the legal action against the governor.

However, Murayama made one last-ditch attempt to convince Ota to sign the leases before the summit date by sending Eto to Okinawa the following week. In his meeting with Ota, Eto again expressed the central government's regret with regard to the schoolgirl rape and offered another token of the government's willingness to work out a solution, a promise to find a way to transfer to the mainland some of the live-fire military exercises that occasionally took place over prefectural road 104. Eto also suggested that the government might be willing to increase the amount of rent paid to Okinawan lease holders. Ota responded by taking the Defense Agency Director on a helicopter flyover of Futenma, and drawing Eto's attention to the dangers the Marine air base posed to the surrounding town of Ginowan. The governor remained steadfast in his refusal to sign the leases.

### **The Central Government Sues Ota**

On December 6, 1995, following Clinton's cancellation of the Tokyo summit, the Murayama administration began the legal process of forcing Ota to sign the leases by filing suit against the governor in the Naha branch of the Fukuoka High Court. Anti-base intellectual Koji Taira (1997) characterized Murayama as purposely choosing the "most offensive" response to the proxy-signature impasse (p. 3). In fact, the decision to sue Ota on behalf of the central government must have been a painful one for the Socialist Party leader, who



was obliged to give up his own long-standing opposition to the bases when he became the prime minister from within his party's coalition government with the conservative LDP.

In its suit against Ota, the Murayama administration contended that the right of the governor to sign the contested leases provided for under the Land Acquisition Law was linked to the Local Autonomy Law. This second law says that prefectures are subordinate to the central government, which delegates to them the right to execute certain administrative functions. Under Murayama's reasoning, the signing of contested leases was a function *delegated* to the governor by the central government, not a decision to be made by the governor alone. Therefore, by failing to sign the leases, Ota was in violation of the Local Autonomy Law (Taira 1997, p. 4), and was endangering the "national interest." What is more, since signing the leases is a delegated duty, the prime minister argued he had the right to complete the task if the governor failed to sign.

The Ota administration argued that there was no legitimate link between the procedures outlined in the Land Acquisition Law and the Local Autonomy Law (Taira 1997, p. 4). However, Ota's principal strategy was to make the suit about the fairness of the bases and not the finer points of law. He challenged the constitutionality of forced leases, claiming that the bases violate the people's guaranteed "right to life"—by forcing them to live under the threat of accidents, crime and pollution—and "right to property"—by dispossessing so

many of their land. He contended that the "national interest" could not be used as an excuse to ignore "local interests."

Murayama would not see the legal action through to its conclusion. In January 1996, he resigned as prime minister, citing the need to prepare his party for the coming general election. He left the unfinished job of suing Ota to his replacement, Ryutaro Hashimoto of the LDP.

On March 25, 1996, the Fukuoka High Court ruled in favor of the central government and gave Ota three days to sign the contested leases. On March 27, the governor again refused.<sup>1</sup> As a result, Prime Minister Hashimoto was empowered to sign in Ota's place. On March 28, the prime minister delegated this duty to the Okinawa offices of the Defense Facilities Agency.

Had this been the end of the process, the leases would have been signed before the first expired on March 31. However, Japan's Byzantine bureaucracy made the process more difficult than simply affixing a signature to the documents. After the leases were signed, they still needed to be officially recognized by the Okinawa Prefecture Expropriation Committee (*kenshūyōinkai*) which could then issue an emergency use order legitimizing the American military's occupation of the land. The entire process would not be complete until formal notification of the signatures was made, first to the mayors who had refused to sign, and finally to the governor's office. The emergency

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<sup>1</sup> Ota later appealed to the Japan Supreme Court where, on July 10, 1996, he made an impassioned speech linking the overwhelming presence of the American military on Okinawa to a historic pattern of discrimination against the prefecture. He asked the court to order a more

use order was not issued until April 12, more than two weeks after the leases were finally signed and just three days before President Clinton arrived in Japan for his summit with Hashimoto.

In the meantime, the United States found itself illegally occupying a two-acre plot of land inside its Sobe Communication facility in Yomitan. This giant listening post—known locally as the "elephant cage" (*zō no ori*) because its towering array of antennas resembled a huge circular fence—was believed to monitor communications within China and North Korea. The owner of the property was none other than Soichi Chibana, the same anti-base activist who tore down and burned the Japanese flag during a national athletic meet in Yomitan, his northern Okinawa hometown. Chibana's grandfather was shot dead trying to stop the military from taking the parcel of land in question. During the wait for the emergency use order, thousands of protesters gathered around the elephant cage each day as Chibana demanded to be allowed to visit his property. He was repeatedly denied entrance.

Just days before Clinton arrived in Japan, it was announced that the elephant cage would be returned to Okinawa as part of SACO's recommendations for reducing the size of American bases on Okinawa by 20 percent.

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equitable distribution of the bases throughout Japan [Ota 1999]. On August 28, 1996, the higher court upheld the lower courts ruling against Ota.

## **The Clinton-Hashimoto Summit**

Mochizuki argues that the turmoil caused by Ota's refusal to sign the *hansenjinushi* leases and the cancellation of the Clinton-Murayama summit in November was a "blessing in disguise" for those who hoped to strengthen the United States-Japan security alliance (p. 15). For one thing, it led to a new leadership dynamic.

The selection of Ryutaro Hashimoto as prime minister after Murayama's resignation in January 1996 brought forth a better counterpart to Clinton for reaffirming the security relationship. Believing resolution of the Okinawa issue was critical to the longevity of his government, Hashimoto quickly began searching for a way to get the Futenma Marine Air Base returned to Okinawa, a top priority for Okinawans. Known for his hawkish view on defense, Hashimoto was also more enthusiastic than Murayama about strengthening the alliance. Finally, China's attempt to intimidate Taiwan during the island's first democratic presidential election in March provided a good context for convincing Americans and Japanese alike about the strategic importance of the bilateral security partnership (Mochizuki, p. 15).

Hashimoto and Clinton agreed to meet in Japan in April 1996.

Rescheduling the summit allowed SACO the needed time to formulate a set of proposals to which the two leaders could affix their approval. These included returning Futenma Marine base and the Sobe Communication Station to Okinawa on the condition that a less-intrusive location for the facilities could be found elsewhere in Okinawa prefecture. The leaders also approved the SACO plan to move the live fire exercises from the Prefectural Road 104 area to a new location on the mainland and to consolidate the remaining bases in order to

achieve a 20-percent reduction in land occupied by the American Military in the prefecture.

However, these concessions to the anti-base Occupation Model view of the Okinawa base situation deflect attention away from the way in which the summit actually worked to shore up the Security and Cooperation Models. The declaration included a reaffirmation of the United States-Japan security relationship, including a recognition of the need for maintaining at least 100,000 American troops in Asia. What is more, in the days leading up to the summit, the two countries signed the Acquisition and Cross-Servicing Agreement designed to allow Japan a more active role in supporting American peacetime and peacekeeping operations. The expanded role includes the ability to provide American troops with food, supplies, and spare parts. The Joint Declaration also included an agreement to review the 1978 Guidelines for Japan-U.S. Defense Cooperation to allow more interaction between American forces and the JSDF in times of conflict.

Four years after the summit, the United States Japan Security alliance, with its expanded rules for American-Japanese peace and wartime cooperation, is stronger than ever. However, a plan that is acceptable to all parties for the main concession to the Okinawans—moving Futenma Marine Air Base to a less obtrusive area of the prefecture—remains a problematic and contentious part of the lingering problem of American military bases on Okinawa.

## Japanese Newspaper Coverage of Ota's Refusal

### **Okinawa Newspapers**

On September 29, 1995, Ota's refusal to sign the *hansenjinushi* leases was the top news story in both the *Okinawa Times* and the *Ryukyu Shimpo*. Both newspapers also dedicated much of the national and community news pages to reaction to and commentary on the governor's actions. The *Okinawa Times* ran 11 separate stories, and the *Ryukyu Shimpo* nine stories, on the proxy signature problem alone. (Both newspapers ran additional stories on the rape and the SOFA controversy).

Clearly viewing events from within the Occupation Mode, the Okinawa newspapers framed the news as a righteous crusade by the governor—Ota as the prefecture's David against the central government Goliath. "Governor Refuses to be Proxy," read the banner headline across the top to the *Okinawa Times*. "Responds that 'Base Strengthening a Fear,'" "Positioned to Confront the Country," said the subheads ("*Chiji Daikō Kyohi*"). The *Ryukyu Shimpo* carried a similar banner headline and subheads, "Governor Ota Refuses Proxy Signature," "The Fact of the Bases Seen as the Problem," "Defense Facilities Administration Agency Gets Strong Shock." ("*Ota Chiji Dairishomei o Kyohi*").

In both stories Ota's discourse on the base problem serves as the news discourse. The first three paragraphs of the *Shimpo* story begin:

Regarding the problem of obtaining a proxy signature on leases for land and property that will expire by May 5, 1997, and which are subject to the procedures for the forced use of land for American military bases, on September 28, Governor Ota made clear at the Prefectural Assembly his intention to reject the request of the Naha Office of the Defense Facilities Agency that he sign or affix his seal [to the leases]. Governor Ota made his decision by taking into consideration the unceasing damage caused by the bases including the recent young girl assault by three American soldiers, the realities of postwar Okinawa and the way in which the base land was forcefully confiscated, saying, "This time it is extremely difficult to sign as proxy these property documents." The Defense Agency and the Defense Facilities Agency, which had expected the governor to sign, received a strong shock and were instantly thrown into confusion. Within the prefecture the five political parties, the *Shakai*, *Shadai*, *Kyōsan*, *Kōmei* and the *Sakigake Okinawa*, welcomed the governor's decision while the *Jimin* [LDP] and *Shinshin* gave it a negative evaluation. The *hansenjinushi* gave their unanimous support.

[This is followed by a brief paragraph listing the names of politicians from the five parties who support Ota's decision]

Governor Ota indicated the problem is the base situation itself, which is mired in a the historic matter of forceful land confiscation for American military bases in Okinawa, the congested situation in which 75 percent of all military facilities in Japan are concentrated in Okinawa, the noise pollution caused by the air fields, the environmental damage caused by live fire exercises and the recent young girl assault incident. Furthermore, in February the United States Department of Defense announced its Far East Strategy, and in November the heads of Japan and the United States plan to meet and reaffirm the Security Treaty. As a result, "Wouldn't the function of the bases on Okinawa could be strengthened and more permanent?" warned the governor with regard to his rejection decision ("*Ota Chiji Dairishomei o Kyohi*").

These first three paragraphs set the tone for the entire article, which clearly demonstrates an Occupation Model mentality. The subhead sets the stage by stating that "The Problem is the Base Situation." Although this concept is attributed to Ota in the text, in the headline it is stated without the quotation

marks that would indicate opinion. The reporter accepts that it is the base situation, not the actions of the governor, that need to be addressed. This is elaborated upon in the text, where the lead paragraph notes that the governor's action was the result of the "unceasing damage caused by the bases" (*kichi higai ga taenai*). Again, this is presented as a statement of fact, not a quoted opinion.

These damages are elaborated upon in paragraph three—75 percent of the bases are on Okinawa, they cause noise pollution, environmental damage and crime. These ideas are well known to the readers of the *Okinawa Times*. They are presented here not for information, but instead as a means of situating this particular strip of information—Ota's refusal—into the hierarchy of propositions that constitute the Occupation Model.

The *Okinawa Times's* main story on the governor's actions similarly portrays Ota's refusal as the natural response to the base situation. However, this newspaper goes further in emphasizing the dangers inherent in the process under way by both governments to reaffirm the Security Treaty. The fear that Ota presents here is not that the treaty itself is dangerous—an Imperialism Model proposition—but that reaffirming the treaty will lead to continued discrimination against Okinawa—an Occupation Model theme. This fear is presented without rebuttal in the headline, the lead, and the third paragraph:

The governor said, "Both the United States and Japan have decided to maintain the strength of American military power in the Far East. The



danger is that, with both governments working to reaffirm the Security Treaty, the function of the Okinawan bases will be strengthened, they will become more firmly established." He went on to make clear that because of the passive response of both governments toward solving the base problem he cannot carry out the proxy signature duty ("*Chiji Daikō Kyohi*").

The *Okinawa Times* also presents the governor's actions as a crusade against the state. This is clear in the next paragraph:

When asked by a member of the press corps whether he expected a response from the central government, the governor made clear that he expects a confrontation with the nation, saying, "I understand the procedures that will follow; this is a reasoned decision." Furthermore, he said, "The [base] situation is unfair. The day when the country and its local autonomous bodies (*jichitai*) will support each other is something to look forward to in the future, but so far the voice of the prefecture has not reached the central government" ("*Chiji Daikō Kyohi*").

In the *Shimpo* story, the reader is told that the prefecture's ruling parties favor the governor's actions while the opposition LDP and the Shinshin parties "gave the governor's decision a negative evaluation." However, it never returns to explain what the opposition party complaints are. The opposition's concerns are likewise absent from any of the other nine stories on the issue that ran in the *Shimpo* that day.

The principal *Okinawa Times* story is slightly more balanced. A representative of the LDP responds that "this [lease extension by proxy] is an administrative process; it should not be made political." As quoted, the Shinshin party representative's full statement is, "Shouldn't more caution be

taken?" These weak statements are contrasted against the strong attitudes of the five ruling parties as represented by a quote from the head of the Okinawa Clean Government Party [*Okinawa Kōmeitō* ], who links the governor's actions to the will of the people: "This decision responds to the expectations of the prefectural people whose anger was strengthened by the young girl assault incident."

Related stories inside both the *Okinawa Times* and *Ryukyu Shimpo* also frame Ota's rejection as an action taken on behalf of the entire prefecture.

"Decision has Okinawa's Pride: Prefectural People's Voice of Approval: A Strong Stance Toward the Nation Appreciated," read the headline and subheadlines across the local community page of the *Shimpo* ("*Okinawa no Hokori aru Ketsudan*"). This news story begins:

"The Refusal announcement is meaningful." "We can appreciate the strong stance taken against the nation." In response to Governor Ota's answers to an inquiry posed to him during the Prefectural Assembly question-and-answer period on the 28th, in which he made clear his intention to refuse the proxy signatory process for the forced use of American base land, one after another voices of approval are coming from the prefectural people. Supporters said, "Because of these bases we have this pain and these incidents." "I want them to stop this coercion of Okinawa only." The indignation of the Okinawan people that was unleashed [*wakiagatta*] by the young girl assault has taken the form of backing for the governor's refusal ("*Okinawa no Hokori aru Ketsudan*").

The *Okinawa Times* ran a similar story. Across the border of pages 22 and 23 ran the headline: "Well Done Mr. Ota, 'You Have the Backing of all the People of the Prefecture.'" Two separate stories sharing this banner headline

carry their own headlines and subheads. "A Large Wave Against the Bases: An Aggressive Refusal Statement: An Historic Event: Push Until the Bases are Withdrawn [*Tekkyo Made Susumeyo*]" says one. "Anti-war Landlords Highly Appreciative: 'We're Impressed,' Say Voices," reads the other.

Commentary and news analysis that presented the Okinawan newspapers' interpretation of the governor's actions reinforced this frame of Ota as Okinawa's hero in a fight against the central government. On the day it reported Ota's decision, the *Ryukyu Shimpo* analyzed the meaning of the event in a *kaisetsu* or commentary piece on page three. The headline read, "Governor, Public Opinion Supports Decision." Subheads said, "Governor Makes Clear His Refusal to Sign: Takes Into Consideration Public Sentiment: Distrust of the Government's Base Policy" ("*Chiji, Seron Uke Ketsudan*").

This story is actually about reaffirming the propositions of the Occupation Model by recontextualizing those of the Cooperation Model. The story begins by paraphrasing the governor, who said he made his decision based on the "fact of the congested base situation, the noise pollution caused by the air fields and the facts of the other damage caused by bases during last 50 years." However, it goes on to say that despite these facts, the prevalent idea among government insiders was that "The complete withdrawal (*tekkyo*) of the bases was [just] the dream to aim for." ("*Chiji Seron Uke Ketsudan*"). Few believed that the governor could take on the central government, especially when the prefecture economy is dependent upon national subsidies and base-related

revenue. The writer lists a number of projects that depend upon government subsidy and notes that the governor himself has acknowledged that his actions could have an influence on the millions of yen the prefecture received from base-related revenue.

However, despite these Cooperation Model concerns, "The prefecture has taken an adversarial stance against the national government because of the anger and other complicated emotions that are wrapped up in the position the nation takes" (*"Chiji, Seron Uke Ketsudan"*). For example:

The exasperating base policy of the Japanese government [*nihonseifu*] does nothing but create distrust. [The government] turned the political problem of revising the SOFA, which was caused by the young girl assault, into "improving the function of the bases;" it has assumed a passive position with regard to noise pollution, the problem of low-flying military planes, live fire exercises, and has allowed military training exercises in residential areas by calling them "material transfers" (*"Chiji, Seron Uke Ketsudan"*).

Add to this the efforts to reaffirm the Security Treaty, the writer says, and it is clear that "from now on, friction can no longer be avoided "

Within two days, the *Shimpo* began a new series of special reports which would run through October and November and carried the title "From Okinawa: The Japan-United States Security Treaty Questioned" (*"Okinawa kara: Nichi-Bei Ampo Tou"*). The first three installments in this 31-part series dealt specifically with the Governor's refusal announcement. The headline on part one reads, "Okinawa's Anger expressed in the Decision." The lead paragraph

begins, "A *habu* has bitten a tank" ("*Okinawa no funman' ga Ketsudan ni*"). A *habu* is a variety of poisonous snake indigenous to Okinawa. The commentary views Ota's decision as a painful one that he was forced to take because the central government has made it impossible to have the kind of "close" (*kinmitsu*) relationship that should exist between national government and prefecture ("*Okinawa no funman' ga Ketsudan ni*"). It again reiterates the mantra of propositions regarding the unfairness of the bases—noise, crime, pollution.

The second article in the "Security Treaty Questioned" series follows this same Occupation Model theme, focusing on the proposition that a reaffirmed Security Treaty will mean the bases will become more firmly rooted in the island. Describing the movement toward a strengthening of the military alliance, the headline says, "A Sense of Crisis Over Movement Toward the Bases Becoming Permanent" ("*Kichi Koteika no Ugoki ni Kikikan*"). The third article in the series ventures into the Imperialism Model, "Trampling on Sovereign Pride" argues that the Security Treaty has become more important than the constitution and impedes upon Japanese self rule.

### **Mainland Japanese Coverage of the Governor's Refusal**

In their coverage of Ota's refusal, the *Asahi Shimbun* and the *Yomiuri Shimbun* demonstrated a gap in the degree of their acceptance of the

Okinawan perspective—the generally more conservative *Yomiuri Shimbun* being more dismissive and critical of the governor.

Both newspapers ran the news of Ota's refusal on their front pages. However, the *Yomiuri Shimbun* placed the news on the far-left-hand side of the page, making it less important than a story about a possible settlement in the long-running Minamata mercury poisoning case, and a report on the possibility that private telephone companies may be allowed to use some of the lines of the national phone company NTT. The entire *Yomiuri* story about Ota's decision was just three paragraphs long:

**Okinawa Governor Refuses to Sign:  
The Forced Renewal of American Military Land Use**

Regarding the Okinawa base problem in which landlords within the prefecture are refusing to renew their leases with the American military, Governor Masahide Ota, whom the national government has asked to sign the leases as a proxy, made clear to the Prefectural Assembly on the 28th that he will refuse to cooperate with the procedure for the renewal of land use by the American military, saying, "I will notify the nation that I cannot provide a proxy signature for the purpose of forcing the use of land for the American military." It appears to be a decision that reflects the increased anti-American sentiment among the prefecture's people, caused by the young girl assault incident and the negative position of both the Japanese and American governments with regard to revising the Status of Forces Agreement.

In November the leaders of Japan and the United States plan to meet to redefine the Security Treaty for the post-Cold War era. However, the governor's position could have a ripple effect on the stable use of the bases, which are the foundation of the treaty.

In May 1997 and March 1996 the leases for property used by such bases as Kadena and Futenma airfields will expire. Thirty-three landlords out of approximately 30,000 are refusing to renew their leases on about 35,200 square meters of land. When the mayors of Naha, Okinawa City and

Yomitan refused to sign, the Naha Office of the Defense Facilities Agency asked the governor to sign [the leases] ("*Okinawa Chiji Dairishomei Kyohi*")

This story locates Ota's decision within the Cooperation Model rather than Occupation Model. In it Ota is not the hero fighting for fairness on behalf of the Okinawan people, but instead a troublemaker who will "refuse to cooperate" with a request from the nation, and whose actions stand to cause problems for the coming head-of-state summit. Missing from this story are any of Ota's opinions on the dangers that the summit posed to Okinawa or any of his comments to the Prefectural Assembly and the press in which he linked his action to a history of mainland discrimination against Okinawa and base-caused damage.

Instead, the *Yomiuri* reporter attributes Ota's actions entirely to "Anti-American" sentiment caused by the schoolgirl rape and both countries' negative position toward amending the SOFA. What is more, the story contains no indication of citizen support for the action. Instead, it emphasizes the small number of *hansenjinushi* with expiring leases, just 33 of 30,000 total land owners. (This information is also included in the *Okinawa Times* and *Ryukyu Shimpo* stories, but comes at the end of longer stories in which the negative aspects of the bases are featured prominently).

On page three of the same edition, the *Yomiuri Shimbun* ran an editorial in which the newspaper made clear its editorial policy is firmly grounded in the

Cooperation and Security Models. The editorial, "Cooperation Sought on the Reaffirmation of the Security Treaty," begins by praising the work of the Two-Plus-Two Committee in reaching an agreement to "maintain and strengthen the Security Treaty" despite the fact that "one remaining part of the schoolgirl assault, and the SOFA review problem that it was wrapped up in, is the concern that a theory which says Japan should unilaterally end the Security Treaty has raised its head" (*"Ampo Saikakunin ni Rikai Eru Kyōryoku o"*).

At such a time it is of no small significance that the four leaders in charge [the Two-Plus-Two representatives] have reaffirmed that "even after the Cold War, the security treaty is indispensable for the peace and stability of the Pacific-Asia region." We appreciate this from the standpoint that hereafter we should maintain the Security Treaty System (*"Ampo Saikakunin ni Rikai Eru Kyōryoku o"*).

The *Asahi Shimbun* made Ota's refusal its principal page one story with a small picture of Ota and a large photograph of the Sobe Communication Facility's "elephant cage" radar array. The Minamata and NTT stories are given secondary placement. The Ota story headline emphasizes that the governor has broken with the established process, "Okinawa Governor: American Base Use Land *Renewal Procedure* Refused" (my emphasis). Subheads link the refusal to the schoolgirl rape: "Won't Sign" Forced Land Use: Takes Opportunity of American Soldiers Incident." One subhead suggests a danger that the operation of the bases could be disrupted. In a reference to the



"elephant cage," the lease for which was to expire in March, a subheadline reads: "Temporarily Unusable Possibility."

The text of the story takes an attitude somewhere between the laudatory tone of the Okinawa newspapers and the dismissive tone of the *Yomiuri*. It begins by quoting Ota that "with the collapse of the Cold War we expected the reduction and consolidation of the bases to continue; however, the American Department of Defense has announced its "Far East Asian Strategy" which seeks to maintain 100,000 troops in the region." The *Asahi* story also provides space for Ota's fear that the November summit could lead to the bases becoming fixed (or permanent, *koteika*) in Okinawa. However, the story also points out that Ota's actions represent the desires of a small number of property owners and that more than 2,000 base landlords with leases expiring at the same time have already signed renewals. What is more, of the 9 mayors with the authority to sign leases for landowners in their cities, only three chose to refuse, the *Asahi Shimbun* notes.

Subtle language and syntax differences between the Okinawa papers and both the mainland newspapers are indicative of particular ideological positions. Throughout the conflict between prefecture and national government, the Okinawa newspapers referred to the landlords as "refusing the forced use of their land." The mainland newspapers most often presented the problems as the landlords "refusing to renew their leases." While both statements are correct, the first presents the landlords as engaged in a righteous cause, while

the latter give the feeling that the landlords are breaking from an accepted or established order. In the stories to follow, the Okinawa newspapers would regularly refer to all American base property as "American military forced-use land" (*beigun kyōseishiyōchi*), while the mainland newspapers would refer to "American military-use land" (*beigun shiyōchi*) mentioning where necessary that, in some instances, the land was being forcefully used.

As with the *Ryūkyū Shimpo* and the *Okinawa Times*, the *Asahi Shimbun* carried a news commentary piece that dealt with the support for the governor's action. However, rather than listing support for the governor, the *Asahi* story, "The Governor Shows the Country his 'Trump Card'" (*"Okinawa Chiji Kuni ni 'Kirifuda'"*), discusses how the governor was able to make his decision despite what had been declining support for such a move within the prefecture. The newspaper comments that the governor actually had stronger support from local authorities in 1990, the year he decided to sign the leases. At that time, five of the nine mayors with bases in their municipal areas refused to sign the contested leases, leaving the decision to Ota. Having just been elected, the governor did not think he was in a position to refuse, the newspaper says (*"Okinawa Chiji Kuni ni 'Kirifuda'"*).

At the time of his refusal, Ota was acting upon the rejections of only three mayors. The others, says the *Asahi Shimbun*, had decided not to risk the financial incentives their areas receive as compensation for the bases by refusing to sign. Given Ota's previous compliance with the signature request

and the decreasing support for a refusal within the prefecture, the central government became overconfident that this time the leases would again be smoothly renewed, the story says. What the country had not counted on was the schoolgirl assault, which allowed the governor to take advantage of public outrage, the article claims ("*Okinawa Chiji Kuni ni 'Kirifuda'*").

Like the *Ryukyu Shimpo*, the *Asahi Shimbun* also ran a news analysis story about a growing "sense of crisis." Here again, while the *Shimpo* was grounded in the Occupation Model, the *Asahi* commentary is a product of the Cooperation Model. The crisis the *Shimpo* worried about was that the Security Treaty would be reaffirmed, thus making the bases in Okinawa permanent. The *Asahi* frets about the exact opposite, that the governor's actions could undermine the Security Treaty reaffirmation. The story, "Sense of Crisis Over Shaky Security Treaty" ("*Yuragu Ampo ni Kikikan*") focuses on what actions the central government may take to attempt to change the governor's mind.

### **Japanese Coverage of the Political Fallout**

Following the initial coverage of the governor's refusal, the Okinawan and mainland newspapers fell into a pattern of reporting similar to their handling of the schoolgirl rape story. The Okinawa newspapers provided much greater coverage of events than the national newspapers. For example, the *Asahi Shimbun* ran 93 stories, covering about 7,744 square centimeters of

newspaper space, during October. However, this pales when compared to the *Okinawa Times*, which ran nearly twice as many stories on the subject—178 articles covering six times the area, 44,468 square centimeters of newspaper space.

The focus of these stories also followed patterns similar to those the mainland and Okinawan newspapers followed in covering the rape story. As can be seen from Figure 6, the *Okinawa Times* devoted the largest portion of its reporting on the lease issue, 35 percent, to stories of citizen support for Ota's positions. This category includes stories about demonstrations in which demands for the "reduction and consolidation" or total withdrawal of the bases—and not the rape or SOFA—was the focus.

Negotiations between the central government and the prefecture (including reports on Ota's snub of Hoshuyama and the agency director's controversial remark about the prime minister) received the second largest amount of coverage, 21 percent. Actions taken by the governments of the United States and Japan—either critical of the governor or showing a willingness to meet some of the prefecture's demands—account for just 12 percent of total area.

**Figure 6. *Okinawa Times*: Percentage of Area Devoted to Lease-Issue Themes in October 1995**





Figure 7 shows that the category receiving the largest amount of coverage by the *Asahi Shimbun* was "U.S.-Japan Response" to the situation, 37 percent. "Japan-Okinawa Negotiations" receive the second highest amount of space, 27 percent. Stories in the category "Ota/Prefecture Actions" received no space. This shows that while the *Asahi Shimbun* continued to cover some citizen demonstrations, after Ota's initial refusal announcement, the newspaper began reporting the governor's actions only as they were interpreted and responded to by the central government or American officials.

**Figure 7. *Asahi Shimbun*: Percentage of Area Devoted to Lease-Issue Themes in October 1995**



### **American Newspaper Coverage of Ota's Refusal and Fallout**

For the *New York Times* and the *Washington Post* the governor's refusal was part of the larger base-issue problem related to the rape, but not a crisis in and of itself. Neither newspaper covered the event the day it happened. Instead, both papers chose to weave the news into stories of turmoil within the Japanese central government or between Japan and the United States.

The *New York Times* made no mention of the governor's actions for almost a week after the refusal announcement. It finally responded on October 5 with a profile of Ota, "Okinawa Governor Takes On Both Japan and U.S.:

Leads Effort to Cut American forces," which still did not deal with the lease issue until halfway through the piece. Despite the adversarial tone of the headline, the story presents a reassuring view of Ota and the base problem to Americans.

Most of Ota's anger is portrayed as aimed at the Japanese central government. The story begins with a story of how Ota's faith in Japan was shattered when he witnessed Japanese soldiers killing civilian Okinawans in order to steal their food and water. This experience, according to reporter Andrew Pollack, led Ota to become "a professor and prominent historian of Okinawa and a leading pacifist" (Pollack, October 5, 1995). Pollack emphasizes throughout the story that Ota's character was shaped positively by his experiences with Americans and negatively by Japan. It is the unfair treatment by the Japanese central government that is the real problem in Okinawa:

**The Governor said he is not against the security treaty that commits the United States to protect Japan. What he opposes, he says is the idea that Okinawa, with 1.3 million people and less than 1 percent of the land area of Japan, is home to 75 percent of the United States military bases.**

**If the security treaty is so important, Mr. Ota said, "the rest of Japan should bear the burden equally. But they wouldn't allow the bases in their neighborhoods."**

**Nor is he anti-American. Mr. Ota earned a master's degree in journalism from Syracuse University and speaks English fluently. Since becoming Governor in 1990, he has made four trips to the United States to argue his view and counts American officials among his friends.**

**Walter F. Mondale, the ambassador to Japan, said of the Governor, "I think we're friends and respect each other" (Pollack, October 5, 1995).**

Pollack points out that Ota has written more than 30 books on Okinawa, including one called "The Ugly Japanese" (Pollack, October 5, 1995).

In addition to softening Ota's image with regard to his anti-American positions, the profile also works to marginalize the importance of his actions. The governor's refusal to sign the contested leases is not presented until paragraph 14 of the 25-paragraph article, where it is presented more as a nuisance than a real threat to the United States-Japan alliance.

For example, Pollack writes that despite favorable attitudes toward the governor, "Some American officials would prefer that Ota just get out of the way" (Pollack, October 5, 1995). Although some of the leases are for land in sensitive areas, they "account for only a minuscule fraction of the land used by the United States Military" (Pollack, October 5, 1995). Perhaps unaware of the legal procedures necessary for Murayama to take over the job of signing the leases, Pollack dismisses the affair, saying, "if Mr. Ota doesn't sign the leases, the prime minister can, so a disruption is likely to be averted."

Pollack mentions that Ota's position is so popular within Okinawa that even Okinawan LDP officials are reluctant to criticize him. However, he marginalizes the governor's overall authority by noting that Ota, "while politically independent, is supported by the Socialist Party and Communist Party" (Pollack, October 5, 1995). Pollack fails to mention that the Communist and Socialist parties were just two of five parties that supported the governor.



The *Washington Post* said nothing about the governor's refusal to sign the leases for nearly three weeks. When it did report the news, it buried it in a story on the turmoil within the Japanese central government over Okinawa. This story, by Mary Jordan, "Japan Seeks Cutbacks In U.S. Military Bases" (Jordan, October 20, 1995), is ostensibly about indications that Murayama may ask the United States for base reductions in Okinawa. However, its main function is to describe the turmoil within the Japanese central government over the base issue. The opinions and actions of the Okinawans are presented as faceless background forces that move the central government officials. In fact, Jordan manages to discuss Hoshuyama's conflict with the Murayama administration, his labeling of the prime minister as "stupid" and his resignation without once commenting on Ota's role in the affair.

Jordan does not even comment on the lease issue until nearly the end of the article, paragraph 10 of 16, and then the governor's name is not mentioned. She mentions that compounding the prime minister's internal problems is the anger of the Okinawans:

The U.S. military occupies 20 percent of the main island of Okinawa, and the outspoken governor there, along with local landlords, has threatened to refuse to renew real estate leases on some of the U.S.-occupied land. The first batch of leases expires in March (Jordan, October 20, 1995).

Jordan concludes the article with the comments of Yukio Okamoto, "a former Foreign Ministry Official and expert on Japanese-American security

issues," who blames polls showing high levels of anti-base sentiment on the weak Socialist-LDP coalition government. Jordan quotes Okamoto as saying, "Unfortunately, the Japanese government has not shown a clear direction to the Japanese people about what is important and what is not important." (Jordan, October 20, 1995). Jordan continues:

Okamoto said a strong government would be able to articulate to the public the overarching importance of U.S. troops to the country's national security, even in the face of an inflammatory incident like the Okinawa rape. But leaders of the precarious government believe, he said, "They cannot (afford to) alienate even one voter (Jordan, October 20, 1995).

On first glance this *Washington Post* story and the *New York Times* story above would seem to be quite different. The *Times's* Pollack make Ota the centerpiece of his story, while Jordan does not even mention the name of the "outspoken governor." However, the two stories are similar in their adherence to the pro-base Security and Occupation model propositions. In both stories the United States-Japan security alliance is accepted as a necessary and important relationship that will weather the current challenges. The real problem, as Pollack identifies it, is between the central government and Okinawa, which could, but probably won't, cause some "disruptions" in the smooth implementation of the treaty. For Jordan it is the conflict within the central government that makes dealing with the Okinawa challenge more difficult. By failing to offer any counter-arguments, she appears to endorse Okamoto's assessment that the "overarching importance" of the alliance is being

challenged because of poor communication from the government to the people rather than because of any internal problem with the relationship.

### **Security Model Dominates the *Washington Post* Coverage**

From September 1995 through March 1996, the *Washington Post* ran 12 stories and one opinion piece on the schoolgirl rape case and nine more stories and three editorials that were mostly about other base-related issues. The newspaper's 12 articles on base issues other than the rape largely followed a pattern of favoring the pro-alliance perspective, drawing the most themes from the Security Model. Most of these stories involve the actions of American pro-base actors. When reported, Occupation Model themes were most often recontextualized to fit into a Security Model world view. For example, "U.S. May Move Some Troops From Okinawa," which ran in the Post on October 28, 1995, actually focuses on Assistant Secretary of Defense Nye's explanations for why the United States should not reduce its forces on the island. Although Nye does say America is "open to discussion" of troop cuts should Japan want it—a comment that is said to be in response to inflamed passions in Okinawa because of the schoolgirl rape—the story goes on to report:

Nye stresses that reducing troop levels on Okinawa was not under active discussion, would not happen anytime soon, and might not be necessary if ways can be found to adjust military activities on Okinawa to satisfy the Okinawans.

**"In the short run it's very difficult to make reductions in the number of troops on Okinawa because of the way the bases are structured," Nye said ("U.S. May Move").**

**Nye would express his views in even greater detail two months later when a story he authored about the Okinawa problem, "U.S. Presence Like Oxygen for Asia," would run on the *Washington Post's* international news page. Although Nye was identified as the assistant secretary of defense for international security affairs, his story was not presented as an opinion piece. In it, Nye dismisses concerns about growing public anti-base sentiment in Japan by noting that the Japanese government remains strongly committed to the security alliance:**

**At their recent meeting in Osaka, Japanese Prime Minister Murayama told Vice President Al Gore that the U.S.-Japan security treaty would be the basis on which Japan would plan for stability in East Asia in the post-Cold War period. This was a remarkable statement coming from a prime minister whose Socialist Party had until last summer firmly opposed the U.S.-Japan alliance. Equally remarkable, the Japanese Diet just passed legislation that increases support for U.S. troops. Total host nation support from Japan is about \$25 billion over the next five years—which makes it cheaper to keep those troops in Japan than in the United States. Finally, Japan has just issued a new strategy report—the first in 20 years—that complements the Pentagon's recent East Asia strategy report (Nye, December 8, 1995).**

**Nye says the Okinawans have legitimate concerns about the concentration of the bases on their island. However, the United States and Japan have been sympathetic, setting up the Special Action Committee on Okinawa to address the question of reducing the intrusiveness of the bases, but**

he rules out any major change in troop strength for two reasons. The first is that America and its Asian allies see a threat from North Korea. What is more:

Uncertainty is the second reason they give for wanting our forward presence. The rapid rise of China and the fall of Russia, lingering territorial disputes and proliferation of weapons of mass destruction make East Asia far from trouble-free. Our forward presence provides for the stability—the oxygen—that has helped provide for East Asia's economic growth. And that growth benefits the United States: Trade with Asia accounts for almost 3 million American jobs. How many U.S. troops will it take to keep that oxygen flowing in the future? No one can tell at this point. It will depend on security conditions in the region, and the views of our allies.

The key point is what Murayama and other Asians say: "in reality, nothing can take the place of the Japan-U.S. security arrangement when we think of peace and stability in the Asia-Pacific region" (Nye, December 8, 1995).

In the *Post's* "Perry Rules Out Reducing Troops in Okinawa Despite Groundswell of Opposition," November 2, 1995, reporter Jordan all but ignores the "groundswell of opposition" part of the story, and instead focuses nearly entirely on Defense Secretary William Perry's recitation of Security Model propositions.

Perry repeatedly said that the Japanese must understand that some inconvenience to them may be unavoidable because the U.S.-Japan security alliance "does not come without cost; freedom isn't free." During the Clinton visit, U.S. officials hope Japan will "renew its commitment to the U.S. troops," Perry said (Jordan, November 2, 1995).

Later in the story, Perry would argue:

**"Our alliance is critical in facing one of the post Cold War (era's) most dangerous threats: a rogue nation with nuclear weapons," Perry said, singling out unpredictable North Korea, which maintains a million-man army. If Japan scrapped the U.S.-Japan security pact and turned to a multinational or regional security force, it would not have the "credible security guarantee" it now enjoys, Perry said (Jordan, November 2, 1995).**

These sentiments were echoed the next day, November 3, in a *Washington Post* house editorial. In "Okinawa Incident" the newspaper expresses its editorial opinion that:

**U.S.-Japan relations require constant work. In Tokyo the other day, American defense secretary William Perry called on Japanese authorities to keep reminding citizens that the neighborhood remains dangerous and that the interests served by the security link are not just America's but Japan's. Only on a basis of openness and mutual confidence can this link be kept as strong as it must be ("Okinawa Incident").**

The following week on the *Washington Post*'s November 12 editorial page, columnist Jim Hoagland's "A Brush Fire and a Squall" compares the United States problems in Okinawa—the brush fire—with the Clinton Administration's differences with Europe over the selection of a new NATO secretary general—the squall. The writer argues that both incidents show that in the post Cold War era, the United States cannot rely on ideology to hold

pacts together and instead must engage in active "alliance management" (Hoagland).

Hoagland notes that the facts of the rape case are "appalling" and that the concentration of bases in Okinawa is perceived by Okinawans as a "double occupation" by Japan and the United States. However, this article, like the *Washington Post* stories above, takes for granted the desirability of the Security Treaty and assumes that challenges to it can be quickly solved by diplomatic action. Hoagland notes that "Perry flew to Tokyo to defuse the problem before President Clinton arrives in Japan," and that he seems to have "banked the fires of protest by formally promising 'adjustments' in the U.S. deployment in Okinawa."

### ***New York Times* Provides a Wider Range of Voices**

During the same seven-month period between September 1995 and March 1996, The *New York Times* gave somewhat greater attention to Okinawa than did the *Washington Post*. The *Times* ran 21 stories on the rape and 14 stories and an editorial on other base issues. These stories also focused more on the situation within Okinawa and the tense relationship between the central government and prefecture. As a result, a wider range of perspectives on the base problem, including much more Occupation Model and even Imperialism Model perspectives would be included.

For example, in her overview of the entire Okinawa base issue, "Rage Grows in Okinawa Over U.S. Military Bases," the *Times's* Sheryl WuDunn introduces American readers to one of the Anti-war Landlords, Shuden Teruya. We are told that this retired government worker from Naha leases two acres to Kadena Air Force Base but "feels so strongly about ousting the bases that he is willing to forgo the majority of his income to see it happen." WuDunn also notes that most landlords do not feel as strongly as Teruya, whose own brother continues to renew his own lease with the military (WuDunn, November 4, 1995). The *Times* gives the lease issue a fuller treatment the next day, November 5, in Nicholas Kristof's "Tokyo Fails to Resolve Base Impasse," which tells of the prime minister's unsuccessful attempt to convince Ota to sign the leases.

The following week, WuDunn once again gives a face to Okinawan opposition with a profile of Anti-War Landlord Chibana. In this story, readers learn that Chibana's adamant anti-base stance stems in part from the fact that his grandfather was shot by American forces for physically trying to prevent the forced confiscation of his property. The reader also learns that Chibana regularly leads tours of the caves in which Okinawans "committed suicide or killed their own children" as the Americans advanced during the Battle of Okinawa (WuDunn, November 4, 1995).

(The following January, Kristof would tour a cave similar to those regularly explored by groups led by Chibana. He would write about the



experience and the horrors of the Battle of Okinawa in "Exploring the Darker Side of Okinawa" (Kristof, January 21, 1996). However, he pens this story in travelogue style with no mention of how events 50 years earlier relate to the current problem of American bases on the island. )

### **Coverage of the Central Government's Suit Against Ota**

#### **American Coverage of the Government's Actions**

Although the *New York Times* provided more information about the primary figures and propositions from the Occupation Model, proponents of the Security Model remain the sources most often quoted. An underlying common-sense acceptance of the United States-Japan Security Treaty underlies most of the American reporting on the subject, including that of the *Times*.

This is clear in the way in which the *Times*, like the *Washington Post*, tended to treat the lease issue as an inconvenience to the process of American military operation in Okinawa rather than a serious challenge to its legitimacy. For example, Kristof begins his brief story on Murayama's decision to take Ota to court as simply "Easing a sore point with the United States." The central government's victory in the legal action is a foregone conclusion for Kristof, who—writing before the court has made its ruling—says the prime minister's

decision to take legal action will "clear the way for continued operation of American bases" (Kristof, November 22, 1995).

When the Japanese court did find in favor of the central government on March 25, 1996, the *New York Times's* Pollack gave the ruling just seven paragraphs. Pollack reports that the process by which the prime minister can sign the leases instead of Ota might take some time. This means that despite the ruling, the United States may find itself "illegally occupying" a parcel of land inside the Sobe Communications facility. What is more, the property's owner, Chibana, has vowed to attempt to enter his property. Yet, despite the potential implications of this news for Japanese and international rule of law and democratic processes in Japan, Pollack introduces it near the end of the article and dismisses it as unimportant. He concludes reassuringly:

The United States Government has generally declined to comment on the matter, saying it is confident that Japan will find a way to allow the continued use of the land (Pollack, March 25, 1996).

After nearly ignoring the lease problem for five months, in favor of Security-Model theme stories, the *Washington Post* gave its first full story on the subject to the court's ruling against Ota. The story opened with the tale of Chibana's grandfather being shot dead while trying to stop Americans from taking the small plot of land that the grandson now fought to reclaim. It closed by explaining Chibana's flag-burning incident, and how his anti-base activities

are premised on the horrors visited upon Okinawa by the Americans and Japanese during World War II.

However, the story's purpose was to explain how the lease problem would affect the Clinton-Hashimoto summit in April, not its significance either as a symbol of oppression or a point of law. The problem is not portrayed as particularly serious. Reporter Sullivan writes that despite the court's decision, delays in implementing the ruling may mean that the United States could be in the "awkward position" of occupying Chibana's property without valid permission (Sullivan, March 26, 1996). This situation could "cause some discomfort" when President Clinton visits Japan in three weeks (Sullivan, March 26, 1996).

### **Okinawan Coverage of the Legal Action Against Ota**

The central government's suit against Ota was a serious matter for the Okinawan newspapers, which depicted the coming trial as a chance for the prefecture to fight for its future. A banner headline across the front page of the December 7 *Ryukyu Shimpo* states the basic facts, "Prime Minister Murayama Sues Governor Ota: Demands Proxy Signature for American Military Forced Land Use. (*"Murayama Shushō, Ota Chiji o Teiso"*). The vertical subhead read, "Prefecture Bets on 'Right to Life' in Constitutional Dispute With Country," a

reference to Ota's claim that forced land use violated the constitutional guarantee of a "right to life." The lead paragraph explains Ota's position:

The national side is acting from the perspective that it has an obligation to offer base land to the American military. This is based on the Status of Forces Agreement which is part of the United States Japan Security Treaty. [The central government claims that] by refusing his administrative duty to act as the proxy signatory on the leases, Governor Ota has "caused extreme damage to the national interest." The prefecture's side emphasizes that "In the case where national interest and prefectural interests are in conflict, the governor, who was elected by the people, has the right to give preference to the prefecture's interests and reject his administrative duty." At the same time, they are challenging the constitutionality [of the proxy signature law] based on the fact that the prefectural people's "right to peaceful existence" is being threatened by the fact that, of all American military installations, 75 percent are concentrated [in Okinawa], where accidents and incidents are frequent (*"Murayama Shushō, Ota Chiji o Teiso"*).

Related stories on subsequent pages all take an adversarial stance against the central government and make the governor's fight the cause of all Okinawans: "Prefecture's 'Thorough Counter-Attack' Supported" (*"Ken no Tettei Kōsen" o Shien*), reads the headline on installment seven of the *Shimpo's* latest news analysis series, "Heavy Base Pressure" (*"Kichi Jūatsu"*). "Prime Minister's Suit Violates the Constitution," "Emphasis on Legality of Refusal: Prefectural People's rights Protected" read two of the headlines on page two.

While the *Shimpo* focused on Ota's attempt to make the suit about the constitution, the Okinawa Times emphasized the issue of prefectural vs. national interests: "Disputed Point is 'Public Interest' Interpretation" (*"Sōten wa*

'*Kōeki' Kaishaku*'). Like the *Shimpo*, the *Okinawa Times* also ran a series of related articles on pages two and three. Across the top of its second and third pages ran the warning, "Government Pressed to Walk 'Tightrope' by Making Local Autonomy the Central Issue." Under this large umbrella headline ran a number of smaller stories. "Okinawa's Pain Goes to Court: Emphasis also on Property Rights Violations," read one. "'Are the Prefectural People Defendants?' A Complaint," ("*Kenmin wa Hikoku Ka' to Hinan*") read the headline on a roundup of comments from around the prefecture. In this story a representative of the *Kōmeitō Okinawa (Okinawa Clean Government Party)* suggests that by suing Ota, the people's representative, the central government has put all Okinawans on trial. In "Socialist Party Okinawa Holds Emergency Press Conference: Demands Resignation of Prime Minister who has Personally Negated History," members of Murayama's party distance themselves from his action by saying they remain committed to the party's historic anti-base position.

### **Mainland Newspapers React to Suit**

The *Yomiuri Shimbun* paid scant attention to the start of legal action against Ota, giving the story just three paragraphs on the front page of its December 7, 1995 evening edition. A related news analysis story ran on page two of the same edition. For the *Yomiuri* the important point was explaining to readers the relevance of the Local Autonomy Law as it was being interpreted by

Murayama to give the central government the right to compel Ota to sign the leases (*"Okinawa Chiji o Teiso"*). Ota's attempt to make the fight about the constitution was not mentioned.

The *Asahi Shimbun* framed the story with much greater sympathy for the Okinawan perspective. The story, "Nation Sues Okinawa Governor" (*"Kuni, Okinawa Chiji o Teiso"*) ran as the top news on the front page of the *Asahi's* December 7 morning edition. The story not only presents the legalistic basis for the government's case, as does the *Yomiuri Shimbun*, but also gives sympathetic explanation of Ota's arguments that the unfair concentration of the bases in Okinawa violates the prefectural people's constitutional rights.

The *Asahi Shimbun's* much greater sensitivity to the Okinawan perspective than the *Yomiuri Shimbun* was further demonstrated in a series of seven special reports, "Okinawa: Behind the Anger" which sought to explain the base issue from an Occupation Model perspective. For example, the first of these, "Governor Ota: War-Dead Friends Have Remained in My Heart for '50 years,' No Longer Will We be the Sacrifice," (*"Tomo no Senshi o Kokoro ni '50 Nen' mō Suteishi ni Sasenu"*) allowed Ota to present a critical recitation of the history of mainland-Okinawa relations in which he explains why Okinawans "distrust the central government more than the American military" (*"Tomo no Senshi"*). Part two, "Bases and Economics: Now a Factor in Obstructing Growth" (*"Kichi Keizai: Mohaya Seichō no Sogai Yōin ni"*), presented the Occupation Model proposition that the bases, while once important to the

economy, now stand in the way of economic development. Nonetheless, such stories remained outnumbered by reports that took an uncritical look at government policies toward the Okinawa problem.

The mainland newspapers followed a similar pattern when the Fukuoka High Court's decision was announced. The *Yomiuri* ran the verdict news on the front page of its March 25 evening edition, but reserved the top story spot for the resignation of the head of the Tokyo Broadcasting System (TBS). The network president quit after it became known that TBS had given the *Aum Shinrikyō* religious cult information that may have facilitated the murder of a lawyer who was investigating the group. The *Asahi Shimbun* made the decision its top story of its evening edition. What is more, several related stories on pages two, three, and 16 attempted to explain Okinawan anger over the verdict from a local perspective.

### **Okinawa Newspapers Respond to the High Court's Ruling**

The American newspapers may have believed that a ruling against the governor was a foregone conclusion, but the Okinawan newspapers reacted to the news with shock and disappointment. The *Fyukyu Shimpō* issued a special one page afternoon edition with the banner headline, "Governor Ordered 'Sign as Proxy'" (*"Chiji ni 'Dairishomei' Meirei"*). The *Okinawa Times* reserved the

news for its regular evening edition but also ran a banner headline across the entire page: "Governor Completely Loses Suit" ("*Chiji Zenmen Haiso*").

While both the *Yomiuri* and the *Asahi* had portrayed the court as sympathetic to Okinawa, noting that the judge had admonished the central government to find a way to ease the burden on the prefecture, the Okinawan newspapers chose to portray the courts as uncaring and misguided. A news analysis piece on the front page of the *Shimpo's* special edition, "Solidification of Bases' Approved," accuses the court of overstepping the bounds of its jurisdiction in its ruling:

The governor's request that the heavy burden of 50 years be lifted from Okinawa has been rejected by the Fukuoka High Court, which emphasized instead the importance of the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty. Even though it was outside the range of their judgment, the court stepped in and accepted the prime minister's highly political position, saying that "the law allowing the forced use of land for the stationing of American forces cannot be considered unconstitutional" ("*Kichi Koteika' Yō nin*").

Another huge banner headline ran across pages two and three, "The 'Heart of Okinawa' Crushed in Decision Removed from Public Opinion" ("*Seron Kara Yūri no Hanketsu Kudakareta 'Okinawa no Kokoro'*"), served as an umbrella head for several stories with headlines such as "The Prefectural People's '50 years of Heavy Pressure' Dismissed: Prefectural Legal Team Exudes Vexation" ("*Kenmin no 'Jūatsu no 50 Nen' Isshū*"); "In and Outside the Courtroom The Voices of Anger" ("*Hōtei Naigai de Ikari no Koe*"); "Prefectural



People are also Extremely Disappointed. . . : "'Harsh' Says the Governor Again and Again" (*"Kenmin mo Sōtō Shitsubō. . ." Chiji 'Kibishii' Kurikaesu*).

In the weeks that followed, Ota's position as local hero would be temporarily usurped by Chibana, whose demand to enter his property that was "illegally occupied" by the American military would dominate the front pages of both newspapers.

### **American Coverage of the Clinton-Hashimoto Summit**

During the entire study period from September 1995 to April 1996, the Washington Post ran nearly one third of all its stories about Okinawa, 11 reports, during just the one week from April 13 through 19, the period surrounding the Clinton-Hashimoto summit. The *New York Times* ran seven stories and two editorials, about one fifth of its Okinawa coverage, during the same period.

This lopsided attention demonstrates the way in which American newspapers tend to use the president as a means of personalizing world events. Complicated and remote issues are made more accessible by showing how they relate to the president, a familiar character in the lives of all Americans. The president's involvement in a variety of otherwise unrelated issues also provides journalists with a way to make a variety of otherwise unrelated news events converge into a single unfolding drama. This was no

less true for the complicated issues surrounding the Okinawa base issue.

Unfortunately, this journalistic convention also makes it much more likely that reporters will frame their stories (especially international news) in terms of the presidential discourse on the subject.

This is true of the American reporting on the Clinton-Hashimoto summit, in which American reporters tended to form their stories by recontextualizing Okinawan dissent and alternative perspectives on the base issue into the established hierarchy of Security and Cooperation Model propositions that were championed by the two leaders. These include the overall implication that the concessions to Okinawa, such as the “closing” of Futenma Marine Base, have solved the base issue without decreasing America's overall presence in Asia, and that reinterpreting the rules for Japanese involvement in American military peacekeeping operations made for a better, more even partnership between the two countries.

### **Concessions to Okinawans**

News that Futenma would be returned to Okinawa was announced on April 12, to pave the way for Clinton's arrival in Japan on April 15. Writing for the *Washington Post*, husband and wife team Jordan and Sullivan declared, “The dramatic announcement by U.S. Ambassador Walter F. Mondale and Japanese Prime Minister Ryutaro Hashimoto, carried live on national television,

solves the most contentious issue between the United States and Okinawa" (Jordan and Sullivan, April 13, 1996). The story mentions that the base will be relocated, but not the fact that a condition of its closing is that Futenma be moved to a new location within the prefecture.

Three days later, in the rare page one story, "U.S. to Trim 11 Bases in Okinawa," Jordan and Sullivan again write excitedly about the details of the agreement to be signed by Clinton and Hashimoto. The agreement called not only for Futenma to be returned but also for the relocation of "a hospital, housing, huge communication antennas and a runway" (Jordan and Sullivan, April 16, 1996).

This news is followed by a string of quotes from Defense Secretary Perry lauding the base reduction deal. Seeming to have forgotten his earlier hard stance against reducing the bases, Perry says, "Why didn't we do this a year ago, five years ago, ten years ago?" (Jordan and Sullivan, April 16, 1996). Suggesting that all has been solved Perry says, "It was a wake up call. . .it caused us to look hard and very seriously at this question. . .I think it had a happy ending" (Jordan and Sullivan, April 16, 1996).

It is not until nine paragraphs into the story that an Okinawan voice is heard, and then only a single positive word is given a direct quote:

Okinawan Governor Masahide Ota, the leading critic of the U.S. military here, said he was "grateful" for today's announcement, but said it did not go far enough. Ota has demanded that all bases on the island be closed by 2015 (Jordan and Sullivan, April 16, 1996).

This is immediately recontextualized back into the Security Model by a quote from Mondale that makes Ota sound unreasonable:

"Most of the questions we get assume that there's some burden-less answer to the presence of American forces—some way to fly planes that don't make noise, guns that are silent, troops that can't be seen," U.S. Ambassador Walter F. Mondale said. "We've tried to do every possible thing we could do to be good neighbors in Okinawa. But we still need readiness ... if you don't have that, you don't have an alliance" (Jordan and Sullivan, April 16, 1996).

A second voice on behalf of either of the anti-base models is the Japan Policy Research Institute's Chalmers Johnson, who comments that the deal will not solve the base problem and suggests Congress have hearings on the need for 100,000 troops in Asia. The article contains no voice critical of the expanded role of the Japanese military provided for in the agreement.

Johnson's weak comment is followed by more details of what is to be returned to Okinawa. In a detail that seems to tie up another loose end, the reader is told that "a grocer [Chibana] who owns a small parcel under the Sobe antenna refused to renew his lease when it expired on March 31. He will get his land back" (Jordan and Sullivan, April 16, 1996). The article ends by giving the erroneous impression that the deal will also end resentment over the bases' wide-open spaces visible from highly congested Okinawan towns:

Visitors to Okinawa are struck by the spacious U.S. bases, with lawns and golf courses and trees, surrounded by cramped Japanese neighborhoods. Under the new plan, military housing will be consolidated and personnel moved to new high-rise buildings, closer to the local standard" (Jordan and Sullivan, April 16, 1996).

In fact, the deal makes only a small dent in the amount of sprawling lawns, golf courses, and trees within island bases.

The *New York Time's* Kristof makes a less enthusiastic and more cautious assessment of the deal, noting in "U.S. and Japan Agree on Plan to Cut Back Okinawa Bases," that given the fact that the bases must be transferred elsewhere in Japan and that no other Japanese cities want them [apparently he is unaware that most of the base functions must remain in the prefecture] "it is not entirely clear that the land will be handed back quite on schedule" (Kristof, April 15, 1996). The Clinton-Hashimoto agreement is expected to "ease hostility among Okinawans to the American military bases," he says. However, later he notes, "Another question is if the return of the bases will ease opposition to the American military or further demands for cutbacks" (Kristof, April 15, 1996).

### **Guidelines Agreement**

Kristof is less critical in his assessment of changes in the guidelines for United States–Japan military cooperation. In his stories he demonstrates the attitude that it is about time Japan did more in its own defense. This is apparent

in the headline of one of several stories he wrote on the subject, "Finally, Japan May have a Future in the Military," it reads. The Clinton Hashimoto summit may be remembered, Kristof writes, "as a milestone—the occasion when Japan took the first steps on a long journey to exorcise the ghost of war and take up a role in international security" (Kristof, April 21, 1996). As Kristof's news discourse progresses it sounds more and more as if he is paraphrasing Nye's 1995 *Foreign Affairs* article, "The Case for Deep Engagement." However, the words are his and not attributed to any particular source. Compare Kristof's news discourse with that of the report:

**Kristof:**

For thousands of years, at least since the rise of Sparta triggered the Peloponnesian wars, nothing has been so disruptive to international order as the friction that comes with the rise of new powers. And there has never been a rising power quite on the scale of China (Kristof, April 21, 1996).

**Nye:**

As Thucydides wrote nearly 2,500 years ago, the real cause of the Peloponnesian War was the rise in power of Athens and the fear that created in Sparta. Similarly, an emergent France was the cause of turmoil in early nineteenth-century Europe.... Asia today is marked by the rise and fall of great powers (Nye, February 1995, p. 91).

## Japanese Coverage of the Summit

Much like the American newspapers, the *Yomiuri Shimbun* framed the results of the Clinton-Hashimoto summit as positive breakthroughs in securing the future of the United States-Japan alliance. The first major story to come out of the approaching summit was the announcement that Futenma would be returned to Okinawa. The *Yomiuri* made the news the top story of its April 13, 1995 evening edition (*'Futenma' Zenmen Henkan de Gōi*). Two days later, a detailed explanation of the SACO recommendations for consolidating the bases on Okinawa by 20 percent would also get front page treatment (*"Okinawa Kichi 20% Henkan"*).

However, neither story contained any analysis of the significance of the reductions or any comments from Okinawans. The closest the *Yomiuri* came to such analysis was a page two story on April 16, which emphasized that Ota now faced the difficult job of finding new sites within the prefecture for some of the facilities to be returned (*"'Kennai Iten' Chiji ni Omoni"*).

The *Asahi* also made news of the Futenma deal its top story. It differed greatly from the *Yomiuri* in providing space for Okinawa reaction. However, it is still largely a positive appraisal of the government's actions. Ota is quoted as saying:

The return of Futenma, which is right in the center of a city and poses a great danger to life, is the thing we most wanted. The fact that we have

realized the return during this tense international situation shows that the government is seriously trying to tackle this problem. We really wanted an unconditional return, but given the current situation, that is too much to ask. [Accepting the condition that the base be relocated within the prefecture] is the least dangerous way of ensuring that this first step in solving the problem is carried out (*"Futenma 5-7 Nen Inai ni Henkan"*).

Unlike the *Yomiuri Shimbun*, the *Asahi* followed up on its front page story with a page-31 analysis of how the Okinawa citizen movement made the base-return deal a reality. "The Shouts of Okinawa Brought Down the Wall" (*"Okinawa no Sakebi Kabe Kuzushita"*) focuses on the joy Okinawans felt at the news that the base would be returned, but also on their disappointment at the conditions attached: "Step by step toward a solution,' says Ota, but 'Cooperating with the relocation will be difficult'" (*"Okinawa no Sakebi Kabe Kuzushita"*).

### **Okinawan Frames**

In Okinawa, the week of April 13 though 19 was a period of banner headlines and full page special reports in both the *Okinawa Times* and the *Ryukyu Shimpo*. While the mood was definitely one of celebration over the news that Futenma would be finally be closed, the elation was tempered by regret over the conditions attached to the deal and the message that this was just the beginning of a long fight. There was a sense of confusion in the headlines of this week over how to interpret the momentous events, a feeling



summed up in the headline across page two of the April 15 *Shimpo*, "Joy, Dissatisfaction, Thought Vary" (*"Yorokobi, Fuman Omoi Samazama"*).

On the day the Futenma agreement was announced, the banner headline across the top of the April 13 *Okinawa Times* front page resembled those of the mainland, "Futenma Base to be Completely Returned" (*"Futenma Kichi o Zenmen Henkan"*). However, the large headline under the banner gave the story a definite Okinawan flavor, "Governor Ota: The First Step toward a Bright 21st Century: Momentum Toward the Idea of [Becoming] an International Capital" (*"21 Seiki e Akarui Daiippo"*). The headline conveys both a sense of excitement and the realization that true victory is still a long way in the future.

Across the top of page two of the same issue joy is replaced with frustration, in the full page headline, "Relocation Within the Prefecture Met with mixed Responses" (*"Kennai Isetsu ni Fukuzatsu na Hannō"*). Under this umbrella headline, the voices from various segments of Okinawan society receive their own headlines that express their disappointment: "The Attachment of Conditions a Concern," "The Content is Insufficient." The news that Kadena Town might receive the relocated base drew the response, "Kadena Resists New Burden" (*"Kadena nado Aratana Futan ni Hanpatsu"*); "First Step Forward Welcomed,Voices [are] also [heard that] Relocation Within Prefecture Will Invite Confusion" (*"Ippo Zenshin to Kangeki: Kennai Isetsu wa Konran Maneku Koe mo"*).

In contrast to Perry's comment, it was widely accepted by the American newspapers that the Futenma agreement was a "happy ending" to the base issue. Inside the Okinawan newspapers the word "*hanpatsu*" (opposition) appeared again and again in headlines of both the *Ryukyu Shimpo* and *Okinawa Times*. So did the word "*tekkyo*" (withdrawal) as more and more voices insisted that moving the bases within the prefecture was unacceptable and that a base-free Okinawa was still the goal. On the day Clinton arrived in Okinawa to finalize the base reduction deal, a banner headline across two community news pages quoted Ota's comments that day: "The Only Strategy for Solution is. . .Base Withdrawal, Says the Loud Voice of the People " (*"Kore Ijō no Kaiketsusaku wa. . .Shiminra Kowadaka ni Kichi Tekkyo"*).

### **Reaffirmation of the Security Treaty**

News about the reaffirmation of the Security Treaty and the expanded cooperation between JSDF and American forces under the new ACSA agreement were nearly obscured in the *Okinawa Times* and *Ryukyu Shimpo* by both papers' intense week-long coverage of the Futenma-related issues. However, both newspapers did devote several stories each to the issue on April 17, the day the two heads of state issued their joint statement. Both papers framed the changes in the bilateral relationship as a dangerous move toward continued oppression of Okinawa—the Occupation model.

"A Deviation From the Constitutional Bounds': The Strengthening of the Military System a Danger" (*"Kempō no Han'i o Itsudatsu"*) read the headline on the national news page of the *Okinawa Times*. This round-up of prefectural opinion on the leaders' joint statement focused entirely on negative opinion. It begins:

"It's a divergence from the Constitution," "It's connected to making the bases more permanent." Opposition to the U.S.-Japan heads of state's joint statement is heard from various individuals and groups within the prefecture. The agreement on the mid-term report [of SACO] in which Futenma will be completely returned and American facilities inside the prefecture reduced by 20 percent has moved the Okinawa base problem rapidly forward. However, the joint statement, which characterizes the Asian situation as "unstable and uncertain" emphasizes the importance of the Okinawan bases. The prefectural people, who view this statement as a large turning point, express their fear that the "Security Treaty's military system" will be greatly strengthened (*"Kempō no Han'i o Itsudatsu"*).

A similar story, "Voices of Warning Regarding Redefining the Security Treaty," (*"Ampo Saiteigi ni Keikai no Koe"*) ran in the *Ryukyu Shimpō*. In fact, the *Ryukyu Shimpō* and *Okinawa Times* coverage of the summit remained nearly identical throughout the week.

A much wider gap existed between the framing practices of the *Asahi Shimbun* and the *Yomiuri Shimbun* with regard to the Security Treaty. Once again the *Asahi* showed much more sensitivity to the Occupation-Model themes. While most of its reporting focused on the action of the American and Japanese governments, "Security Treaty, Bases' Fear Also Exists They Will Be

Strengthened" ("*Ampo, Kichi, Kyōka no Fuan mo*"), a story which ran on the community page on April 13, gives half a page to the fears of Ota and other Okinawans.

No such negativism exists in the *Yomiuri Shimbun* coverage of the summit, which reserved the most space for generally laudatory discussion of the reaffirmation of the Security Treaty and the expansion of the cooperation guidelines. In all of its stories, this news was framed to reflect the discourse of the president and prime minister, both of whom repeatedly reiterated the propositions of the security model. Few alternative voices were presented.

The *Yomiuri* also lent its own voice to the Security Model with a three-part series of commentary on the significance of the summit titled "U.S. Japan Relationship Questioned: President Clinton Comes to Japan." Part two of this series ran next to the news of the Futenma deal at the top of the paper's April 13 morning edition. Despite the critical-sounding series title, the series' purpose is to provide rationales for strengthening the alliance. Part two, "Greater Importance on Asia: Biggest Topic Now The Consideration of China" dealt with the threat posed by China. The story expressed relief that Hashimoto was prime minister for this summit, since he was more willing to consider China a danger than his socialist predecessor Murayama.

The morning before the summit began, the *Yomiuri Shimbun* ran a preview of the important agenda items for the discussion. Okinawa was not mentioned among the topics. The story, "Affirmation of the role of the 'Regional

Security Treaty': The Asia Situation Stressed," indicates that in post-Cold War Asia, it is no longer possible for Japan to see the Security Treaty simply as pertaining to its protection. The aim of the summit was to recognize that "within the limits of the constitution, Japan must split the burden of carrying out the role of a 'regional Security Treaty'" ("*Chiiki Ampo' no Yakuwari Kakunin*"), that is, it must take a role in American military operations not directly linked to Japanese defense. Although this thought is attributed to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, it is presented not as one of several perspectives, but as common sense.

This theme was continued in the *Yomiuri's* report on the results of the discussions with two related stories under a single headline, "Alliance Relationship At 'Mature' Stage" ("*Dōmei Kankei 'Seijuku' no Dankai*"). The first of these two stories, "The Roles of Both Sides Recognized," focuses on a point made in the meeting that Japan must take a more active role in cooperating on defense. "Until now," the prime minister is quoted as saying, "we have not thought about what we would do in an emergency. (Within the law) we have to start thinking about what we can do" ("*Sōhō no Yakuwari o Kakunin*"). The second story, "Regarding Discussing the Legal Problem of 'Emergencies': The Three Ruling Parties Voice Their Cooperation" tells the reader that the rest of the government is on board with Hashimoto's plan to discuss an expanded military role for Japan.

## **Case Study Conclusions**

When reporting on Governor Ota's refusal to use his authority to force the renewal of leases for base property held by a group of "Anti-War Landlords" the Okinawan newspapers followed a pattern similar to that of their coverage of the 1995 schoolgirl rape. Demonstrating a common-sense acceptance of Occupation Model propositions regarding mainland Japan's historic discrimination against Okinawa, the *Okinawa Times* and *Ryukyu Shimpo* generally lauded Ota as the prefecture's hero for standing up to the demands of the central government.

When Prime Minister Murayama sued Ota to force him to sign the leases, the Okinawa newspapers gave preference to explaining Ota's counter-attack strategy, in which he argued that the bases were unconstitutional. Familiar Occupation propositions were repeated again and again in these stories—having 75 percent of all American military facilities on Okinawa is unfair, the bases are an unending source of crime, accidents, pollution, etc. This was done not for informational purposes (these ideas were well known to Okinawans) but instead as a means of locating the governor's actions within the hierarchy of Occupation model propositions.

Okinawan coverage of the Clinton-Hashimoto summit in April 1995 largely focused on the deal to return Futenma Marine Base and other facilities to the prefecture and to reduce by 20 percent the total space occupied by the

military. However, rather than reporting this agreement as the conclusion of the Okinawan struggle, both the *Okinawa Times* and *Ryukyu Shimpo* focused on the discourse of Okinawan elites, who cautioned that the deal was just a first step. The conditions attached to the deal—such as the need to find new locations for American facilities within the prefecture—were reported on as great disappointments and evidence that the central government still did not understand Okinawa.

Both the *Okinawa Times* and *Ryukyu Shimpo* framed the reaffirmation and strengthening of the Security Treaty as a dangerous agreement. This was not because the treaty itself was seen as a threat to peace—an Imperialism model proposition—but because it could cause the unequal distribution of bases in Okinawa to become permanent—an Occupation model fear.

Mainland newspapers' discourse about the controversy over Ota's refusal to sign contested base-land leases took a much different shape. The *Yomiuri* downplayed the significance of Ota's actions in its initial coverage. In fact, it focused on Ota's refusal to cooperate with the central government rather than on his arguments for refusing to sign. The *Asahi* gave the story the most prominent position on its front page and included comments from Ota on his fear that the bases could become permanent. Both newspapers emphasized the small number of contesting landlords. In reporting on the fallout from the governor's actions, both newspapers also focused on the turmoil within the

central government rather than citizen rallies and other activities taking place in Okinawa in support of the governor.

When Murayama sued Ota, the *Yomiuri* gave the action scant attention (three paragraphs on the front page), and emphasized the relevance of the Local Autonomy Law as it was being interpreted by Murayama to give the central government the right to compel Ota to sign the leases. The *Asahi Shimbun* explained the governor's attempt to make the conflict about the constitution, and provided more detail on Okinawan sentiment in related articles on inside pages.

This same gap in framing practices between the two mainland newspapers was also apparent in their coverage of the Clinton-Hashimoto summit and the announcement that Futenma would be returned to Okinawans. The *Yomiuri Shimbun* made the concessions to Okinawa its principal page-one story on the day the Futenma deal became known, and again when additional base reductions were announced as part of the agreement. But it framed the news in terms of its relationship to the coming summit rather than as a victory for Okinawans.

By comparison, the *Asahi Shimbun* complemented its front page report on the Futenma agreement with additional stories inside the edition that linked the deal to the efforts of Ota and the Okinawan citizen movement. This pattern also applied to coverage of the reaffirmation of the Security Treaty, which was uncritically lauded by the *Yomiuri Shimbun*. The same news was more



cautiously reported by the *Asahi Shimbun*, which provided space for Okinawan fears about the agreement's effect on the permanence of the bases.

The *Washington Post* and *New York Times* largely ignored Ota's refusal to sign the contested Anti-War Landlord leases. Neither newspaper reported on Ota's announcement on the day it occurred. Instead, both wove the news into other reports on the base issue in general. Overall, the *New York Times* provided more space to the voices of dissent among Okinawans than did the *Washington Post*. However, in the end, both newspapers focused mainly on American government attitudes and interpretations of the situation.

This was particularly true during the Hashimoto-Clinton summit, which resulted in the most intense period of reporting on the base issue for both newspapers. This demonstrated the American media's preference for interpreting international affairs through the person of the president, a practice that necessarily favors elite discourses. As a result, Security Model themes dominated the coverage of this event in both the *Washington Post* and *New York Times*. Both newspapers treated the return of Futenma and other concessions to Okinawa as the resolution of the base problem. The reaffirmation of the Security Treaty and expansion of United States-Japan rules for military cooperation were reported as positive breakthroughs.

In the following chapter, I will discuss these differences in framing practice among all six newspapers within the context of my research questions and thesis.

## **CHAPTER 7**

### **SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS**

My central thesis for this dissertation was that, during the period of intense media coverage of the Okinawa base issue from September 1995 to April 1996, newspaper reporters in the United States, mainland Japan, and Okinawa "framed" their stories in ways that supported the ideological hegemony of cultural elites within their particular societies.

To test this thesis, I devised four related sets of research questions: 1) What is ideology and how is it related to culture and discourse? Can the journalistic practice of framing be understood in terms of discourse? 2) What are the ideologies of the cultural elite in the United States, mainland Japan, and Okinawa with regard to American military bases in Japan? Can these ideologies and their relationships to each other be represented in a systematic way? 3) Are there cultural or structural conditions within the print media of the three areas that would predispose reporters to favor one discourse or ideology over another? And, 4) Can a journalistic preference for elite ideologies be demonstrated through an examination of newspaper texts.

In this chapter, I will review my answers to each of these research questions and explain how these answers prove the dissertation thesis. I will also offer some suggestions for further research.

## **Definition of Terms**

### **Ideology and Hegemony**

In Chapter 2, I explained how my understanding of ideology" and "hegemony" was influenced by the work of theorists such as Antonio Gramsci, Louis Althusser and Raymond Williams. Gramsci viewed ideology as the means by which the ruling classes convinced working classes to accept State domination. By the "State" he meant that diffuse set of institutions that had a vested interest in maintaining status quo power relationships. Gramsci believed State "hegemony" was maintained through the constant winning over of the working classes through persuasion. As Marx before him, Gramsci saw ideology as a product of underlying economic systems.

Althusser removed the idea of ideology from traditional Marxism by rejected this economic essentialism. He argued that ideology as historically constructed patterns of living was a force unto itself with the power to create individual subjectivities. However, since individual identity could only be constructed through the dominant ideology there was no room in his theory for resistance to power.

Williams's theory of ideology is similar to Althusser's concept of a "lived system of meaning." However, he combines this with Gramsci's idea of hegemony, thus providing for resistance to power. Williams sees hegemony as

the constant negotiations between dominant and subordinate cultural groups for the maintenance of status quo power relationships.

I accept ideology as a lived mental model of reality, a kind of culture through which individuals construct their identities. I understand cultural elites in much the same way that Gramsci imagined the State, as a diffuse set of entities with an interest in the preservation of existing power structures. I also believe that cultural elites must maintain their hegemony over dominated groups through the continual reaffirmation and renegotiation of their models of reality, their ideology. As do many linguist and media scholars, I see this process carried out in discourse.

### **Discourse and Framing**

I accept Fairclough's (1995) definition of discourse as both a "communicative event"—a concept most common in linguistics—and the language of a particular mental model or accepted set of social knowledge—a post-structuralist concept. Newspapers fulfill both these discursive functions. The act of reading a newspaper is a communicative event between writer and reader in which information is transmitted and consumed. However, that information is not transmitted without context. The writer must transform these events and facts into a "story." Each story relates to, and helps update and refine, a particular mental model of reality, which is usually shared by reader and writer.

What is more, the work of reporting—especially on topics with international dimensions—requires the reporter to negotiate a variety of discourses (plural). That is, the reporter must interpret the language of sources and subjects who often view the same sets of facts from within models of reality quite different from the writer's own. The news story that emerges is a chain of discourses, all of which are subsumed into or recontextualized as a primary news discourse.

I argue that this process of recontextualization of divergent discourses into a primary news discourse is consistent with the process of "framing" as it was conceived by sociologist Erving Goffman (1974) and applied to news by media analysts such as Todd Gitlin (1980). The principal news discourse that emerges from the recontextualizing of other discourses is what I recognize as the "frame" of a particular story.

The connection between "frame analysis" and "discourse analysis" is most clear in the similarity between Goffman and Gitlin's concepts of frames, and van Dijk's concept of models. Goffman defines a frame as a system of "entities, postulates, and rules" (p.21) into which people incorporate new "strips" of information and occurrences. Gitlin suggests that a news frame is a system of "little tacit theories about what exists, what happens, and what matters" (p. 6-7). Van Dijk (1988) defines models as hierarchies of "scripts" (p.21), which are themselves "Organized sets of proposition" and "attitudes," into which new information is added when a reporter attempts to make sense of the world.

I argue that a story's frame becomes ideological when the news discourse that defines it emerges from, and acts to naturalize (to treat as common sense) the propositions and attitudes that constitute the models of reality attached to cultural elites . This does not mean that reporters are intentionally ideological. Ideology remains invisible to both the reader and writer when the subjectivity of both is constructed through the elite models.

### **Ideological Models of the Okinawa Base Issue**

In chapter 3, I answer to the second research question—what are the ideologies of the elite in the United States, mainland Japan, and Okinawa with regard to American military bases in Japan, and can these ideologies and their relationships to each other be represented in a systematic way? I demonstrated that the major propositions and attitudes regarding the Okinawa base issue during the study period can be organized into four principal models. Two of these models—which I call the Security and Cooperation Models—are pro-base. Two models—which I define as the Occupation and Imperialism Models—are anti-base. The Security and Imperialism Models define group identity in terms of threats and Others outside the United States-Japan alliance. The Occupation and Cooperation Models define group identity in terms of power relationships inside the alliance.

## **The Security Model**

American elites, particularly those within the Clinton Administration, tend to define the Okinawa base issue in terms of the propositions and attitudes of the Security Model. They contend that despite the end of the Cold War, Asia remains an unpredictable and potentially unstable region. A potentially aggressive China and North Korea symbolize this dangerous uncertainty. They argue that an American pullout or draw-down in the region could not only encourage an arms race or armed conflict, but could also disrupt the free flow of essential Asian trade.

American elites believe that the United States has an obligation to deal with this uncertainty because of its historic role as a stabilizing influence in the region. What is more, because it defines the boundaries of the region as including all of the Pacific, the Clinton Administration argues that America's Pacific states and territories give to America a territorial interest in the region. To ensure stability, a "forward presence" of no greater than 100,000 troops is necessary. The bases on Okinawa, which station 28,000 of these troops, are essential.

The attitude of this model toward American troops in Okinawa is that they are disciplined and committed men and women gallantly willing to live apart from their homes and loved ones in order to carry out their duty to protect

American and Japanese interests. Those Americans who commit crimes or careless accidents are unrepresentative of the military as a whole.

### **The Occupation Model**

Elites Within Okinawa, particularly members of the administration of former Governor Masahide Ota, view the Okinawa base issue from the Occupation Model. This model is largely unconcerned with outside dangers. Instead, it views the bases themselves as the biggest threat to Okinawan peace and happiness. Those who see the world in terms of this model believe the land on which the bases sit was stolen from Okinawans by Americans using "bayonets and bulldozers." This theft continues today with the Japanese government forcing landlords to renew their leases with the American military. The occupation of prime real estate by these bases is believed to hinder Okinawan economic development. It is also seen as contributing to urban sprawl, which decreases safety and the quality of life of Okinawans.

The Occupation Model views the American military as having an "occupation mentality," which causes it to value military operations over the needs, desires or safety of its Okinawan hosts. Okinawan elites argue that military planes create intense noise pollution, and occasionally disrupt or even claim lives by crashing. American live-fire exercises denude the hillsides and cause run-off that kills ocean coral, parachute drops have sent troops and



equipment into residential areas, resulting in property damage and civilian deaths.

Within this model, American servicemen are seen as arrogant, reckless, lascivious, rude and indifferent to the rights of Okinawans. These characteristics cause them to commit crime and become involved in accidents. This situation is exacerbated by the Status of Forces Agreement, which is seen as giving Americans extraterritorial rights that encourage them to break the law.

### **The Cooperation Model**

Mainland Japanese elites, who avoided discussion of Security Model themes throughout the Cold War, tend still to view the Okinawa base issue in terms of the Cooperation Model. This model is also favored by American military leaders in Japan who must routinely justify their presence in Okinawa to Okinawans in terms of benefits more tangible than security theory. Within Okinawa, members of (then-)opposition parties and some business and labor organizations also view the base issue from this perspective.

Like the Occupation Model, the Cooperation Model looks inward. However, it views the bases not as a threat, but instead as a benefit to Okinawa, mainland Japan and the United States. Rather than hindering economic development, the bases are seen as providing millions of dollars each year in rent on land that might otherwise sit idle. What is more, the bases provide

employment for Okinawans in the form of thousands of high-paying on-base jobs, and through contracts with Okinawa companies for labor and service. As compensation for housing the bases, the central government provides Okinawa with millions of dollars more in direct aid and public-works subsidies than it gives to any other prefecture.

Having bases in Okinawa is beneficial to Americans, who save billions of dollars in operating costs that are paid by the Japanese Central Government. America saves several billion dollars more by being able to maintain an East Asian presence from nearby rather than from mainland America (O'Hanlon, p. 155). The United States-Japan security relationship also benefits Japan by allowing it to maintain Article Nine of its "peace constitution" without having to consider the need for, or ramifications and costs of, expanding its Self Defense Forces.

Cooperation-Model adherents insist the military follows stricter pollution rules than do Japanese companies. They also dismiss the Occupation model discourse on crime and accidents by noting that the rates of both are lower for American military personnel on the island than for Okinawans themselves. Instead, they emphasize the ways in which the military is attempting to be a "good neighbor" and friend to Okinawa.

## **The Imperialism Model**

Some Imperialism Model themes were occasionally present in the discourse of Ota and his supporters. However, most of those who view reality in terms of this model, such as the Japan Communist Party and radical pacifists, do not have the elite status of many of those who see the world in terms of one of the other three models discussed above.

Like the Security Model, the Imperialism model looks outward. However, the central script of this model is that militaries equal militarism, not deterrence or defense. The Imperialism Model emphasizes the lack of any clear enemy for Japan in the post–Cold War era. The Security-Model concepts of uncertainty and the dangers of "rogue" nations such as North Korea are viewed as ruses meant to conceal the true purpose of the bases, which is to promote American hegemony in Asia.

A central proposition of the Imperialism model is that the United States military is not in Japan to defend the country, but instead to use Japan as a launching pad for military intervention into the affairs of other nations. Those who see the world in terms of this model argue that Japan involves itself in wars not of its making, and becomes a target for retaliation, by being a partner in American military adventurism. They believe true peace and security can only come to Okinawa if the island returns to its historic role as a weaponless center for international trade.

## **Structural and Cultural Characteristics in the Media**

In Chapter 4, I answered the question of whether cultural or structural conditions within the print media of the three areas predispose reporters to favor one or another of the above ideological models.

My research shows that Okinawan newspapers have a history of supporting elite powers, dating back to the *Ryukyu Shimpo's* support for the prefectural governor appointed by Meiji oligarchs to Japanize the island. The *Shimpo* supported the Japanese military government during World War II, the post-war American military government, and later the pro-American civilian government. In the 1960s, power again began to shift, this time toward anti-base, pro-reversion elites. The *Okinawa Times*, a post-war newspaper company, began to take a commanding lead in island readership by aligning itself ideologically with the pro-reversion leaders. In response, the *Shimpo* also changed from its pro-American editorial policy to support for reversion and base withdrawal. Today, the Okinawa newspapers and American military cooperate with each other, but in a climate of mutual distrust and suspicion.

The mainland's *Asahi Shimbun* and *Yomiuri Shimbun* are also tainted by their support for the Japanese military during World War II. Throughout much of their post-war history these two newspapers attempted to atone for their militaristic past by adopting ardently pacifist positions. In recent decades, the

*Yomiuri Shimbun* has attempted to garner readers and distinguish itself from the newspaper pack by adopting a more conservative editorial policy.

Several shared cultural characteristics incline both mainland and Okinawan newspapers toward elite models of reality. For example, a value on harmony makes investigative reporting on government a rare occurrence in newspapers throughout Japan. Political scandal often must travel a round-about way through the tabloid press and occasionally the foreign media before arriving in the Japanese mainstream newspapers.

A variety of structural characteristics also incline the Japanese media toward government frames. Chief among these is the *kisha*-club system, in which government agencies control the flow of information by only providing members of their official press clubs with news releases and briefings. Under the system of *ban* (beat) reporting, journalists and the political source they are assigned to cover full-time sometimes develop close personal relationships. Often, information on certain topics is provided by the source to the reporter on the condition that other information the reporter learns will remain secret.

The Japanese newspaper practice of providing new reporters with on-the-job training contributes to the problem of "corporate journalism." Journalists learn from their superiors which editorial positions and attitudes are acceptable within the company's philosophy. The problem of overly-homogeneous news values and perspectives is exacerbated by the Japanese

newspaper practice of not providing reporter bylines and by their hiring only reporters who are graduates of the same three or four elite universities.

American journalists in Japan face a different set of structural problems that incline them toward official discourses. American reporters are generally based in Tokyo, but are expected to cover not only Japan but also Korea and parts of Southeast Asia as well. What is more, news from the Tokyo bureau must compete for space on the international page with news from hot spots around the world. As a result, events are often not considered newsworthy until they have already spun out of control. American reporters usually frame such situations in terms of how the American government will respond to them. In addition, a lack of resources and time, often coupled with a poor understanding of the Japanese language, inclines American reporters to return again and again to a handful of accessible sources within the American and Japanese governments. American reporters also have the tendency to report on Japan as a mirror for American values. This often causes them to turn to well established stereotypes and generalities that are already part of their readers' mental models of Japan.

### **Ideology in Newspapers Reporting About the Okinawa Base Issue**

In Chapters 5 and 6, I analyzed newspaper reports from the three areas regarding the Okinawa base issue in an attempt to answer the question of

whether they demonstrated a preference for one of the ideological models identified in Chapter 3.

The data demonstrate that in the areas where elite ideology with regard to the Okinawa base issue was strongest, newspapers framed their stories in ways that clearly demonstrate a preference for elite models of reality. This was particularly the case in Okinawa, where both the *Okinawa Times* and the *Ryukyu Shimpo* constantly favored the Occupation Model discourse of the Ota administration, while at the same time demonstrating a willingness to provide occasional space for Imperialism Model ideas.

Cooperation Model themes were occasionally present in Okinawan stories about American and Japanese responses to Okinawan demands or efforts to decrease the burden of the military on the island. However, all but absent from Okinawan news reporting were those aspects of the Cooperation Model that emphasize the economic and social benefits of the bases to the island. Likewise, Security Model themes were presented in stories about American government statements and actions. However, the Okinawan newspapers often recontextualized these viewpoints back into the Occupation Model discourse by juxtaposing them against more informed- and reasonable-sounding comments from Okinawan elites.

American newspapers showed a primary preference for Security Model propositions and themes. This reflects the Clinton administration's strongly-articulated policy on the necessity of the bases for protecting American strategic

interests in the Pacific-Asia region. Cooperation Model propositions were of secondary importance to the administration and received secondary attention in the press.

Occupation model themes were occasionally presented in American news stories. However, they were often used to add drama to the real focus of the stories, which was the efforts of American and Japanese officials to resolve such Okinawan concerns. Missing from the American news reports was the perspective of the Imperialism Model. This is not surprising since these ideas—popular with communist and socialist activists—are most counter-intuitive to the common-sense assumptions of the Security Model.

The Japanese *kisha* club and *ban* reporting systems predisposed mainland Japanese newspapers toward reporting on the base issue from the perspective of central government responses to Okinawans. Nonetheless, the *Asahi Shimbun* and *Yomiuri Shimbun* exhibited a far greater gap in ideological direction than either the two American or two Okinawan newspapers did among themselves. This is likely because the Japan central government—while exerting strong influence on the press—maintained a contradictory and poorly articulated ideological position regarding the base problem. This vagueness was at least partially the result of the weak coalition government comprised of the ideologically distant Liberal Democrats and Socialists. The lack of ideological articulation by government was also at least partially the legacy of



the central government's evasion of security issue discussion during the Cold War.

### **Contribution to Political Science**

This dissertation contributes to the study of political science in several important ways. First, it provides an means for understanding how the news media, (even those media that operate in liberal democratic societies such as the United States and Japan) help maintain status quo relationships of power by facilitating the hegemony of cultural elites . It accomplishes this, by demonstrating that discourse analysis can be harmoniously combined with more traditional forms of media studies such as frame analysis to illuminate the ideological nature of news reporting and writing.

In the process, this study adds to the knowledge of the under-studied structures and history of Japanese news media, their relationship to government and other institutions of power, to each other and to Western media. This dissertation is particularly important as the first English-language study of any facet of the Okinawan media, their differences and similarities to mainland news organizations and role they play in the struggle against the American military bases in the prefecture. My work has also provided insight into how American news reporters construct images of Japan for Westerners.

On a different level, my study contributes to increased understanding of a major political problem facing the United States—local opposition to American military bases in Okinawa. It does this in two ways. First, it systematically represents the different ideological models through which Americans, Okinawans, and mainland Japanese construct their respective political identities in relation to the bases. By so doing, it provides a clearer picture of complexities of the problem than has previously been available. What is more, my analysis of the news stories provides an in-depth descriptive look at the various political processes that took place during a particularly contentious moment in United States-Japan relations. What emerges is a detailed picture of the intricacies of the bilateral alliance.

### **Suggestions for Future Research**

The most obvious limitation of my study was that it dealt only with newspapers and not with the full range of mass media that were reporting on the base issue. Future researchers may want to compare my results with Okinawan television and radio reports during the same period to see if there is a discernible difference in the ideological direction of each.

My study also provided only a brief sampling of news discourse during a particularly contentious period of United States-Okinawa-Japan relations. It would be useful to compare my results with a study of news reports from other

periods of intense protest such as the reversion in 1972, or with periods of relative calm.

It would also be useful to compare my study of events during the liberal Ota administration with events that followed during the more conservative administration of Governor Keiichi Inamine. For example, the proxy signature and base reduction protests in 1995-1996 could be compared to media coverage of the 1997-1998 controversy over the proposed construction of an off-shore helicopter base to replace Futenma Marine Corps Air Station. Coverage of the 1995 schoolgirl rape could be compared with coverage of the July 2000 assault of a junior high school girl by a marine stationed at Futenma.

While the viewpoints of several American, Okinawan and mainland Japanese journalists were represented in this study, my focus was on news text rather than on reporters or readers. A future researcher may choose to survey and compare the attitudes and backgrounds of reporters. It would also be useful to survey reader opinions and attitudes to see if news discourse has a discernible impact on how citizens in the three areas view the base issue.

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